Early Muslim Expansion Explained in 8 Hours From Yarmouk to Tours

Almost 1400 years ago the ancient and prosperous lands of the Middle East were on the verge of conflict of 3 empires and 3 religions: 2 of them fighting constant, bloody, and fruitless war for centuries, one newcomer looking to put its mark. The newcomer was the Rashidun Caliphate and its arrival would change the history of the region and the world forever. The Roman state was almost constantly at war with the Iranian empires ever since the two entities touched borders in the 60s BC, as the Parthian empire achieved famous victory at Carrhae. The Roman Republic transitioned into the Empire and then this Empire’s Western portion was lost to foreign invasions, leaving only the Eastern Roman Empire, while the Parthian empire was replaced by the Sassanid Empire, but even then these two states continued to fight. In the 3rd century AD, another factor was introduced to these conflicts – the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids. These two Arab tribal confederations migrated from modern Yemen and became the vassal states of the Eastern Roman Empire and the Sassanids respectively. They participated in the Roman-Sassanid wars, often as scouts or raiders detached from the armies, or as light cavalry units within the armies, while also defending both empires from the Arab tribal raids from the south. The populations of these kingdoms worshiped traditional Arab paganism and monophysite Christianity, and the latter created tensions with their suzerains, as the Sassanids were sure that any Christian influence may strengthen their Roman enemies, while the Romans adhered to miaphysite Orthodox Christianity, which considered monophysitism to be heretical. The Roman attempts to suppress monophysitism caused the Ghassanids to rebel against them in the late 6th-early 7th century, and weakened Roman support in the area. On the other hand, religious tensions between the Lakhmids and the Sassanids were compounded by the attempts of shah Khosrow II to control the region directly. In 602 he captured and executed the Lakhmid king Al-Nu'man III, turning the kingdom into province administered by governor. That forced the Lakhmid tribes to ask their Arab brethren to the south for help. Although the allied forces managed to defeat the Sassanid army at Dhi Qar in 609, the Sassanids were able to keep the province under their rule. This sequence of events not only created divided loyalties among the Arab tribes in the region, but effectively stripped the Sassanid border of its traditional buffer. Despite that, the Sassanids were still very strong. In 602 they used the internal strife within the Eastern Roman Empire as pretense to declare war. The Sassanids scored number of impressive victories in the first years of the war, and although the Roman noble Heraclius took the throne in 611 and started to stabilize the situation, he wasn’t able to slow down the enemy completely; by 621 the Sassanids controlled the South Caucasus, the Levant, Egypt and most of Anatolia, which marked the largest extent of their territory. Even though Emperor Heraclius was forced to fight against the Avars in Europe too, he was able to gain some momentum by winning 2 battles against the Sassanids between 622 and 625. According to some sources, Khosrow enlisted all men capable of fighting and turned the tide again: in 626 the army under Shahrbaraz besieged the capital of the empire, Constantinople, supported by the Avars and Sclaveni from Europe. The Roman empire was on the brink of destruction, but the defenders of the capital persevered. This was the turning point in the war, as in 627 Heraclius entered an alliance with the leader of the Western Turkic Khaganate, Tong Yabghu, and together they invaded Iranian heartland. Heraclius defeated the Sassanids at Nineveh in 627, and threatened the capital Ctesiphon in 628, which prompted the nobles to overthrow Khosrow. His son Kavad II became the next shah, and signed peace treaty with Heraclius. The Sassanids paid war indemnity, but otherwise, the conflict achieved nothing, and the two exhausted empires returned to the pre-war borders. Meanwhile to the south, the Arabian Peninsula was going through an upheaval. The population of this peninsula worshipped many religions, from the traditional Arab pagan beliefs to Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity. The Sassanids controlled the province of Mazun and the eastern portion of Yemen, while the deserts in the central and northern parts of the region were ruled by the nomadic Bedouin Arabs. Their brethren resided in the rich merchant city-states in Hijaz. One of these city-states called Mecca was both religious and economic center governed by the Quraysh tribe, trading mostly spices with Axum, the Romans, and the Sassanids. In 570 boy called Muhammad was born in the Quraysh tribe. As young man, Muhammad spent his time as merchant, probably participating in and then leading trade caravans all over the region. As is often the case with traders, Muhammad would meet and converse with members of various religions on his travels. According to the later sources, he started receiving divine revelations sometime in 610. Soon this new prophet began spreading the message of new religion – Islam - in his home city of Mecca. However, the Meccans didn’t receive it well and in 614 they started to persecute adherents of Islam. All this prompted Muhammad and his followers – the Muslims - to emigrate to Medina in 622. This started war between the Muslims and Mecca, and by 629 the latter lost, and was conquered. According to the early Muslim sources, at this point, sometime in 628, Muhammad sent envoys to the neighboring states urging their leaders to join Islam and bow to the one God – Allah. The Sassanid shah Kavad insulted the Muslim envoy, while the one sent to the Romans was killed in Ghassanid territory. This prompted an attack by small Muslim army, which was defeated by the Ghassanids and Romans in September of 629 at Mutah. The same sources claim that Muhammad decided to lead 30,000 strong army into the Byzantine territory to retaliate, and took the city of Tabuk. However, most modern sources do not agree with this account of events. In any case, the conquests of Muhammad in Arabia continued. By 631 most of the Arabian Peninsula was under Muslim control. Muhammad passed away year later. There are conflicting sources regarding the succession process, but one of the closest allies of Muhammad – Abu Bakr - became his successor, with the title of Caliph; he was the first of the Rashidun Caliphs. In the meantime, Kavad II, who became the Sassanid shah in February of 628, immediately started killing his brothers to secure the throne, which resulted in deepening disagreements between the Persian and Parthian nobles. Kavad died of the plague in September, and although his 8-year-old son became the next shah as Ardashir III, the empire was controlled by member of the Parthian clique, the vizier Mahadharjushnas. This deeply concerned the Persian party, and so it allied with Khosrow’s general Shahrbaraz. The latter attacked took the capital in April of 630, killing Ardashir and Mahadharjushnas, and becoming the shah. The Sassanid realm was now in state of civil war. Using all that the governors of Yemen and Mazun declared their independence from Ctesiphon, which made them easy prey for the rising caliphate. Just 40 days after Shahrbaraz took the throne, he was killed and the leader of the Parthian faction, Farrukh Hormizd, raised Khosrow’s daughter Boran to the throne. This first queen in Sassanid history was overthrown by the son of Shahrbaraz, Shapur, few months later. To stop the war between the factions, Farrukh offered marriage between Shapur and another daughter of Khosrow, Azarmidokht, but the latter refused and the noble usurped the throne for himself in the late 630. He would be killed by the supporters of Azarmidokht in 631, after which she took the throne for herself. Farrukh’s son Rostam marched his troops to Ctesiphon to avenge his father, defeating Azarmidokht’s armies along the way. After taking the capital he restored Boran as the queen. The ruling alliance of Boran and Rostam managed to convince the leader of the Persian clique Piruz to stop the hostilities. However, after Rostam left the capital for the frontier, Firuzan killed Boran in June of 632. Rostam then marched for the capital again. According to some sources, the armies of both Firuzan and Rostam were tired of the bloodshed, and forced their generals to reach an accord. One of the last members of the house of Sasan, the 8-year-old grandson of Khosrow II, was crowned as Yazdegerd III. Although the civil war was now over, the Sassanid realm was extremely vulnerable, as the Parthian clique basically controlled the northeastern portion of the empire, while Turkic raiders attacked from the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time, the first Caliph Abu Bakr sent portion of his army under Usama ibn Zaid to raid the Ghassanids in June of 632, possibly checking if the Byzantine frontier was well defended. The death of Muhammad and the departure of this army made big number of newly conquered Arab tribes think that the Caliphate was fragile, and in July all of the Peninsula save for Hijaz rebelled against Abu Bakr in what was called the Ridda War or the War of Apostasy, as many rebel groups were led by people who declared themselves prophets. The situation was most dire around Medina, as the rebels threatened the second most important city of the new realm in late July. However, Abu Bakr swiftly marched to the area and defeated the rebels in early August. That gave enough time for the army, which was sent north and defeated small Ghassanid army around Mu’tah, to return. Abu Bakr proved to be talented commander: instead of uniting his armies and marching on each of the rebel groups separately, which would have allowed the rebels to attack his rear with impunity, he divided his army into smaller groups, and these units attacked the enemies around the Peninsula. This strategy worked to perfection and by March of 633, the Caliph’s rule over the entire region was restored. It is difficult to assess how much the caliphate lost in terms of manpower, but the sources underline that the generals and troops gained invaluable experience in this conflict. While the Ridda Wars were going on, the leader of the Arab Bani Bakr tribe, Muthanna bin Harithah, was raiding the Sassanid territories in southern Iraq. The Sassanid civil wars made this frontier subject to attacks, and Muthanna, who adopted Islam sometime in the 630s, informed Abu Bakr of this fact in early 633. The caliph decided that it is good time to take over Iraq, and one of his main generals during the Ridda Wars – Khalid ibn al-Walid - was ordered to invade the region. Khalid was able to recruit an army of 18,000 at his base at Yamamah and left for Iraq in late March 633. letter was sent to the Sassanid governor of Dast Meisan – Hormozd - demanding his surrender. Hormozd obviously didn’t, but sent letter to the capital, asking shah Yazdegerd III for reinforcements. This letter was probably trick by Khalid, as Hormozd gathered his 20,000 and marched out of the capital of the governorship, Uballa, to defend the crucial road from Yamamah near Kazima. Khalid, however, moved his troops through the desert and threatened Hufeir. The Sassanid leader was informed of this and had to march towards Hufeir via Uballa. According to the Muslim sources, that was exactly what Khalid was hoping would happen; despite the civil wars, Sassanid armies were still stronger, as their armor and weaponry made them superior, and the only tangible advantage Caliph’s forces had was their mobility. Khalid was going to use this mobility to tire the sassanid army. This would become one of the most important elements of the early Muslim expansion – their mobility and aggression were forcing their foe to defend multiple cities and fortresses, as it was never clear where the Arabs would strike. By the time Hormozd reached Hufeir, Khalid started marching to Kazima. He could have probably taken the city with ease, but didn’t want to be besieged by the heavily armored Sassanids, so his troops waited and rested to the south of Kazima, while Hormozd marched towards him. In the first days of April, the tired Sassanid forces approached. The engagement that would occur in the area is traditionally known as the battle of the Chains, due to the description of the Sassanid forces in the Muslim sources: according to them the Sassanid infantrymen were chained to each other to create cohesive line, or to prevent any retreat, however, this makes no sense tactically, as that would have made the infantry even less mobile, and each dead warrior would have burdened their companions. We also never see this description in the numerous battles fought between the Romans and the Sassanids. Most probably, this stems from an incorrect reading of the Persian word “silsilah”, which can be translated as mountain chain or bounding chain or single line of soldiers, so the word “chain” might be metaphor for the disciplined Sassanid infantry. In any case, Khalid wasn’t going to allow Hormozd’s troops to rest, and his preparations forced the Sassanids to form up directly to the west of Kazima at the end of the tiring march. Their formation was the traditional infantry center and cavalry wings. Meanwhile, Khalid’s army was arranged in similar manner, but for the time being stayed in the desert behind the hills dividing the two armies. This delay only added to the fatigue among the Sassanids, as they had to stay in formation in their full panoply under the sun. However, this waiting couldn’t continue for long, as the Sassanids controlled the springs in the area, so few hours later Khalid emerged on the hills and his troops stopped some distance away from those of Hormozd. The only surviving primary sources of this engagement belong to the Muslim historians, so we will present their view of this battle. As was customary for the region and traditional for the Roman, Sassanid and Arab battles of the era, the battle started with duel, as Hormozd moved forward and called Khalid to fight him one on one. Apparently, Hormozd then dismounted and Khalid followed suit. As two generals clashed and fought to standstill, few Sassanid skilled warriors attacked Khalid. Another Arab general, Qaqa bin Amr, who will play larger role in the future, saw this and also decided to join the fray, attacking Khalid’s assailants. Qaqa and Khalid were able to overcome the Sassanid fighters and killed Hormozd. The Arab generals returned to their lines and Khalid ordered his troops forward. The armies engaged each other. On the wings, the balance of forces didn’t allow either side to gain the upper hand, while in the center the Muslim infantry charged their counterparts few times, clashing and falling back without dealing much damage. However, the Muslim troops were much more rested, as even the infantrymen had travelled to the battle mounted. The Sassanid footmen weren’t able to rest after their march, and each charge tired them even more. During one of the charges Khalid’s center managed to crack the disciplined Sassanid line in few places. The Sassanid army, which was left leaderless in the wake of the duel, panicked, and the commanders leading the wings - Qubaz and Anushjan - started retreating with their horsemen. Their Muslim cavalry counterparts didn’t chase the enemy horsemen and instead enveloped the Sassanid center. Soon, the battle was over. We don’t have clear source on the number of casualties, but it is probably fair to assume that half of the Sassanid army was lost, while Khalid’s casualties were less than few thousand. Meanwhile, shah Yazdegerd, who received Hormozd’s letter in late March, decided to send an army under Karinz to reinforce his governor. The speed at which it happened suggests that only the forces around the capital were gathered; according to the sources, Karinz had somewhere between 15 and 25 thousand men when he moved south and crossed the Tigris. He was apparently moving towards Uballa to help the governor, but after he crossed the small river called Maqil, he encountered the rest of the Hormozd’s army led by Qubaz and Anushjan, some 10 thousand troops. Karinz was told about the events of the battle of the Chains. Simultaneously mobile force commanded by Muthanna appeared nearby, probably sent by Khalid to chase the remainder of the Sassanid force and scout ahead, while he was recruiting from the ranks of Arab tribes in the area of Kazima and Hufeir. We don’t know what Karinz was thinking at this point, but it is clear that the Sassanids understood that they were not dealing with minor raid, and they faced traditional Bedouin Arab army made up of light cavalry. Catching Muthanna’s mobile force in the open field would be impossible, since the shah’s army was considerably slower, so Karinz didn’t move to the strategically crucial Uballa to protect it, likely worried that Muthanna would be able to attack his flank and rear. The Sassanid general decided to sacrifice Uballa and keep his position along the river in order to prevent Khalid from crossing the Tigris, and also from marching westwards to the most important city of the region – al-Hirah. In the meantime, Khalid was informed by Muthanna that new army was moving to the south. The Sassanid position left him no other way to advance. Using the whole army to take Uballa might have entrapped him, so only small group was sent to take it, while Khalid went on and united with Muthanna. The battle that is now known as the Battle of the River took place in the third week of April. The Sassanids had anywhere from 25 to 50 thousand troops, depending on the sources, while Khalid commanded around 18 thousand, as he was able to reinforce his army by recruiting from the local Arab tribes. The sources for this battle are conflicted, so we will try to do our best to form coherent narrative. Before the armies formed up in the morning, Khalid personally scouted the positions of Karinz’s forces, and was now sure that winning set piece battle was his only option to continue the campaign. He returned and the armies started to get into formation, both having similar structure with infantry in the center and cavalry on the wings. The Sassanid army was deeper, as its commander made no attempts to widen his front and outflank the enemy, probably relying on the superiority of his troops and the fact that his second rank would be fresh when the time came. The battle started with Karinz calling for duel. According to the Sassanid sources, the duels were way for the commanders to prove to the troops that they are ready to fall for them, so personal combat between champions was usual sight. Khalid wanted to answer the call, but one of the duelists who was near him galloped towards the Sassanid commander and Khalid stayed back. In the ensuing duel, the Arab fighter was able to defeat his opponent. That demoralized the Sassanids, so Qubaz and Anushjan were probably forced to march forward and demand another duel, to restore their morale. The Muslim wing commanders Asim and Adi galloped to them. Soon, the Sassanid commanders were dead and Khalid ordered his entire army forward. Despite the fact that the Sassanids lost all of their top commanders, initially this charge was fruitless, as the forces of the Caliphate failed to make any headway and were even pushed back. But this push back made the Sassanid lines disorganized, as the units lost cohesion due to the lack of command. Khalid was able to exploit this, and his counter-attack created even more holes in the enemy formation. The rear of the Sassanid army attempted to retreat, while the front was still fighting. However, left with no support, the front was soon massacred. Lightly equipped and fast Muslim troops were able to catch up to the fleeing Sassanids with ease, and the battle restarted along the river. The sources do not give clear picture of what happened here, but most of the Sassanid losses occurred in that area, as some were killed, some drowned, and some were able to cross the river. By the end of the battle the Shah’s army lost anywhere from 15 to 30 thousand troops, while Khalid’s casualties were in the hundreds. After the victory at the Battle of the River, Khalid didn’t cross into central Iraq, probably for variety of reasons. Firstly, he needed to create new administration in the region and start collecting taxes. Secondly, moving into the Sassanid empire would have stretched his supply lines and would have put him into territory with no Arab tribes. On top of that, Khalid liked to fight on the edges of the deserts, which gave him the opportunity to outmaneuver his opponents when needed. The caliphate’s commander established new authority in the province, with its inhabitants starting to pay the Jizya tax. Simultaneously, scouts from the local tribes were sent to the west and north to discover if the Sassanids had more armies nearby. As the Persian road and postal system were probably among the best of their time, the shah learned about another defeat shortly after, and while Khalid was making his preparations, Yazdegerd ordered the troops from the northern and eastern parts of the empire to march towards the capital, Ctesiphon. direct attack on the region controlled by Khalid was difficult, as the Arabs now controlled the crossings, so when the first army, commanded by Andarzaghar, arrived, it was sent toward the city of Walaja, the first strategic target on the road between Uballa and al-Hirah. It was expected that the Arabs would attack in this direction, so the remnants of the Sassanid forces which fought under Karinz joined Andarzaghar, bringing his numbers to somewhere between 25 and 30 thousand troops. This army took positions outside of Walaja sometime in May. The second army was led by one of the top commanders in the Sassanid army, Bahman, and it was supposed to reinforce Andarzaghar if the Muslims indeed decided to move to al-Hirah. For now, this force of 20 thousand was to be stationed along the Euphrates, halfway between Uballa and Walaja. Meanwhile, Khalid’s scouts, being from the local tribes, were able to gather information with impunity, so he seemingly knew about every enemy move. He decided that his smaller force needed to defeat one of the armies opposing him, and he could not allow them to reinforce each other. So, he left minor garrison around Uballa and marched west, hoping to defeat Andarzaghar, without alerting Bahman. Along the way, Khalid reinforced his army from the Arab tribes, which were now more eager to join his ranks, since the tax imposed by him was lower than the one, they had to pay before, and that brought his numbers to around 15 to 20 thousand. The goal was to destroy the army under Andarzaghar before Bahman could reinforced it. Although Bahman’s army noticed the movement of the Arabs, they were much slower, so Khalid was able to reach Andarzaghar well before Bahman, sometime in the second half of May. According to the sources, Andarzaghar had enough room to maneuver and wait for Bahman along the river, but he was confident in his troops and kept his position. For almost day the two armies seemingly remained in their respective camps, within the reach of each other, without attempting to start battle; the Arabs were probably resting after their forced march, and the Sassanids were hoping that this wait meant that they might be reinforced. However, this wait couldn’t last, since Khalid knew that he had to score the decisive victory before the second Sassanid army arrived, so on the next day both forces formed up in standard formation with center and two wings. The battlefield near Walaja was an even plain stretching between two low, flat ridges which were about 1 kilometer away from each other. To the north east was barren desert, with the river Khasif running close to the eastern ridge. Both armies had the ridges behind them, meaning that an attack from the rear was not possible to begin with. The Sassanid leader was surprised to see that the whole Muslim army was smaller than previously reported, and that it only consisted of footmen, which contradicted what he had heard about the crucial role Khalid’s cavalry played in the previous battles. Despite that, he was convinced that his position was impenetrable and decided to wait, as both armies knew that Bahman couldn’t be too far away. Indeed the Muslim commander ordered his entire army forward. Led by Khalid, who fought in the front rank, the army of the Caliphate charged into the enemy. For an hour or so, the two lines fought to standstill, losing few warriors. But the Sassanids had the numbers, so their tired front line was replaced by the rear rank, which gave them edge. Despite Khalid’s personal martial skill, his troops were getting tired, so Andarzaghar’s counter-attack started to push the Muslim troops back. Slowly but surely the Sassanids advanced, while the Arabs were getting dangerously close to the ridge, which would have made any retreat impossible. At this point, Khalid gave signal that changed the course of battle: the cavalry that he sent into the desert during the previous night appeared on the eastern ridge behind the Sassanid army. This was Khalid’s trademark move, as his mobile cavalry was able to hide in the deserts with ease. The advance of the Sassanid army away from its fortified position meant that its rear was undefended. The light Arab horsemen charged into the Sassanid lines, while Khalid’s infantry lengthened its front to envelope the wings of Andarzaghar’s army. Minutes later the battle of Walaja was over. The Sassanid commander was dead and his army was completely destroyed, with only 5 thousand survivors managing to retreat from the field. Khalid’s casualties were around 3 thousand. As Khalid’s troops were tired after the long march and the battle, his army wasn’t able to pursue the Sassanid survivors. Those were mostly the Christian Arabs who were more mobile, and they managed to find shelter in nearby Ullais. The messengers from this group went to other Christian Arab tribes to the northwest, asking for help, and also informed the shah in Ctesiphon. The tribes answered the call of their kin, while Yazdegerd sent messengers to Bahman to go towards Ullais. It is not clear why, as Arab and Persian sources are conflicted, but according to the former, Bahman gave command over his army to another general called Jaban, who marched with the entire army to where the Christian Arabs were concentrating. The Persian sources claim that Bahman returned to Ctesiphon with his entire army. Meanwhile, Khalid moved his troops towards the city, and sometime in May fought the allied Christian Arab and Sassanid army near Ullais. The details of the battle are lost, but we know that the Muslims won. The sources are once again conflicted on the number of casualties, with the Arab sources stating that Khalid’s force killed 70 thousand enemies, mostly through the executions after the battle, while the Persian writers think that the army facing Khalid’s 18 thousand was comparable in size and managed to retreat towards al-Hirah after minor defeat. In any case, in the last days of May Khalid approached al-Hirah, which was the initial goal of his campaign. Again, the sources are inconclusive. We know that the local Sassanid garrison and their Arab allies mounted resistance for few days, but eventually, the sides decided to negotiate. As Khalid promised to spare the lives of the population in exchange for the payment of the Jizya tax, the locals decided to surrender. The Arab commander spent the next few months building up new administration in the region and collecting taxes. At the same time, raiding parties were sent to Central Iraq and towards the border of the Eastern Roman Empire, and this raiding brought both loot and information on enemy movement. Some sources claim that the Caliphate gained degree of control over Central Iraq, but it seems that Khalid didn’t have enough troops to keep such wide region under his authority. Still, the Caliphate’s raiding parties were not getting much resistance to the north and northeast, while his scouts informed him that the Sassanid garrisons to the northwest were still intact, with larger concentrations at Anbar and Ain-al-Tamur. The first one was further away and the direct route to it was through Ain-al-Tamur, but attacking the fort of Anbar would have been more unexpected so, in late June of 633 Khalid left half of his troops in al-Hirah and marched west towards Anbar with 10 thousand strong army. Anbar would become the first Arab attack across the Euphrates river. The details of the engagement that happened here are unclear, but it seems that Khalid’s decision to attack Anbar surprised his opponents, and the leader of the garrison, Sheerzad, was forced to surrender after the Arab archers showed their effectiveness. Then the Caliphate’s raiding parties approached the town of Ain-al-Tamur from the direction of al-Hirah, so when Khalid engaged the Sassanid troops, mostly made up of Christian Arabs from the west, in July, he was able to win with relative ease. The leader of the Christian Arabs was taken prisoner and then executed, and the city surrendered to the Muslims. Events of the next few months between July and September are shrouded in mystery, as some sources claim that Khalid was staying in Anbar and Ain-al-Tamur, slowly setting up the administration of the newly acquired region, which seems uncharacteristically passive for him. Others claim that the last 2 remnants of the apostate activity of the Ridda Wars were to the south, so Khalid moved most of his non-garrisoned troops towards Dawmat al-Jandal, and helped his fellow Caliphate general, Iyad ibn Ghanm, defeat the rebels in the region. This inactivity or absence gave some time to the Sassanids, and they started recruiting and concentrating 5 armies in the area between Muzayyah and Husaid. Qaqa bin Amr, who was left to command the garrison at al-Hirah, ordered the raiding parties in central Iraq and the garrisons of Anbar and Ain-Al-Tamur to take positions to the south of the Sassanid forces, delay them as much as possible, and not allow these 4 small armies to unite into one force. At the end of September Khalid returned to al-Hirah alongside the troops he picked up around Dawmat al-Jandal, and ordered the Qaqa bin Amr and Abu Laila to lead portions of the garrison to Husaid and Khanafis respectively and take command, while his troops rested in the city. Apparently small Muslim and Sassanid armies fought minor battles in October, and the Sassanids suffered minor defeats, which compelled them to retreat towards Muzayyah. Khalid now had an open route to the Sassanid capital Ctesiphon, but the Sassanid army at Muzayyah, and the concentrations of the Christian Arabs in the area between Saniyy and Zumail, were still threat, so the Caliphate commander decided against attacking Ctesiphon. The main Sassanid army at Muzayyah probably considered its position to be safe since it would be difficult to attack them without going through Saniyy and Zumail. At the same time, Khalid knew that attacking the majority light cavalry Arab Christians could push them to the north to unite with the troops at Muzayyah, so Khalid devised plan. His army was already divided into three corps and they moved directly against the Persians using the desert to avoid Saniyy and Zumail. This was technically very difficult, as all three corps had to not only bypass the enemy armies without being detected, but also arrive at the decided location simultaneously. It was risky, but the possible reward was also high. Everything worked as planned. Khalid’s corps converged on the target at the same time, and during one of the nights in the first week of November, his 20 thousand attacked the sleeping Sassanid army of comparable size. The latter was not expecting this attack and the army of the Caliphate scored an easy victory, killing more than 10 thousand Sassanid warriors. After that defeating smaller Christian Arab force seemed easy, but instead of confronting them head-on, Khalid repeated his 3-pronged maneuver, to avoid the losses. The Muslims suffered minimal losses, while the Christian Arabs lost more than half of their army. Apparently, few recent Muslim converts were among the killed, and their families sent an appeal to the Caliph Abu Bakr to punish Khalid. This rejected appeal was sent through the future Caliph Umar, and will become important for our story down the line. Khalid’s mobility and the inability of his opponents to consolidate their forces meant that the region between Muzayyah and al-Hirah was now under the control of the Caliphate. We have sparse information on the early administration of these lands. The Muslim sources claim that while the Persians living in the cities were often taken captive and enslaved, the local Arab population was forced to pay the Jizya tax, but was otherwise allowed degree of autonomy and even freedom of worship. More raids were sent across the Euphrates in the next month, while Khalid was contemplating what his next move should be. Attacking Ctesiphon was still dangerous, as that would have stretched the supply lines too much. That made an attack on the only Sassanid target in the area - the city of Firaz - the only option. Firaz was right on the border of the Sassanid and Eastern Roman empires. Khalid and his 20 thousand reached the area in December. Once again, the sources are conflicted, but few details that have reached our times allow us to form coherent timeline. We know that the local Sassanid and Roman garrisons united their strength on the north side of the Euphrates, while Khalid held the crossing on the other side. Despite the fact that the Muslim sources state that the united Roman-Sassanid force was large, it is fair to assume that neither empire could have large force in the area, since the Sassanids needed these troops in central Iraq, while the Romans were concentrating their forces on the crucial coastal areas and urban centers already being raided by the smaller Muslim armies. Even with united force and the inclusion of the local Arab tribes, the allies led by the Sassanid commander, Hormozd Jadhuyih, probably had between 15 and 25 thousand troops. For 5 or 6 weeks the armies remained opposite each other, as neither side had safe place to cross the river. It seems that sometime in the third week of January, Khalid slightly retreated from the positions he held, perhaps baiting his counterpart into attacking. Indeed, the allied force crossed the river and formed up against the Muslims. Both sides had similar disposition with infantry in the center and cavalry on the wings. The allied army charged the Muslims, probably hopeful that their heavier equipment would give them an advantage. Slowly but surely, this charge pushed Khalid’s lines back. Simultaneously, the Muslim general ordered the cavalry units from the second rank to leave the main body and take position to the far left. The Roman-Sassanid army continued to advance and the Muslims retreated even further. Khalid’s detached force was ordered to take the bridge and then attack the allies from the rear. This maneuver was successful, as Hormozd Jadhuyih’s army immediately started losing cohesion - the allies thought that there was another big Muslim army that took the bridge, and would soon surround them. Simultaneously, Khalid’s main force started their counter-attack, and those units of the allied army not killed on the spot started routing towards the northeast. certain number managed to swim across the river, but more than half of the allied army was killed. Khalid lost few hundred from his ranks. Khalid was about to attack deeper into Persian territory, but he soon after received letter from the Caliph, Abu Bakr. The letter ordered him to cease his attacks on the Sassanids and to move into Syria to battle the Romans. So, Khalid and small contingent of his army prepared to move west. As with the Mesopotamian invasions, there had probably been no better opportunity for strike into Roman lands, as the destructive quarter-century long conflict from 602 to 628 had undermined crucial defences in both regions. The Roman east, with all its religious, cultural, financial and strategic significance, was now dangerously vulnerable. During 633, the Muslims sent four separate corps to invade Palestine, in addition to the areas around the Sea of Galilee, the River Jordan and the Dead Sea. Though they achieved success, assaults on the large urban settlements of the region could not be considered until reinforcements were brought up. So, both for the additional troops and for Khalid’s expertise in warfare, Abu Bakr sent the order for him to move west. To save time and to bypass Roman defences, the Muslim general chose more dangerous route through an especially desolate, waterless stretch of the Syrian desert, much to the alarm of his sub-commanders. In order to survive, it is reported that Khalid, in his ingenuitive way, ordered 20 camels be forced to drink large amounts of water so that they could be used as makeshift storage tanks. The beasts were then periodically slaughtered along the journey when nourishment was needed, and the water was then harvested from the camels. After five grueling days of marching through this desolate landscape, the 9,000 strong Muslim army emerged at Suwa. Then, they swiftly inflicted minor defeat on the Roman Arab clients - the Ghassanids - at Marj al-Rahit, while they were celebrating easter. Proving his strategy correct, Khalid’s improbable desert crossing had also neutralised the Byzantine defences on the Arabian border. Now he turned south, towards the Syrian town of Bosra, where the arrival of his reinforcements led to its capture by mid-July of 634. Despite this success, the Muslims had little time to celebrate. Roman Emperor Heraclius, who was now in Emesa, sent his brother Theodore, and an Armenian general named Wardan, south towards Ajnadayn, 25 miles southeast of Jerusalem, where they began to gather large army. Spies reported this gathering force to the Muslims, and the burgeoning Caliphate’s army marched to meet their Byzantine opponents. Very few hard facts are known about this battle, but we can reconstruct version of the fight using the available sources. Muslim accounts vastly exaggerate the number of Roman troops they faced, and it is likely even that the weakened Byzantine forces in Syria - 10,000 strong and commanded by Wardan and Theodore - were outnumbered by the 15,000 Muslims. Both armies formed up in extended lines with their camps to the rear, and both sides stood ready with three divisions of infantry - right, left and centre - while each wing had cavalry flank guard. Behind the Muslim centre was small reserve, and in front of their centre was small group of champions. Before the battle began, Christian bishop rode over to Khalid’s army and attempted to negotiate Muslim withdrawal. However, the Rashidun general simply responded by offering the traditional choice - conversion to Islam, payment of the Jizya tax, or death in battle. The fighting at Ajnadayn began when the Byzantine auxiliary missile units, stationed ahead of the main line, began to rain arrows and stones on their adversaries. As the superior Byzantine ranged units loosed, the Muslims suffered losses and were unable to respond. However, one Muslim warrior named Dhiraar, heavily armoured and brandishing heavy shield stolen from Roman soldier, marched directly into the arrow fire, shouting his war cry. After the hail of missiles ceased, Dhiraar and his entourage of fellow champions were met by their Byzantine counterparts, and it is said the Muslims got the better of the fighting, slaying several Roman elite warriors and two generals. As the dueling came to an end, the Rashidun army attacked, and the subsequent fighting was slogging match with little maneuver, and lasted until nightfall. The next day, Byzantine commander Wardan attempted to lure Khalid into trap by offering parley, but the plan went wrong and he was instead killed by the fearsome Dhiraar. Aiming to exploit the confusion which this loss of leadership caused in the Roman ranks, the Arabs attacked again with their flanks in front and centre behind. After savage hand to hand fighting, which exhausted and depleted both armies, Khalid deployed his 4,000 strong reserve in the centre and drove deep wedges through the Roman formations in this area. Unable to withstand the pressure any further, their line collapsed. After this defeat, Emperor Heraclius sent his brother Theodore back to Constantinople in disgrace. At the same time, the remnants of his shattered army, in addition to the local Roman population, withdrew to the apparent safety of the walled cities, which subsequently became crowded with refugees. Perhaps an omen of things to come, Heraclius then retreated with his headquarters further north, to the city of Antioch, due to the fact that Muslim forces now controlled the countryside and were expected to advance on the most prominent urban centre in the area. week after their victory at Ajnadayn, the Arab forces began to march north in the direction of Damascus. On their way, they had to leave mounted detachment at the city of Fahl, ancient Pella, to keep the Roman garrison there tied down while the main army marched onward. After this was done, the Muslims reached Yaqusa on the southern bank of the Yarmouk River. Here he was opposed by blocking force of Byzantine troops on the northern shore. They were in no real position to offer serious permanent resistance, but they were there to delay the Muslims, and to allow the great city to further prepare for coming siege. After short battle here and another battle against 12,000 Romans at the Yellow Meadow - otherwise known as Marj-us-Suffar - the road was clear to Damascus. When the invading Arabs neared the city, the Muslim commander realised that his forces were not numerous enough to encircle it entirely. Instead, each of the Muslim sub-commanders stationed their contingents outside of the city’s various gates, fully blockading the crucial thoroughfares by August 21st, with total of around 20,000 soldiers - 16,000 infantry and 4,000 ‘mobile guard’ cavalry. Damascus immediately began starving due to the lack of supplies and unpreparedness for siege, while the Muslims were well supplied due to their domination of the fertile and productive local countryside. As the swift Arab light horsemen were relatively usel ess in siege, Khalid Ibn al-Walid sent few hundred of them to the Eagle’s Pass to the north, in order to act as scouts. Here, they watched for any Byzantine relief force aiming to pass through this choke point. The other half stayed near the city as reserve, ready to help repel any sortie made by the Romans. In Antioch, the Roman Emperor learned of the siege and sent 12,000 strong relief force, along with plentiful supplies, to help Damascus on September 9th. When this force reached the narrow pass where the Muslim scouts were stationed, it pushed the cavalry back. One of these scouts managed to send notice to al-Walid and he, gambling that repelling the relief attempt was more important than maintaining too tight blockade, took the remaining cavalry at night to the Eagle Pass, where he managed to rout the Romans. Despite their apparent success, the besieging Arab forces were now stretched thin by Khalid’s withdrawal. Historians believe that if the garrison’s general Thomas had chosen to launch sortie at this point, the Byzantines could have broken the siege, but they did not and therefore lost the opportunity. It seems that al-Walid realised he had put the siege in danger with his gamble and he hurriedly returned to Damascus after he attained victory at the Eagle’s Pass. As the garrison and Thomas realised that no relief was coming, morale among the defenders of Damascus became weaker and weaker; it was clear action would be needed. So, the Emperor’s son in law decided to launch counteroffensive of his own. For this first attack, Thomas decided to concentrate on one specific section of the city, drawing men together from all sectors of the city towards the Gate of Thomas, where he was faced by around 5,000 soldiers under Shurahbil. After the defending soldiers gathered in the area, the Byzantine commander began his sortie by ordering his archers to rain down constant stream of arrows against their enemy, to which the Arabs responded accordingly. Using the cover granted by the Roman missile units, the infantry rushed through the Gate of Thomas and fanned out into battle formation, with Thomas himself leading the assault. During the subsequent skirmish, it is reported that Thomas both broke through section of the Muslim line and almost killed Shurahbil, but he was then shot in the eye by the widow of slain Arab soldier. Despite some level of success, the sortie had failed to break the siege and the Byzantine forces retreated into the city. As they did, it is said that the injured Roman leader swore to take thousand eyes in return for his own. That night, another plan to break the siege was devised by the defenders. As concentrated attack on one of the gates had failed, Thomas would this time launch simultaneous strikes from four of the gates. Two large forces were gathered at the eastern gate, where Khalid was in command, and at the Gate of Thomas, where the main attack against exhausted enemy units would be undertaken. The other forces at the Small Gate and the Jabiyah Gate were designed to pin their besiegers in place. As Thomas sounded the attack, grinding battle took place at the Jabiyah gate, with both sides suffering many losses. After while of this slaughter, Abu Ubaidah and his forces at this gate managed to doggedly repulse the Byzantine assault, driving them back into the city. The situation was far more serious at the Eastern gate, where the Byzantines had larger force. This larger contingent of defenders managed to break the Arab infantry and drive them back, but Khalid himself then arrived with 400 elite mobile guard cavalry, and with them, struck the Roman flank. This weakened the sortie irreversibly and the defenders were slowly driven back inside the gates. Once again however, the worst of the fighting once again occurred at the Gate of Thomas. Here, the Byzantine forces were led by the one-eyed Thomas himself and, after intense fighting, there was still no weakness in the Muslim ranks. At this point, the Roman commander seems to have realised there was no point in continuing the grinding melee, and commanded slow, steady withdrawal. All the while, the Arab archers continuously showered his men with arrows. This was the last effort by Thomas to break the Muslim siege, and it had failed with the loss of thousands of men. With this defeat, he could no longer afford any more attempts at breakout. Greek in Damascus known as ‘Jonah the Lover’, in Arab sources, climbed over the wall and informed Khalid that on the night of the 18th of September, there would be Christian religious ceremony which would leave the walls relatively unguarded. He supposedly betrayed his city because his marriage to his fiancee had been interrupted by the siege and, frustrated, asked for the Muslims’ help in obtaining said bride. This man soon converted to Islam, but the details are incredibly vague. Whatever the case, details of the opportunity led Khalid to borrow ladders from local monastery and to purchase ropes in order to form an assault party. That night, 100 strong contingent, led by the Muslim general himself, climbed the walls, dropped into the city and killed the guards at the Eastern Gate. Then the attackers flung open the gate and let the remainder of Muslim forces at the Eastern Gate inside the city. The other Byzantine detachments stationed elsewhere were unaware of this surprising development and, instead of helping, stayed at their posts. At the same time, Khalid began to fight his way toward the centre of the city. Now attempting to save the city for final time, Thomas sent envoys to Abu Ubaidah at the western Jabiya gate offering surrender and payment of Jizya in exchange for capitulation by terms. This was given by the supposedly peace-loving Abu Ubaidah. However, Khalid, who had finished slaughtering his way to the centre of the city, was furious that surrender had been allowed even though the city had technically been taken by storm. Nevertheless, the many Muslim unit commanders agreed that surrender would be honoured - Khalid reluctantly accepted this judgement. The fall of Damascus was shock for the Byzantines, as they probably thought that the Muslim attack on the region was massive raid and not full-on invasion. Syria and Egypt were the most important provinces of the empire, and the fall of the former would mean that the land route to the latter was cut, and it was now also vulnerable to being occupied. Emperor Heraclius’ couldn’t allow that, so he started sending orders to the provinces in order to bring in more reinforcements to the region. Simultaneously, the political situation in the caliphate had also changed, as caliph Abu Bakr passed away in late August of that year, and was replaced by Umar. The new caliph immediately started implementing administrational and military reforms, creating new administrative positions in the provinces, and changing the formation of the army from the one created on the tribal principle to more centralized one. Immediately after his ascension, Umar sent letter to the army, reliving Khalid of his post and appointing Abu Ubaidah in his place. We don’t know if this was part of the reforms or, as some sources claim, it happened due to the previous animosity between the new caliph and the general. In any case, it seems that before the messengers could reach Damascus, the 3 day-peace the Muslims promised Thomas had passed, and Khalid, alongside 5 thousand cavalry, guided by Jonah, started pursuing the Romans. Thomas had around 10 thousand people with him, both soldiers and citizens of Damascus, but instead of finding refuge in one of the nearby towns, this group was heading towards Antioch, and that allowed the Arab cavalry to catch up to them to the south of Latakia sometime in late September. The details of the engagement now known as the battle of Maraj-al-Debaj are scarce, but according to the Muslim sources, cavalry detachment of few hundred caught up and took position to the south of Thomas. The Romans immediately noticed them, deciding that they would be able to defeat this small group with ease. To the surprise of the Romans, as soon as the Arab cavalry and Roman infantry started fighting, another group of Khalid’s horsemen appeared to the east. Although the Romans had thousands of refugees in their midst, they still outnumbered the Muslims, and portion of their infantry formed up to face the new threat. However, half hour after the battle was joined here, third group of Arab cavalry started charging from the north, and the Romans barely got into defensive formation in time to prevent it from breaking through. Thomas’ situation was becoming dangerous, as the route to Damascus was now cut off, but the Romans were still fighting on an equal footing, and the battle raged on three sides. An hour later Khalid himself appeared to the west with the largest part of his army and charged the Romans. Despite the fact that Thomas managed to get few units to this front, they were swept aside almost immediately, and the Arab cavalry was now deep inside the Roman formation. Thomas was soon killed. The Roman resistance continued for some time, but was broken within an hour. Some soldiers and refugees were able to slip away to the north, but the majority of the Romans were either killed or captured. Khalid lost just few hundred troops. Immediately afterwards, the Arabs headed to Damascus and reached it in early October. Apparently, Abu Ubaidah already received the messenger from the caliph, and informed Khalid of his demotion. According to sources, the latter accepted it without much protest, but it did change the flow of the Caliphate’s expansion in the region Abu Ubaidah was much slower and more deliberate than Khalid. Umar preferred more hands-on approach to the armies, often issuing orders after every engagement, which slowed down the campaigns due to the distance to Medina. He even placed informers in the army, which made Abu Ubaidah even more careful in his decisions. At the same time, the Muslims received some reinforcements, bringing the total number of their troops to 30 thousand. However, that wasn’t the only change in command made by Umar, which brings us back to Iraq, where Khalid left Muthanna in charge of 9-thousand-strong army in 634. For the next few months Muthanna, whose numbers weren’t enough to conquer any more lands, implemented the tactic of raids in order to keep the superior Sassanid forces at bay. The details are lost to time, but the Sassanids, who were used to fighting in pitched battles, were having difficult time containing the raids, and one of them even reached Babylon. The best Sassanid commander, Rostam, who basically controlled the court of the 10-year-old shah Yezdegerd, was reluctant to leave the capital, worried that it might incite another revolt. But Muthanna’s raids were too dangerous, so the general decided to take command over the forces in Iraq and marched south, supported by the Sassanid generals Bahman, Jaban and Narsi, and the Armenian noble Jalinus Even before this multipronged counterattack began, Muthanna knew that he needed reinforcements, and sent messenger to the capital. By August this messenger was in Medina, just in time for the ascension of Umar. The new caliph appointed Abu Ubaid, not to be confused with Abu Ubaidah, to command in Iraq, and gave him 6 thousand or so troops to reinforce Muthanna. The latter was now informed of the Sassanid counterattack, and when Jaban got close to al-Hirah in late September, the Arab commander abandoned it, retreating to Khaffan By early October Abu Ubaid joined him, bringing the total strength of the Caliphate’s force to more than 15 thousand, similar number to that commanded by Jaban, who crossed the Euphrates and was now at Namariq. The details of the battle of Namariq are not clear, but it seems that Jaban suffered minor defeat and was forced to retreat beyond the river. Abu Ubaid decided to fight the approaching Sassanid armies in detail, and marched north towards Kaskar, hoping to defeat the smaller army under Narsi and knock him out. Although the Muslims won again, the Persian army managed to retreat mostly intact, and Abu Ubaid, who knew that Jalinus might cut his retreat to al-Hirah, moved his army double-time to prevent this from happening. Indeed, the army of the Caliphate reached the city before Jalinus blocked them. The closest Sassanid armies to al-Hirah were those of Jalinus and Bahman. letter from Rostam ordered them to unite their troops, cross the Euphrates and attack the city. In late October of 634 their united armies, numbering around 20 thousand, attempted to force the river near Kufa, but Abu Ubayd and his 15 thousand were able to halt this crossing. For some time, the armies stood in front of each other screaming insults, until Sassanid emissary approached Abu Ubayd with Bahman’s message: “Either you cross over to our side, and we shall let you, or we shall cross over to your side, and you must let us!" Although his officers protested it, Abu Ubayd was eager to cross and fight in pitched battle, so he ordered his army to do that. Seeing this, Bahman repositioned his troops slightly to the north, allowing the Muslims to move across and form up. Unlike previous battles, the Persians had dozen or so elephants, and they were placed in the vanguard with heavy cavalry between them and the infantry in the second echelon. Abu Ubayd’s army crossed the river in 2 hours and started to get into formation, once again with horsemen in front and the footmen in the second line. Bahman continued to wait, and it was Abu Ubayd who gave the order to his soldiers to attack. The Arab cavalry galloped forward, but their horses were scared of the elephants, probably seeing them for the first time, and the charge stopped before it managed to reach the Sassanid lines. In response Bahman moved his archers to the front and commanded them to shoot at the retreating Arabs. The volleys killed and wounded many, and when the leaders of the army of the caliphate attempted to move their archers forward to start skirmishing, the whole Arab line became chaotic and disjointed. The Persian commander used that and directed his cavalry and elephants to attack. While the cavalry was mostly stopped, the elephants easily created wedges everywhere they struck. The Arab army was slowly, but surely forced back. The presence of the elephants was panicking the horses, so in order to stabilize the front, Abu Ubayd commanded his horsemen to dismount. He led group of warriors himself, killing few elephants and their entourages. However, another elephant was sent towards the Arab leader and soon he was killed by the beast. Many other Muslim leaders were killed and their army started fleeing in chaos, and the Sassanids started chasing them. Muthanna was one of the last remaining commanders, and he achieved some degree of discipline and organization at the crossing, leading the rearguard and allowing the remainder of the army to retreat. He was badly wounded during the fight, but his actions saved thousands. The battle of the Bridge was the first battle the Persians won in this war. More than 10 thousand Muslims lay dead, while the Sassanid casualties were around 2 thousand. Over the following weeks, Bahman didn’t pursue Muthanna, who withdrew to Ullais, and returned to Ctesiphon. Some sources claim that there was another rebellion against Rostam, others that Bahman was sent to deal with the Turkic raiders. The sources are also conflicted on the events that happened in Iraq later in 634 and then in 635, with some chronicles asserting that Muthanna’s army deserted and he abandoned all the previous conquests, and others stating that the Sassanids sent large army under Mihran, and it was decisively defeated at Buwaib in April of 635. In any case, this lull in action allows us to return to the Levant. The Muslim army was getting used to the new command structure, and using this pause, Heraclius was bringing more forces to the region, by land to Antioch and, as the Romans had complete naval control, by sea to the various ports. The second group was to be commanded by Theodore Trithyrius, the treasurer of the Empire, and in December of 634 it started assembling to the west of Pella, which was the perfect place to launch an eastward attack, cutting the line of communications with Arabia. It is not clear how big this army was Spies had informed Abu Ubaidah about this threat in December, and in early January of 635 he marched south towards Pella, leaving corps under Yazeed behind. As soon as the small garrison of Pella learned of this, it retreated towards the main army, flooding the river Jordan and creating swamp-like territory dividing the Byzantine and Arab armies After occupying Pella, the Arab army commanders decided to move towards Baisan to engage Theodore. They didn’t know the terrain of this area well so soon after the vanguard led by Khalid got stuck in the mud, and the Muslims were forced to withdraw back to Pella Theodore waited for week or so, hoping that his foes would become less vigilant. On the 23rd of January he marched his troops towards the river with plan to attack the Muslim camp at night. However, the Muslims had placed scout troops along the river, so as soon as the Romans started crossing, the Arab camp was informed of it and started to form up for battle. We have only limited details on the battle, which, according to the Arab sources, raged through the night and most of the next day. The Romans were able to push their counterparts back to the camp using their slightly larger numbers. According to one chronicle, Theodore was wounded in one of the charges, and the resultant loss of morale made the Romans retreat. When they began crossing marsh, the Arabs used this to their advantage: they attacked, killing thousands. The rest returned to Baisan. Whatever was left of the Roman army dispersed into various garrisons to the west and south, while Theodore returned to Antioch by sea. There was no army to fight back against Abu Ubaidah, so he divided his army into corps to conquer as many cities as possible. Shurahbil took Baisan and then Tiberias. Afterwards Shurahbil and Amr bin Al Aas went south, while Abu Ubaidah and Khalid marched north. By the March of 635 the Muslims were in control of the while region to the south of Beirut, save for Caesarea, which withstood siege reinforced by Heraclius, and Jerusalem, which had the strongest fortifications Heraclius probably thought that the Muslims will be busy with the sieges and he has some time, so he was busy recruiting in order to counter-attack in 636. Simultaneously the alliance with Yezdegerd was established Heraclius married his granddaughter to the young Sassanid shah. It was planned that the Persians will attack the Muslim positions from the east. Meanwhile, Abu Ubaidah’s 15 thousand were moving north and by November took over the territory between Damascus and Emesa, putting this major city in danger. Heraclius rushed reinforcements, which brought the strength commanded of the garrison commanded by Harbees to 8 thousand. In early December the city was besieged. Harbees hoped that the Arabs, who weren’t used to the cold will not be able to sustain the siege for too long. At the same time, Emesa was well-fortified city, with the walls 1 mile in diameter and moat surrounding it and citadel within the walls, so the defenders’ situation wasn’t hopeless. The Muslims weren’t strong at the art of siegecraft at that point and the lack of siege weapons made the assault impossible. So, for weeks and then months the sides did nothing but exchange arrow volleys. By March of 636 winter began to subside, and it was becoming clear that the Arab army is planning to starve the Emesans. The food supplies were getting dangerously low, so Harbees decided to sally out and kill as many foes as possible, believing that it might end the siege. He left small units to defend the walls and concentrated more than 5 thousand near the southern gates. Initially this sortie was very successful – the Muslims were caught unprepared and were outnumbered 2-to-1, which led to hundreds of casualties and forced them to retreat under Harbees’ pressure. However, Khalid managed to get his cavalry together, arriving to the area of battle shortly after. The numbers were now on the Arab side, and this was enough for the Romans to break off the fight and return to the safety of the walls. The defenders were jubilant and not at all surprised when the Muslim army gathered to the south and started withdrawing. Harbees decided that he can score brilliant victory and immediately marched out of the city with the same 5 thousand. He caught up to the retreating Muslims few miles to the south, but as soon as his mounted troops started charging, Abu Ubaidah’s units turned back and attacked. Few minutes later the Romans were surrounded from all sides. Harbees was killed and only few hundred of his soldiers escaped. After the short battle, the Arabs returned to the city and the garrison which was left leaderless surrendered. Meanwhile, to the north, Emperor Heraclius has been preparing an army to counter-attack for some time. Various sources provide numbers of this army ranging from very modest 30 thousand to the fantastical 400 thousand. It should be noted that the chroniclers who wrote on this war lived at least one or two generations after the events, so their depictions weren’t based on first or even secondhand accounts. We know that at the peak of the Byzantine-Sassanid War of 602-628, Heraclius was able to raise an army of 70 thousand for his attack on the Sassanid empire, but that army had considerable Göktürk element. At the same, the Byzantines had to keep some forces in Italy, Balkans and the Caucasus in order to check the encroaching Lombards, Slavs, Avars, and Khazars. In our opinion, the Byzantines outnumbered their opponents at least 2 to 1, but considering the logistical situation in the area of operation, their numbers were below 100 thousand. Heraclius, who was now in his 60s, suffered from edema, so he wasn’t going to lead the army, predominantly made of Greeks, Armenians and Christian Arabs, personally. Instead, the army was divided into 5 columns, commanded by 5 generals The plan was to engage and surround the Muslim forces around Emesa, and use another column to take Damascus and prevent the troops of the Caliphate operating to the south from reinforcing the northern group The army left Antioch in the middle of June. Unfortunately for the Romans, few days before their leading column reached Emesa, the Arabs learned about the counter-attack, either from their spies or from the prisoners they took while raiding Shaizar so Abu Ubaidah ordered his corps to fall back. Initially, the idea was to retreat to Damascus to preserve this conquest, but the city was surrounded by open space that would have given an army with superior numbers an advantage, so the Arabs started retreating towards Jabiya, which was located between the river Yarmouk to the south, lake Tiberias to the west, and the desert to the east. Messengers were sent to the southern group with the order to march towards Jabiya. The Byzantines, who barely missed an opportunity to crush their opponent around Emesa, started chasing the Arabs, slowly coalescing after taking the city. They retook Damascus and continued south, and sometime in the middle of July 636, their vanguard made contact with the Caliphate’s rearguard to the north of Jabiya. The Arab commanders, who initially liked their position, now understood that they might be attacked from the southwest – via the narrow passage between lake Tiberias and the river Yarmouk. The Byzantine field army could have engaged them from the front, while the garrison of Caesarea might have attacked using the passage. Therefore, Abu Ubaidah left Khalid in command of the rearguard and started repositioning his troops. The latter engaged the Byzantine vanguard, led by the light Christian Arab horsemen, allowing the rest of the army to move unharassed. The Muslims encamped in the eastern part of the Plain of Yarmouk. Some distance to the east of them were the lava hills stretching from north to east of Azra, and the mountains of Jabal-ad-Druz. few days later, probably in the last days of July, the Roman army entered the plain and built fortified camp in its western part. With the central portion of the plain left unoccupied, the armies started preparing for battle by scouting the enemy positions. The sources mention extensive negotiations which continued for weeks, but the details of the talks are convoluted. In short, they ended in failure and the battle was inevitable. According to some sources, the caliph’s reinforcements, consisting of 5 thousand famous Yemeni archers and thousand footmen, who were veterans of the earliest Muslim campaigns in Arabia, joined the army sometime during this negotiation. The battlefield was enclosed on its western and southern sides by deep ravines. To the west, Wadi-ur-Raqqad flowed into the Yarmouk River near Yaqusa. This stream ran north-east to south-west for 11 miles through deep ravine with very steep banks. The ravine was crossable at few places, but there was only one main crossing, where the village of Kafir-ul-Ma stands today. stands today. South of the battlefield ran the canyon of the Yarmouk River, while deserts occupied the north and the east of it. The plain was mostly flat, save for small hill called Samein On the 14th of August, the Roman army moved forward and started forming up to the east and north of Allan. It is debated whether the army was commanded by the Armenian general Vahan or each of the 5 corps had separate leader. The Byzantine army positioned itself as follows: the light Ghassanid cavalry of Jabala was stretched across the plain as the vanguard, with the objective of screening the army and skirmishing with the enemy. Qanateer commanded the left flank, while Gregory was on the right flank, and 2 central corps were led by Dairjan and Vahan. The Romans had spear and sword infantry in the first rank, archers in the second, and cavalry behind them. Although Abu Ubaidah was the overall commander appointed by the caliph, sources claim that he allowed Khalid to be the one giving the orders. The Muslim force matched the widths of the Roman army, but as it was smaller, its formation wasn’t as deep. Khalid moved some of his light cavalry to the vanguard to observe the Romans. The infantry was divided into 4 corps made up of 9 units each, with infantry in front and the archers behind them There were 3 cavalry units behind each flank and center, while Khalid’s mobile cavalry unit served as reserve. The Arab commander’s plan was to defend and tire his foe, and then counter-attack when possible. Both armies had southern flank secured by the river Yarmouk, while the northern flank bordering the desert offered chance to outflank the enemy. The battle of Yarmouk started on August 15th, 636, with the Roman light cavalry vanguard moving behind the main army, mostly reinforcing the left flank cavalry. The Arab vanguard did the same and joined the main cavalry units. It is unusual to see battle fought in this era which wasn’t started by clash of light skirmishers, but the sources didn’t mention this happening, instead insisting that the champions of both sides dueled for few hours. In any case, after the screening forces pulled back, third of the Roman infantry advanced across the front at midday. Soon the Roman footmen clashed with their counterparts, while the archers in the second rank skirmished, sending volleys above the heads of their infantry. The details of this first day are scarce, but it is possible that the Byzantines decided that reconnaissance in force would provide benefits – their attack was slow and lacked determination. After few hours of fighting, they disengaged and returned to their initial positions. The first day of battle was over and the sides returned to their respective camps. At night few Roman light cavalry units moved forward, but they were caught by their Arab counterparts and forced back. These raids were seemingly disjointed and lacked an objective, as they were not conducted by nearly enough troops to do much damage, however, they allowed the Romans to form up in the darkness without alerting the enemy. The plan was to attack the Muslims as early as possible, not giving them the opportunity to get into formation. Indeed, the whole Roman army attacked before dawn; some sources claim that they knew of the Muslim religious rites - that one of their prayers happened at this time - and decided to use it to their advantage. Unfortunately for the attackers, the same light cavalry patrols who fought them during the night were ordered to remain in front, and as soon as the Romans came into contact with these forward units, the Arabs retreated to their main force and informed them of the impending attack. To the surprise of the Romans, their foes managed to prepare for the attack. However, they had their orders and so the second day of the battle began. The Roman plan was to tie up the Muslim army’s center and pressure its wings. To that end, the attack in the middle was relatively passive. The Byzantine left attacked the Muslim right head-on. The first two attempts to break through failed, but the Byzantines had numerical advantage and used it: fresh troops moved to the front, and the third attack pushed the Arabs back. Some of them started retreating towards their camp and some joined the center-right. This opened way for counterattack by the Arab right-wing cavalry. Its charge wasn’t strong enough to force the Romans back, but tied them up for some time, allowing the infantry to retreat. Soon the cavalry was unable to withstand the pressure and also retreated. Later Muslim sources mention that the wives of the retreating warriors shamed them into returning to the battle. We don’t know if that is true, but the Arab right flank reformed and started marching towards the approaching enemy. Meanwhile, the Roman right, which was probably made of the best heavy infantry in the empire, was even more successful. Some sources mention that it was fighting in testudo formation, but that is probably an anachronism. In any case, the first or the second attack by this group drove the Muslim left flank back, and they hastily retreated towards the camp. Similar to what happened on the other side of the battlefield, the Muslim cavalry attempted to stem the enemy advance with counterattack, but it failed, and the horsemen joined their infantry en route to the camp. The sources once again claim that their wives urged them to return to the battle and even threw stones at their husbands. As the Roman right was slower due to its heavier armour, the Arabs had more time to rearrange their line and move towards the Romans. An attentive viewer might ask, why the Byzantines didn’t exploit these breakthroughs by pouring troops between the gaps in the Muslim formations or by outflanking the enemy right by widening the front In truth, we don’t have answers to these questions, but it can be assumed that the fresh Muslim cavalry in the center and in the reserve possibly discouraged the former, while the latter was dangerous due to the fact that the Arabs had already used desert terrain numerous times in the past to outflank the Byzantines. It was noon, and Khalid had been just watching the battle until that moment, but seeing the return of the wings spurred him into action, taking the command of the cavalry in the center. First, his united cavalry force charged to the right, and moments after joining up with the right wing, attacked the enemy left. The Romans didn’t expect an attack from the flank, and were forced to retreat to their original positions, losing men along the way. To the south, the left of the caliphate’s army was about to engage the Byzantine right. Initially, the Arabs were having the worst of the fight and were about to break and flee again, however, Khalid was on his way. He sent one unit of his cavalry to exploit the gap between the enemy right and center-right, and charged the rest into the side of the Roman right. As mentioned, this was the best Roman infantry, so they resisted longer than their counterparts and suffered fewer casualties, but still retreated. The cavalry unit sent to attack the Roman center right surprised the latter, managing to break in and killing the commander of this group The Romans recovered from their surprise and pushed back the attackers. However, seeing that their flanks were retreating, the center also broke off and returned to their starting positions. Both parties probably suffered similar casualties, with the majority of the Arab losses during the early retreat. The Roman right lost most troops and that would prove to be important during the next day, as this detachment started its advance alongside the whole army, but stopped well short of the enemy army with archers on both sides entering halfhearted skirmishing contest. Meanwhile, Roman center-right engaged the Arabs, but this attack only served to tie-up this portion of the opposing army. The main attack targeted the right and center right of the Muslim army and although initially the Roman onslaught was slowed, their numbers started to play role. Muslims started to retreat, especially on the right flank, where their line was pressed all the way to the camp yet again. This allowed the Romans to increase the pressure on the rightmost units of the Muslim center right and start turning the line. Amr’s corps finally reformed and returned to the battle, but all their efforts only managed to stabilize the line. The Arab cavalry in the second line attempted to outflank the Romans, but Qanateer moved his to block off this advance. Seeing that the Roman right is passive, Khalid deduced that his left is safe and moved the reserve cavalry to the right and charged the Roman flank. The Byzantine commander attempted to move more troops from his second rank to widen his front, and it worked for some time. However, the Romans now lacked the deepness and with this advantage negated, the Arabs in the other parts of the line started to push back. Approaching dusk, the continuation of the battle impossible and the attackers disengaged, retiring to the initial line. It is clear that the Romans were getting frustrated, as they expected their numbers to prevail at this point of the engagement. In the first three days, the Romans probably lost more troops, but they still outnumbered the foe, meanwhile for Khalid, the main worry was the losses among the Yemeni archers and on the right flank. The Roman plan for the next day was to attack the right half of the Caliphate’s army to divide it and encircle each corps separately, and then do the same with the left half. To that end their left attacked the Muslims and soon the right flank of Khalid’s army was shoved back yet again, but not as far as in previous days. Made mostly of the Armenians, Roman center left was equally successful against the Muslim center right. This time the Roman troops were able to turn this portion of the Arab line, which opened up space between their corpses and the Christian Arab light cavalry, which was stationed in reserve behind the center, was commanded to charge into this gap. The Muslims were suffering heavy casualties and it was becoming clear that Khalid needs to move to the area to stop the Romans from winning. Before he did that though, he sent word to the left and center left, ordering them to advance and tie up the forces in front of them. With that the Arab commander divided his cavalry in two halves. One of them moved to the left and attacked the Armenians from the side and rear, while Khalid himself moved against the Christian Arabs. The arrival of the reinforcements has invigorated the beleaguered Muslims and they counterattacked. The fight here continued for few hours, until eventually the Muslims started gaining the upper hand. Engaged from 3 sides, the more heavily armoured and disciplined Armenians suffered some casualties, but still were able to retreat in relative order. Their Christian Arab allies weren’t as able to defend themselves and lost many hundreds before they were able to return to their initial position. Seeing that their center has fallen back, the Roman left also disengaged. However, the left half of the Muslim army was still in melee. Initially, the Arabs had the upper hand as their charge surprised the Romans, but their commanders steadied the troops and soon they were pushing back. The small number of Arab archers proved to be their undoing, as the Romans had the upper hand in the skirmishing. Apparently, the arrows did so much damage to the forces of the Caliphate, that later Arab sources called it the “Day of Lost Eyes”. Unable to withstand the volleys, the Arabs started to pull back. Shortly after, they were followed by the Romans. This attack had the Muslim forces on the back foot and in full flight. All of them, except the leftmost unit of the center, which managed to crush the enemy detachment in front of it and attacked the right side of the Roman center. Eventually this group was overwhelmed. The Muslim withdrawal stopped around the camps, but they were chased by the Romans. According to the Arab sources the Muslim women joined their brethren in the fight against the attackers. It is impossible to confirm it, but it seems that by the end of the fourth day of the battle, the Romans were either pushed back or disengaged on their own. Both sides were extremely tired and battered. Some sources mention that there was an attempt to negotiate from the Romans and that the Arabs have refused. But in any case, the armies spent the 19th of August resting. Khalid made just one change to the formation. All of his horsemen were drawn into one large detachment behind the right-wing infantry, save for one cavalry unit which was sent north into the desert. At the dawn of August 20 – the 6th day of the battle both sides charged and engaged in the melee across the line. After the melee began, Khalid sent portion of his cavalry forward with an order to attack the side of the Roman left, but upon their approach Roman cavalry wheeled around their footmen and blocked the advance. That was the moment the Arab commander was waiting for, as the rest of his horsemen moved forth attacking the Roman cavalry from the side and rear. Soon the Roman horsemen was crushed and the Arabs attacked the infantry, which broke under the attack from three sides and started falling back into the center. The Muslim right now attacked the Roman center left from the flank and rear. Meanwhile, the commanders of the Roman army noticed that their left-wing cavalry was routed from the field by the consolidated Arab cavalry, and they attempted to counter that by bringing their mounted troops together. Unfortunately for the Romans, it was too late and before they were able to form up, Khalid smashed into them routing them. The Roman cavalry wasn’t able to resist for long and promptly started to leave the field of battle. Back east the Armenians were defending the attack from 2 sides and for now were able to hold off the assailants. However, after Khalid dealt with the Roman cavalry and made sure that they won’t return, his horsemen charged into the rear of the Armenian formation. They collapsed under the charge and started retreating to the southwest. The Arabs repositioned to attack the center right and right of the Roman infantry, but before they did, the latter fled on their own, again to the southwest, towards the only crossing over the river, all the while the Muslim cavalry blocked off their retreat from the north and footmen from the east. The remains of the Roman army were hoping to cross Wadi-ur-Raqqad, but the 500-strong Arab mounted unit sent away into the desert, actually was commanded to block off this crossing. Understanding that they were in trap, the Roman officers attempted to form up some kind of defensive line, but before they could do it, they were attacked by the cavalry from the north and infantry from the east. It was slaughter and many thousands were killed in this encirclement, with some units managing to cross the rivers by swimming. Around half of the Roman army lay dead on the plain of Yarmouk, while the Muslims lost less than fifth of their troops. At this point in this story, we have to leave the Syrian front, as things have started heating up in Iraq. In the aftermath of the decisive victory at the battle of the Bridge, Persian forces made no moves to capitalize on it, either hoping that the attack was over, or being preoccupied with other matters. This gave Caliph Umar time to come up with response. Lacking an immediate source of manpower, the pragmatic Rashidun caliph raised another army from the previously untapped tribes who rebelled against the caliphate during the Ridda Wars, including the Banu Tamim and Banu Jadila. These warriors, supplemented by additional contingents mustered by Umar, were gathered and sent north, but problems were still present. Quarreling between many of the tribal chiefs prompted the caliph to appoint trusted paragon to supreme command, who was absolutely beyond reproach. After being talked out of leading the army himself, Umar’s commander would be Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas, the seventh person to embrace Islam, and companion of the prophet. The presence of such respected general united the army in spirit. Additionally, many more warriors joined themselves to Sa’d’s invasion force as it marched north up the Medina-Hira road in May of 636. By the time it reached the Euphrates region for second time, the Muslim army was probably the most formidable Persia had faced so far. Unfortunately for Sa’d, resistance to his advance was soon in coming. The best Sassanid general, Rostam, who basically ruled the court of the 12-year-old shah Yazdegerd III, wanted to fight smaller battles to minimize risk, but that decision was unpopular with the nobles and commoners alike, as the battle of the bridge probably made the empire complacent. Therefore, the general departed the Persian capital at the head of massive imperial force, beelining straight for the Muslims encamped near Qadissiyah. The two opposing armies finally caught sight of one another across the span of the al-Atiq canal about 30 miles east of Hira. After an exhausting march in the midst of Iraq’s blistering summer, Rostam ordered his men to take up positions and encamp across from Sa’d’s army. Rather than immediately mounting an assault across the canal, the bulk of both armies remained on their own side of the waterway for several months, with the peace only punctuated by small scouting missions and raids. Rostam probably knew that the previous Islamic army had been defeated during botched river crossing, and was therefore content to wait and receive Sa’d’s attack, hoping it would happen again. The Muslims, meanwhile, were fighting two-front war, so keeping the Mesopotamian army passive, for the time being, was prudent. In Syria, their army was engaged against the Romans in campaign which culminated in mid-August, at the Battle of Yarmouk. With the Christian empire’s war machine broken, Umar was free to dispatch reinforcements to Sa’d’s force. In the hope of keeping Rostam occupied, the Muslim leader sent repeated embassies to treat with his Persian counterpart, demanding that the Zoroastrians submit to Islam in return for peace. With the Sassanid commander unwilling to convert and reinforcements streaming into their camp, the Muslims challenged their enemy to battle, arraying their forces in formation and allowing the Sassanids to cross the canal, withdrawing mile to the rear. With the al-Atiq canal bridge occupied by Muslim guards, Rostam’s imperial army spent the night hours damning the waterway with debris to enable passage. At dawn Rostam, seated on his throne, ordered his army across and had the army advance in battle formation against the arrayed Muslim forces. The climactic struggle for Persia was about to begin. The army under the authority of Rostam Farrokzhad was likely made up of, at most, 60,000 Sassanid troops. Even Sassanid field army at the absolute apex of the empire’s power probably would not have been able to muster such massive numbers, and it is even more unlikely that the politically divided, militarily exhausted realm of 628 onwards could bring to bear anything more than 60,000. Rostam’s bulwark was also multi-ethnic army, having come together from regions all across the vast expanse of the territory ruled by the House of Sasan, from Azerbaijan to Khurasan. It included among its ranks Kurds, Armenians, Turks, Arabic allies and units from many other peoples. The right and left center units of the imperial army were under the command of Jalinus and Beerzan respectively and, in total, comprised 30,000 warriors - 20,000 melee infantry and bowmen in the first line and 10,000 cavalry in the second. Among these troops were 10,000 professionally trained Persian Immortals, revered elite fighters who chained themselves together as signal to the enemy that they were prepared to die rather than retreat. Bounded by swampland which was difficult to traverse, the Sassanid left and right wings were led by Mihran and Hormuzan, both illustrious generals drawn from highborn Persian clans. Each led 10,000 infantry in their front rank, backed by 5,000 cavalry behind. In front of Rostam’s line was screen of 33 mail-clad elephants. 18 of them were deployed in the center while the remainder were split equally on either wing. Rostam himself, donning ornate armour, mounted raised his throne just behind the center, accompanied by small strategic reserve. About mile to the west, Sa’d’s 30,000 warriors drew up in manner that mirrored their adversaries - four tribally organised divisions with infantry in the first line and cavalry in the second. In addition to the Muslim forces from Arabia proper, Christian Arabs from the border of Sassanid territory and even some captured Persian officers had joined the army after converting to Islam. Although Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas was capable of deploying his army properly, ailments and injury prevented him from mounting horse and exercising effective tactical control. Instead, the companion-general appointed trusted deputy Khalid ibn Urfuta to carry out his immediate orders, and took up strategic position atop the fortress of nearby Uzeib. The various units were commanded by their tribal chieftains, and included men such as Shurabil Ibn Simt - veteran of the Ridda Wars and Syrian campaign - who led the Muslim left wing. As Rostam’s large army continued to form up, Muslim soldiers took part in their usual noon prayer, donned their armour and waited. By the early afternoon hours, the massive Persian army was finally ready to fight. Rostam’s plan was simple and to the point - smash both flanks of the enemy army and then smash into their exposed center. The Battle of al-Qadissiyah began with heavy barrage of arrows loosed by the Sassanid archers, whose superior bows and higher quality arrows inflicted massive casualties on their lightly-armoured counterparts. The Muslims attempted to return the favour, but their low powered bows and inferior arrows resulted in the missiles bouncing harmlessly off the Persian heavy armour. The amused Sassanid troops mocked the Muslim archers by repeating the word “Spindles, spindles!” as the impotent arrows fell harmlessly. With most of the Islamic front line pinned in place by Rostam’s lethal storm of arrows, the general ordered the 7-strong elephant corps on his left to lead charge directly at the Muslims opposing him, followed by the rest of the troops. Frightened by the oncoming titans, the Rashidun mounts forced their riders to scatter from their position, leaving the infantry exposed. Beset by Mihran’s flank and lacking cavalry support, the Muslim warriors fell back slowly, suffering casualties but not breaking under the assault. Sa’d, witnessing the danger his right flank was in from Uzeib, had two units of cavalry from the unengaged centre dispatched to reinforce and shore up the line. One of these contingents struck Mihran’s troops in the front while the other hit them in the flank, pushing the Persians back to their starting position after fierce fight. Observing that his attack on the Muslim right was stalling, Rostam completely changed tack. He dispatched part of his immediate reserve under Bahman to keep that part of the Muslim army locked in place, then ordered the Sassanid right and right-centre to advance, fronted by elephants and covered by another deadly volley of arrows. Again, the vanguard of elephants panicked Rashidun mounts and forced the horsemen to flee for infantry cover. This state of affairs could not continue if victory for Islam was to be attained. Sa’d, realising he had to do something about the Sassanids’ assault beasts, had orders conveyed that light troops from the Arabian Bani Tamim tribe deal with them. Darting in and amongst the massive elephants with considerable skill and daring, the agile warriors cut the cables which kept the elephants’ mounting platforms atop the animals, and showered the occupants with missile fire. vast number of the isolated elephant-riders were killed where they stood, while the rest led their exhausted war mounts back behind the main Persian line. The general Sassanid attack on this side of the field was also wrestled back. In an attempt to take advantage of his enemy’s lack of elephants, Sa’d ordered general attack all across the front. It is said that while the Sassanids were equipped better than their foe, the Muslims were superior fighters. This level of skill allowed unit in Sa’d’s centre to punch through the Persian line and get close to the enthroned Rostam. Descending from his position, the general drew his sword and entered the fray personally along with some retainers. With the army’s morale bolstered by the presence of their leader, the Muslim counterattack was repelled and the front re-established. By nightfall, the last of the days’ fighting had come to an end. This first dreadful day, also known as the ‘Day of Disorder’ by the battered Rashidun warriors, was over. The wounded were gathered and cared for by women in the Muslim camp and trained surgeons of the Sassanid army while the remainder rested. When dawn came, both armies once again lined up for battle, facing off until midmorning. At around noon, thousand reinforcements from Syria under Qaqa bin Amr began streaming onto the field to reinforce the Muslim army, coming ten at time as to give the illusion of vast numbers. This increased the morale of the Muslim army tenfold and Sa’d immediately ordered another charge all across the line. Despite the heavy casualties that his troops inflicted on the Sassanids, the enemy ranks remained coherent and unbroken, mainly due to the force of their heavily armoured cavalry. Casualties increased as the fighting grew more and more brutal, but after two hours of fruitless fighting, both sides pulled back. The Muslims were trading well - four dead Persians for each of their own - but Rostam, trusting in his superior numbers, was content to grind Sa’d’s force into the dust. On the Muslim side, Qaqa, displaying his energetic and restless nature, used the break in fighting to cover the camels that the Rashidun army brought with wooden structures, making them look to the untrained eye of horse like unfamiliar, terrifying beasts. When fighting resumed not long after, the disguised camels were paraded in front of the charging Persian cavalry, spooking the horses into breaking ranks. Sensing an advantage, Sa’d had the army attack along the entire front again. This time, without elephants or cavalry to bolster their ranks, zealous Muslim warriors scythed into the Persians units, viciously routing many of them towards the waterway behind and almost causing the entire Sassanid army to buckle with the shock. However, Rostam’s personal intervention and unmoving confidence allowed his shattered contingents to get back into the fight. Throughout the evening hours, Persian and Rashidun troops engaged in slogging match which, as the sun dipped beneath the horizon, managed to painstakingly throw the Muslims into retreat. With that, both exhausted armies retired for the night. When daylight came on the third day and the armies were arraying for battle, Sa’d’s troops were met with an unwelcome surprise. The enemy ranks parted briefly and through them marched the mighty elephants, recovered and rearmed, now each surrounded by protective ring of infantry and cavalry. When midmorning came, Rostam had his archers unleash another extended arrow volley which locked the Muslims in place. As this barrage concluded, the entire Sassanid army, fronted by the terrifying elephants, began inexorably trudging onward. Suddenly, as they approached Sa’d’s line, the infantry shielding each elephants’ front shifted aside according to plan, enabling the giant war beasts to crash into the Muslim line at close range. The riders were able to escape and fled without delay, but the infantry wasn’t so lucky. Sa’d’s entire army was brutally shoved back, losing hundreds of men who were gored by tusks, crushed by the elephants’ feet, or put to the sword by Persian arms. Rostam caught the smell of blood in the water. In order to end the battle, he sent cavalry division on deep flanking attack against the Uzeib Castle itself, but this was rapidly countered by unit of Muslim riders. Although that attempt failed, the army of Islam was visibly about to disintegrate, despite the coming of even more reinforcements from the west. Taking advice from defected Persian soldier at the last possible moment, Rashidun light infantry slid through the ranks, surrounded the two lead elephants and blinded them, before swarming the creatures and their onboard missile troops. With the elephant alphas killed, other beasts along the line were overwhelmed and killed in the same manner. Many others, driven into rage by pain and unable to see through mutilated eyes, turned 180 degrees and stampeded towards the canal, crashing through the Persian ranks and disordering Rostam’s army. Sa’d ordered yet another full-scale assault, impacting on the Sassanids with devastating force. al-Qadissyiah was devolving into war of attrition. Not even darkness on the ‘Day of Hardship’ brought the fighting to an end, but the soldiers’ sheer exhaustion gradually led the troops to disengage at sunrise the next day. Both armies seemed to be at breaking point, but it still wasn’t clear who the victor would be. As both armies rested, Qaqa decided to make decisive move. Under the cover of brief sandstorm, he and 700 troops launched an attack on the blinded Persian center, breaking through the line and approaching Rostam. Isolated and disoriented, the Sassanid general was found by Rashidun soldier and slain. Fighting continued until rumours of their commanders fate spread around the Persian army. At that point, the center finally cracked and routed towards the river, followed shortly after by both flanks. The imperial army of the Sassanid Empire had been defeated. The Sassanids lost more than 20 thousand. While the Muslim losses were less than 10 thousand. Arabia was violent place in its own unique fashion. Far from being comparable to the large, hegemonic empires which bordered and often puppeteered its many tribes to further their own agendas pre-conquest, the barren desert of the Arabian Peninsula and most of its people are more accurately balanced against the fearsome nomadic folk of the great Eurasian steppe. Fighting against rival tribes and defending one’s own kin from attack were central part of life, fact which played key role in creating the local culture. Motivated in part by vicious terrain that was untenable to larger military campaigns, the dominant tactic was the so-called razzia - raiding expedition designed to plunder, pillage and take slaves. Such wealth of common martial experience meant that most Bedouin Arabs were, especially compared to the agriculturalists and urban citizens of the near-east, veteran military population. This pre-Islam tribal society provided solid foundation for the development of conquest army, but until the prophet’s lifetime and possibly afterwards as well, there was no ‘army’, as such. With very few exceptions, every single adult male in Bedouin life was warrior, compensated for their endeavours with booty, honour or the defence of their own kin-group from enemies who were attempting to do the same. With the advent of Islam, leadership of Muhammad and the subsequent unification of the Arabian Peninsula under the first Rashidun caliph, its weapon-rich cities and Bedouin-inhabited hinterland alike came under one rule, and one religion. This warlike population, who until recently were occupied fighting one-another in small-scale struggles, could now be directed en masse to attack the settled, exhausted and unready empires beyond the desert frontier. Although now turned to single purpose; to expand the Dar al-Islam, the early Islamic armies remained in many ways what they had been before - tribal raiders. As the assault on Byzantine and Sassanid territory began, it quickly became clear that the established empires were not going to be met on their own terms. It was to be mobile war of razzia which the two emperors and their armies, each bent towards attacking the other, simply could not match. To this purpose, primary strategic weapon of war utilised by the conquering Arabs was the unassuming camel. Accustomed to travelling across incredibly arid terrain with essentially no water, these workhouse pack animals were used to lethal effect on campaign. Camel-mounted armies of Muslim infantry would frequently strike Byzantine or Sassanid territory from unexpected, undefended angles, bleeding the empires of manpower and money before fading back into the desert, where their enemies simply could not go. Imagine playing game of Civilization and possessing an area of apparently impassable terrain near your key resource-producing regions, so you naturally do not fortify the area, because you don’t need to. After all, if no powerful enemy can get there, they can’t attack it anyway. However, one of your underdog opponents then starts cheating and bypassing the impassable to strike at the heart of your most crucial land. Worse still, you can’t chase them back through that terrain. If you try, you give them the opportunity to strike elsewhere. This is what the established empires must have felt when the Muslims started attacking. Khalid ibn Al Walid - arguably the greatest early Muslim general, exploited this prodigious mobility to frustrate and exhaust Sassanid imperial army in what is perhaps the greatest example of its use. During an attack in 633, Khalid planted his Arab army in front of Hufair and tempted Persian general Hormuz, then stationed at Kazima to approach him. His heavily-armoured force embarked on tiring march to do so. When the commander got there however, he discovered that the Muslims had ghosted into the desert and were beelining back towards Kazima. Bound to march in the defence of such strategically vital place, Hormuz forced his unruly, exhausted troops on countermarch. By the time Hormuz arrived back near the city, his army was near mutinous, barely in fit state to move, let alone fight, and in terrible situation. Meanwhile, Khalid’s well-mounted, leisurely stroll back to Kazima had allowed his forces to prepare adequately. In the subsequent Battle of Chains, rejuvenated Muslim forces soundly thrashed Hormuz’ thoroughly outmaneuvered, physically drained army. The average Arab warrior of the early Islamic conquest period would’ve been far less standardised in form than soldier from the Byzantine or Sassanid Empires. Infantry and cavalry were both prominent, despite Arabia’s prominent lack of viable horse-rearing ground. Moreover, the distinction between foot and mounted troops was often blurred. Changing with the situation, cavalry might dismount and fight as infantry while what might be dubbed mobile infantry were frequently carried to battle on horses or camels. Equipment, relatively similar between both cavalry and infantry, was purchased and provided by the individual warrior or tribesman, rather than being issued by the Rashidun Caliphate as state. However, potential combatants who were indeed too poor to assemble equipment of their own might be assisted by wealthy kinsmen, neighbors or other benefactors. Even for the well-to-do in Muslim society, however, good quality equipment was scarce in the early days. There was nothing overly unique about Muslim weaponry during their wars of expansion. Spear, sword and bow were the primary methods of assault, but it is said that the Arabs possessed particularly long spears and remarkably short swords when compared to their enemies. As this short sword was carried in shoulder-baldric rather than belt at the waist, it is likely that this style was copied or inspired by the old Roman gladius, which was kept in similar manner. Metal armour seems to have struck both hot and cold in the Arab mindset from the very beginning, as is evident in saying of the second caliph Umar. He describes mail armour as ‘Keeping our horseman busy, nuisance for our infantry and yet always strong protection’. Originating from the scalding hot and sun-bleached deserts of Arabia, heavy armour must have seemed anathema to Arab warriors at first, due to the sheer discomfort it must have brought on when worn, not to mention its encumbering effect. We can imagine the more well-off Arab warriors investing in coat of mail, only to speak to their comrades about it and be met with traditionalist derision at wearing such burdensome thing. Therefore, it may have been that use of armour was based upon both warrior’s ability to obtain it, in addition to the willingness to don it in battle and on the march. Conversely, it might also have been the case that mail was reserved for frontline troops, while rear-line infantry and archers went without. Whatever the case, notable and repeated occurrence during the Rashiduns’ expansion was trouble facing enemy archers. It became so bad that, whilst fighting the Byzantines in the eventual victory at Yarmouk, Islamic warriors suffered what became known in legend as the day of lost eyes. It might have been that this, in addition to other such occasions, was brought on by reluctance to wear heavy armour and helmets. Two other crucial ‘units’ which partially made up early Rashidun armies have come to symbolise the Muslim style of war during this period - the ‘mobile guard’ cavalry strike force and Mubarizun. Rather than being default part of the Islamic army of expansion as an institution, however, the mobile guard in particular was in fact circumstantial reorganisation enacted by the great general Khalid Ibn al-Walid in the middle of his invasion of Syria. After the commander’s triumph at Ajnadayn in late 634, it was clear that the next stage of the Muslim invasion would have to pierce deep into Syria. So, sifting through the 8,000 strong army under his leadership, Khalid extracted the most veteran, most elite and deadliest fighters to form 4,000 man-strong band of horsemen which was known as the ‘Army of Movement’, or more commonly the mobile guard. In an army whose warriors were already battle-hardened veterans, these paragons were the crème de la crème. One of those handpicked 4,000 was the near mythical warrior-captain Qa’qa bin Amr. Not only did this ferocious lieutenant supposedly play crucial role in both the Battle of Chains and the Battle of Yarmouk, but he was also personally chosen by the caliph to lead Arab reinforcements to the Battle of al-Qadissiyah. If our sources are to be believed, he also played key role in winning this domino-toppling clash as an energetic cavalry commander. That was the sheer quality of soldiers assembled together in Khalid’s elite unit. As coherent and unified force, the mobile guard was frequently used by the legendary sword of Allah as lethal mounted reserve which could be used wherever it was seen fit. The unit could plug hole in allied lines by riding swiftly to where aid was most needed, or it could sweep around the flanks of an enemy to roll up their battle line and win the battle. Under Khalid’s generalship, it played both of these roles during the battle at Yarmouk. Despite its fame and flashy style of warfare, the Rashidun mobile guard was an incredibly short-lived entity, which nevertheless served its purpose. When Khalid was dismissed from his post by Umar, the regiment as unified entity was simply disbanded and its members dispatched to other fronts in Islam’s ongoing wars of conquest. Many more of its warriors apparently passed away during the plague of 639/640, and those few who survived accompanied Amr Ibn al-As to Egypt. The Mubarizun, translated as ‘duelists’ or ‘champions’ served the purpose one would expect of warrior bearing their title. The bravest men in all the Arab armies, Mubarizun would step forward alone and battle Byzantine or Persian champion in the ritualised single combat which was so common in that period. Arab champions were particularly deadly, gaining victory in most battles. As victors they would bring pride to their religion and caliphate, morale to the army and conversely demoralise the enemy force. Still, despite their successes, Muslim forces frequently found themselves on the sharp end of heavy casualty figures and manpower replenishment rapidly became an issue that the caliphs needed to deal with. Part of this shortfall was made up by non-Arab deserters who took up with the invaders and quickly became key cogs in the overall machine of expansion out of the Arabian Peninsula. As early as the Battle of Al-Qadissiyah, 4,000 soldiers from the army of Rostam Farrokhzad went over to the Muslim side. So great was this coup that the defecting warriors were able to demand from the Arabs land of their own choosing, to closely associate themselves with an Arab band of their own preference and to be paid salaries sometimes even in excess of regular Arab warriors. These and other such traitors to the Sassanid shah’s cause were known as the Hamra, or ‘red people’. This phenomenon became so prevalent that, during the Muslim invasion of Khuzestan and the Siege of Shushtar, famous unit of elite Persian soldiers known thereafter as the Asawira, led by one of Yazdegerd’s most senior and trusted commanders, also went over to the caliph’s side. Not only did these most capable of soldiers convert to the new and rising religion of Islam, but they were given in exchange the highest possible level of pay, dwellings in the new town of Basra and position of honour within the Bani Tamim tribe. While massive amount of Byzantine territory was lost to the Arabs, it paled to the annihilation which they inflicted on the Sassanid state, almost certainly in large part due to this lack of faith in their leadership. Persian civilians and soldiers alike seemed all too eager to defect and join the invaders at the slightest opportunity, perhaps due to instability within the royal house, weakness of leadership or oppressive taxes. Conversely, Arab soldiers were, as soldiers go, relatively well behaved. Atrocities still, no doubt, occurred in great quantities, as they do in the vast majority of military conflicts. However, Islamic rules of military conduct, known as siyar, mandated that some sense of civilisation remained even at the darkest points of war. Enemy envoys were to be safeguarded and inviolate, non-combatant civilians were to be treated as neutral parties and truces were to be accepted wherever possible. ‘Do not kill women or children, or an aged infirm person-’ once proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr ‘Do not cut down fruit-bearing trees. Do not destroy an inhabited place. Do not slaughter sheep or camels except for food. Do not burn bees and do not scatter them. Do not steal from the booty and do not be cowardly.’ This kind of attitude, which ideally would result in minimal damage to ‘enemy’ civilian occupations and populations, is likely to have garnered the invading Arabs incredible favour. In the previous season, we covered the first stages of the Muslim conquest of the Middle East. It started in 633 with the campaign in Mesopotamia against the Sassanid empire by the general of the Rashidun Caliphate Khalid ibn al-Walid. After string of victories that brought him to the border of the Eastern Roman Empire, Khalid entered Syria and again won number of decisive battles culminating at the battle of Yarmouk, which put most of the region under the control of the Caliphate. In southern Mesopotamia though, the Sassanid empire attempted counter-attack which led to the battle of al-Qadisiyyah. After the battle that continued for days, the Muslim army commanded by Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas defeated Rostam’s Sassanid force. Amidst the slaughter and unfolding catastrophe at Qadissiyah, the commander of the Persian centre-right - Jalinus - assumed leadership of the imperial army’s remnant and set about saving what forces he could. Assembling small, elite strike force, he thrust towards the al-Atiq dam and drove unit of Muslim troops away before forming perimeter and holding it. As Sassanid stragglers withdrew across the dam wall to the other side, Jalinus bravely repelled many attacks from the Muslims and managed to see most of the remaining troops to safety, but it was still painfully small number. When the last of them were on the canal’s far side, Jalinus had the dam destroyed and began hastily pulling his men upstream to Najaf before the victors fully turned on him. Unwilling, however, to give the foe any breathing room, Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas dispatched Qa’qa and Shurahbeel to hunt down scattered Persian units, while cavalry commander Zuhra bin al-Hawiyya was sent after Jalinus with 300 elite Arab horsemen. Not deterred by the dam crossing’s destruction, Zuhra and his 300 drove their mounts into the torrent and forded it before chasing Jalinus’ column upstream. The latter realised he was being chased and halted with his own cavalry at nearby bridge, while the infantry carried on withdrawing all the way to Najaf. After short time, the horsemen of Zuhra came across Jalinus’ valiant rear-guard and charged it, breaking the formation swiftly and provoking its leader into yet another withdrawal. His heels constantly bit by Zuhra as he did, Jalinus chose to turn and face the enemy in final fight, believing that the best way to stop the pursuit was to kill the leader. So, he halted his forces, turned about face and arrayed for battle, before personally riding before his troops and challenging Zuhra to single combat. Galloping forward atop their horses, the two exhausted commanders fought one another to decide the issue once and for all, and once again it was the Muslim who came out on top after hard-fought struggle. Jalinus was killed and his cavalry took flight, but many were still caught and slain by Zuhra’s riders. By sunset, the 300 reached Najaf, where they halted for the night. With the aim of conquering prosperous Iraq, which the Muslims believed was the ‘heart of the world’, Sa’d reorganised his 20,000 troops into five marching corps1 with Zuhra retaining his advance guard position. Two weeks after Qadissiyah, he was quickly joined at Najaf by the remainder of the army and given the order to cross the Euphrates. Incoming Sassanid reinforcements under Nakheerjan arrived in the area soon after, having been initially bound for Rostam’s now broken force. Hearing of the defeat, the reinforcement group halted east of the Euphrates and waited for new orders from Ctesiphon, which came in the form of Firuzan, general tasked by Emperor Yazdegerd with preventing or delaying the seemingly unstoppable advance of the Muslims. When Firuzan appraised the situation, he decided that his army of fresh and recently defeated forces under his command wouldn’t be enough to throw the Arabs back. So, he instead prepared defensive actions at series of defensible locations and cities on the road to the Persian capital, so that the great city would have time to fortify. As his first move, Firuzan ordered the governor of Burs, Busbuhra, to hold his branch of the Euphrates and gave him some troops to help with the task, while the general and his main army started massing near Babylon. When Zuhra’s advance guard neared Burs, the city’s governor rode out to meet him. In short battle, the holding force of Sassanid troops was routed and Busbuhra severely wounded. During the flight, he died from his wounds. Following this defeat, the new local leader made peace with the Caliphate, agreeing to provide information and logistical assistance. From these new allies, Zuhra learned that the formidable main Sassanid army opposing him was indeed across the Euphrates at Babylon, along with several high nobles. Zuhra then forwarded this crucial information to Sa’d at Najaf, and waited for the four corps trailing his own to catch up. When they did, the Muslims advanced on Babylon in strength and, at some point in December 636, met Firuzan along the river bank and crushed his army in brief but harsh battle. One of the defeated generals, Hormuzan, fled south with his contingent to his domain in Ahwaz, while Firuzan and the remainder withdrew north in good order, leaving garrisons at Sura and Deir Kab along the way2. Zuhra again set off in hot pursuit and, despite fierce resistance from the defensive Sassanid armies in his way, managed to defeat them at Sura, Deir Kab, and Kusa on his relentless drive to Ctesiphon. By early January of 637, the Muslim leader neared Vologesocerta - just one of the cities which made up larger Ctesiphon, where he was again rejoined by the bulk of the army. To the desert-dwelling Arabs, whose largest urban areas were but fraction of the size, the Persian capital was unlike anything most of them had ever witnessed in their lives. More than just single city, Ctesiphon had in fact grown to encompass about seven grandiose population centres which had been constructed and assimilated over the centuries, forming true metropolis. Because of its unique nature, the Persian heartland was dubbed Madain, or ‘The Cities’ in Arabic. On the Tigris’ western bank stood Seleucia, Vologesocerta and Veh-Ardashir, while Ctesiphon proper and number of peripheral hubs were to the east. Perhaps the most majestic sight for those approaching Arabs during 637 would have been the 40-meter-tall Arch of Khosrow, an architectural marvel unique in the world at the time. Although Firuzan hadn’t managed to stop the Muslim advance, his delaying action had worked, and now the entire western portion of Yazdegerd’s imperial capital was fortified with deep ditch, with manned positions at regular intervals. The Sassanid Shah3 and his advisors also massed number of ballistae and catapults in the bounds of Veh-Ardashir which, as the closest sub-city to Ctesiphon proper, was the focus of their defensive efforts. Zuhra ordered an attack on Madain shortly after his arrival, but Yazdegerd’s artillery began launching bolts and throwing giant stones out of Veh-Ardashir and into the Muslim ranks, causing severe losses and forcing Zuhra’s forces to retreat out of range. Unable to reply in kind, he sent scouting parties to probe and find way inside, but everywhere came across the Persians’ defensive trench and were unable to breach it. Sa’d arrived at this point and assumed command, swiftly deciding that there was little point wasting his warriors in careless assaults against such strong defences. So, instead he established blockade around all of Madain west of the Tigris and settled his forces down for long siege. However, Sa’d wasn’t content to sit and wait for victory, taking all measures he thought possible to secure faster surrender of the unbelievers, primarily by scything away the western bastion’s food supplies. To do this, he had his subcommanders conduct raids on the neighboring hinterland, seizing cattle and sheep for the Muslims’ own uses whilst also sapping the enemy’s resources by preventing supplies from reaching Veh-Ardashir. In the process of doing so, Arab cavalry seized thousands of farmers as prisoners of war who, upon the intercession of regional leader who had submitted, were freed upon agreeing to pay the Jizya tax. In addition, security for their lives and possessions were guaranteed, an act which won the Muslim invaders considerable good will with the locals. Throughout the months long siege, Sa’d’s warriors had also been continuously harried by the sophisticated Sassanid engines of war Yazdegerd’s generals had amassed, although casualties at their hands remained relatively light. Unfortunately for the Persians, some of their engineers defected during the course of the siege and provided their masters with at least 20 novel artillery pieces of their own. When these contraptions subsequently began sending their own missiles howling into Ctesiphon, the dense concentration of Sassanid soldiers and civilians inside resulted in them causing terrible destruction. The fact that the Muslims had even acquired weaponry of this kind, which had until then been universally in Persian hands, also badly affected morale. By mid-March 637 western Madain’s situation was becoming intolerable. Persian civilians starved to death in the hundreds, while more were reduced to eating stray cats and dogs to survive. Beset by such conditions, the Sassanid troops not manning the ditch were concentrated into single strike force and led in desperate sortie beyond their defences. The Muslims arrayed to meet them in pitched battle and desperate struggle began. Zuhra’s corps was in the thick of the action and he himself was wounded by an arrow. Despite his injury, the valiant Bani Tamin chief led counterattack and personally slew the Persian strike force commander, after which the defenders withdrew behind their ditch. The savage fighting to repulse the Persian attack was followed by few hours of eerie calm, during which Sassanid officer approached the Muslims with an offer: each belligerent would retain whatever territory they had captured on their respective sides of the Tigris. However, these conditions were declined with the reply “There can never be peace between us until we get honey out of the lemons of Kusa.” When these peace overtures were rejected, the Persian forces in Veh-Ardashir quietly withdrew from their positions and pulled back across the Tigris. Western Ctesiphon was now under Muslim control. Yazdegerd III also sent his family, retainers and treasury ahead to Hulwan, where the emperor intended to move his court if the great capital fell. Although behaving as if defeat was already inevitable, from his seat in the White Palace Yazdegerd appointed Rostam’s brother Khurrazad and Mihran to command the defence of the eastern city. These generals promptly redeployed their remaining forces on the eastern bank and waited for the besiegers’ next move. That same evening, on the river’s edge of newly occupied Veh-Ardashir, Sa’d stared across the Tigris at the glorious Arch of Khosrow and pondered his next move, eager to claim it for Islam. As Muhammad’s former companion strategised to himself, Persian approached him and asked “What are you waiting for?”, followed by the alarming revelation that “Not another two days will pass before Yazdegerd departs with everything in Ctesiphon!” Time was now of the essence. Another sympathetic local, possibly disillusioned by heavy Sassanid taxation or possibly even recent convert to Islam, took Sa’d to known ford in the river, one which Sa’d deemed unsuitable due to the swift current and deep water. Rather than make hasty decision right then, he chose to sleep on the issue and decide in the morning. During the night, Sa’d supposedly had strange dream in which he saw the Tigris’ waters, only they were flowing incredibly quickly and were unrealistically deep. Still, his own Arab cavalry appeared and plunged into the seemingly impassable torrent, reaching the other side relatively easily. The next morning, Sa’d convened conference of his highest generals and declared that the cavalry would swim through the river, and asked if there were any volunteers to lead the dangerous attack. The first to put himself forward was Asim bin Amr, Qaqa’s tribal comrade and dashing military leader, followed by 700 of the most reckless and brave Muslim warriors. After all necessary preparations had been made by midmorning, Asim plunged into the water and began his crossing. Khurrazad responded by ordering his Persians into the river to meet them, but after hearty resistance the Sassanid cavalry who responded were pushed back when one of their comrades from the city came, shouting “Why are you killing yourselves, there is nobody left in Ctesiphon to defend!” He was at least partially correct. Upon receiving word that the Muslims were crossing the Tigris, Emperor Yazdegerd had departed his capital for Hulwan, taking much of the imperial court with him. After their resistance faltered, most of the army defending the city followed suit4, save for Sassanid regiment fortified in the White Palace. On the Tigris, Sa’d took the opportunity Asim’s lance-like advance had given him and began ferrying the rest of his warriors across to the bridgehead, not without danger of succumbing to the raging waters. One man fell from his horse and fell into the current, but the all-powerful Qaqa reached down in the nick of time and heaved him up. Despite the myriad dangers of the crossing, in relatively short order the entire Islamic army was on the eastern bank of the Tigris river. The moment Sa’d himself landed, he ordered Asim and Qaqa to move on the core of Ctesiphon, in the process of which they encountered token resistance, but this was quickly dealt with. The Muslims found their final opposition in the White Palace, but chose to deal with it by sending forward yet another companion of Muhammad - Salman. Persian by birth, he had converted to Islam after meeting the prophet in Arabia, and now his heritage proved crucial boon. “I am actually one of you, feel for you.” he said upon meeting the defenders, and outlined the usual three choices - Jizya, conversion, or death. After short negotiation, the hopeless palace troops accepted the Islamic tax and surrendered. Ctesiphon - Jewel of the Sassanid imperial superpower for over four centuries - was now in Arab hands, people who had been mere afterthought only years earlier. Separate columns of Arab riders under Zuhra and Qaqa galloped forth from the captured city almost immediately, moving in different directions5 in pursuit of their enemy. The spoils were plenty - for example, 11 priceless suits of armour and swords which belonged to Heraclius of the Byzantine Empire, the Turkish Khagan, and other world leaders. Other treasures now in Sa’d’s hands included gold, jewels, and imperial regalia. With the Sassanid capital had come the empire’s boundless wealth, and also the first major mass conversions of Persians to Islam. Salman the Persian in particular played role in this religious change, preaching to his countrymen the values and beliefs of the new faith. Although Ctesiphon and all the ‘Suwad’ was lost to the House of Sasan, the Persians’ resistance to their conquest by the Muslims would continue in the old heartland beyond the Zagros. We last left the Muslims’ Syrian campaign in the aftermath of Abu Ubaidah and Khalid Ibn al Walid’s triumph over the Romans at Yarmouk. Exhausted from that long six-day struggle, the Muslims remained camped around Jabiya for month, collecting the bounties of war and recuperating their strength. The scant few of Heraclius’ warriors who survived the massacre fled north to the relative safety of Northern Syria, leaving Palestine at the mercy of the Islamic forces. Without an army to check his progress, Abu Ubaidah assembled his generals in October 636 to decide how best to exploit the situation. Some argued for an attack on the strategic lynchpin of Caesarea - coastal fortress whose garrison could be indefinitely reprovisioned by the Roman navy if besieged, but which could also serve as potential beachhead for counterattack if not taken. If the Muslims got it, the campaign for Palestine would be over. However, other commanders pointed inland towards much simpler and symbolically enticing target - Jerusalem. Not only could this isolated city be strangled into submission with relative ease, but the loss of their holiest place would be crushing blow to Roman Christian morale. Unable to come to decision, Abu Ubaidah sent message to Caliph Umar asking his opinion. The reply was simple - take Jerusalem. So, Abu Ubaidah led the Muslim army straight at the holy city. Realising what was about to happen, Jerusalem’s patriarch Sophronius secretly sent the holiest Christian relics, including the true cross, off to Constantinople by sea. The raiding Arab mobile guard under Khalid reached Jerusalem sometime in November, just before the rest of the army, and this prompted the Roman garrison to pull back inside. Discovering to their chagrin that its fortifications had been reinforced after Yarmouk in anticipation of just such siege, the five commanders - Abu Ubaidah, Khalid, Yazid, Amr and Shurahbil, nevertheless blocked off all passage in and out of Jerusalem. This state of affairs continued for four months in relatively uneventful siege of which few details survive. The situation in the city must have become unbearable though, because in March 637 Sophronius offered to surrender Jerusalem if Umar himself came and personally signed the treaty with him. When these terms became known, Shurahbil suggested that Khalid, whose appearance was relatively similar to that of the caliph, should impersonate their leader and secure quick surrender. However, this attempt at deception failed the next morning because Khalid was far too well known in the Levant by this point. When it did, Abu Ubaidah instead dispatched message to Medina explaining the situation. few weeks later, having made the long journey from Arabia, Caliph Umar arrived near Jerusalem. Khalid and Yazid greeted him, both dressed in fine silk clothing, but this annoyed Umar - firm enemy of luxury and proponent of the Spartan way of life. Seeing his generals in such state of apparent excess, the caliph picked up some pebbles and threw them at the two stunned men, shouting “Shame on you, that you greet me in this fashion. It is only in the last two years that you have eaten your fill!”. The caliph’s rage was quickly sated when Khalid and Shurahbil revealed that they were, in fact, still carrying armour and weapons beneath their fine outer garments. Drama aside, he quickly got down to business and negotiated with Sophronius, with the result that Jerusalem was opened to the Muslims by late April. It is said that the pact between Umar and Sophronius recognised Christians as ‘protected people’ with the right to practice their own religion in return for the Jizya, but this ‘Covenant of Umar’ is probably apocryphal. Now that the holy city of Christendom was in his hands, the caliph conferred with his commanders and then went back to Arabia. The Syrian army then split into thirds, with Amr and Shurahbil moving to reoccupy and secure Palestine, Yazid besieging Caesarea, while Khalid and Abu Ubaidah moved to begin the conquest of Northern Syria. With the situation in the region seemingly hopeless after the Yarmouk disaster, Emperor Heraclius sailed from Antioch and withdrew back into Anatolia, intent on consolidating Byzantine military strength and protecting the remainder of his empire. Once the ship departed, it is said that Heraclius said the words: “Farewell, long farewell to Syria, my fair province. You are an enemy’s now. Peace be with you, o’ Syria, what beautiful land you will be for the enemy’s hands.” Despite this effective abandonment, some of the Roman garrisons were still determined to resist the Arab advance. From Jerusalem, 17,000 strong force under Khalid and Abu Ubaidah marched unopposed to Damascus, and then even further north to Emesa. From there, Khalid was dispatched with his elite mobile guard to Chalkis - modern Qinnasrin - but was intercepted on plain at nearby Hazir by 7,000 men under the town’s Roman commander - Menas. He deployed his limited forces in three divisions - centre and two wings, placing himself at the forefront. Khalid charged with his Arab cavalry and soon enough fearsome mounted engagement was underway. After only short amount of time, however, Menas was slain amidst heavy fighting, and his troops, who loved their general, went wild with fury. Despite their numerical inferiority, the Roman troops matched the Muslims pound-for-pound in the head-on clash, pushing them back little but committing themselves too much. To exploit the opportunity, Khalid detached unit of cavalry from one of his wings and led it around the Byzantine line, attacking his enemy from the rear and defeating them. It is said that not single Roman survived this engagement at Hazir. Following this victory, in June 637, Khalid moved on Chalkis itself, where the garrison was stubbornly fortified in the town’s citadel. Rather than launching an assault, the Muslim general merely demanded those inside and the defenders surrender, which they did soon after. Abu Ubaidah rejoined Khalid at this point and the pair moved north to Aleppo, where they defeated minor Byzantine force commanded by Joachim in pitched battle outside the city. Much like at Chalkis, the Romans retreated into their fortifications - hilltop citadel outside Aleppo itself. Joachim sallied out few times in an attempt to break the siege, but failed, and by October 637 the city was in Arab hands. The greatest Roman city in Syria - Antioch, was now close. To precipitate an attack on it, Ubaidah sent strike force to deal with the garrison at Azaz in the north, so that no Roman units could hit them from the flank as they were taking Antioch. This was done swiftly, and when the strike force returned Ubaidah’s advance on Antioch began. When the Muslim army was 12 miles from one of the urban jewels of the Byzantine Empire, they were met at an iron bridge over the Orontes River by powerful Roman army who had come from Antioch. Although the details of this ‘Battle of the Iron Bridge’ are also unknown, it is clear that Khalid used his mobile guard to superb effect, crushing the Romans in battle whose casualties were only exceeded by Ajnadayn and Yarmouk. In the wake of thousands of fleeing enemy soldiers, the Muslims approached and besieged Antioch, but taking the illustrious capital of the east was an anticlimax. Only few days into Abu Ubaidah’s investment - October 30th, the weakened city surrendered on terms and its defenders were permitted to withdraw north unmolested. Having cleaved the Eastern Roman Empire into two disconnected pieces, Abu Ubaidah dispatched Khalid on daring cavalry raid across the Taurus Mountains and into the Tarsus region, while the supreme commander himself thrust south down the Mediterranean coast, capturing seaports such as Laodicea, Gibala, Antarados and Tripoli making it impossible for emperor Heraclius to use the superior Roman navy to bring armies into the Levant. Although fighting in the area was far from over, by late 637 most generals of Syrian campaign settled down to rule their respective regions as governors1. At Hulwan, Yazdegerd III was still eager to salvage his crumbling empire after the loss of Ctesiphon. To do this, he ordered the main Persian army under Mihran and Khurrazad to halt their retreat and turn to face the invaders near Jalula. Armies attempting to push north past the riverside town were forced to march through narrow gap between the Tigris’ Diyala tributary to the west side and an area of barely passable broken ground to the east. If Mihran’s 20-30,000 could hold this position, the remainder of the northern Suwad and Sassanid territory east of the Zagros Mountains would be unassailable. With the aim of converting Jalula into an impenetrable fortress able to resist any enemy thrust, Mihran immediately started digging in. ditch was excavated three miles to the south which connected the broken ground to the river, blocking the gap. Behind this trench were number of other fortifications, artillery and thousands of Persian archers, while in front were placed an array of wooden anti-cavalry caltrops. Recruits were mustered, armed and trained from the local area, and provisions were gathered from around the nearby countryside. Jalula was to be crucial battle. The moment Sassanid defensive works began around Jalula, word reached Sa’d in Ctesiphon that this was happening. As the Muslim general was just as keen to seize the fertile northern Suwad as his Persian enemies were to keep hold of it, and wanting to push the defensive frontier eastwards, Sa’d sent his nephew Hashim bin Utba with 12,000 troops to reduce the Persian position. In order to prevent reinforcement or retreat, Sa’d also dispatched 5,000 men to deal with Persian governor Intaq’s garrison at Mosul. After several attempts at taking that city by storm, Muslim spies managed to secure the defection of Christian Arab contingent in betrayal which led to the fall of Mosul. In the main force heading for Jalula during March 637, Hashim brought with him many companions of Muhammed, as well as the ever-ferocious Qaqa ibn Amr. Also in the Muslim ranks were several thousand Persian troops along with Sassanid officers who had joined them after Ctesiphon. When the Arabs and their Persian units approached the Jalula gap after day’s march from the former Sassanid capital, Hashim constructed his camp and deployed along the southern arc of Mihran’s protective trench, unwilling to launch an outright assault against it. So, the situation remained in this manner for many months, during which reinforcements, provisions and money was channeled into the fortified city from Hulwan, where Emperor Yazdegerd was continuously rallying additional forces. Aware that his situation was only going to worsen with time, Hashim ordered several attempts at storming the fortified ditch. Despite the disconcerting failure of Mihran’s wooden caltrops to stop Arab cavalry, Persian missile troops managed to overwhelm and repel these attacks. Afterwards, the Sassanids replaced the wooden obstacles with more effective iron ones. Demoralised due to their lack of success in breaking the Persian line, the Muslims ceased offensive actions for while, and that gave Mihran an opportunity of his own. Utilising the constant steady stream of reinforcements coming his way, the Persian general began launching sorties against Hashim’s positions, inflicting losses and gaining confidence as he did. Although the Muslim army was easily able to fight up to 80 of these attacks off when they arrived and pushed Mihran back into his fortifications repeatedly, there was still no way to break the deadlock. With little other option, Hashim sent word back to Ctesiphon that he required reinforcements. Sa’d initially sent 600 infantry and 400 cavalry to bolster the army at Jalula, but this total was barely enough to replace the losses suffered during eight months of battle and light siege. So, soon after, another 500 cavalry reinforcements were dispatched which included many competent Arabic tribal chiefs who had fought against the Caliphate in the Ridda Wars. The Persians, having been themselves reinforced by Yazdegerd and emboldened by Muslim inability to break their defences, now decided to go on the attack before Hashim was further reinforced. Mihran also realised that simply waiting wasn’t going to win him the battle - the only way to make the Muslim invaders leave was to inflict decisive defeat on them. Deployment for an assault began with haste. Such Sassanid preparations for major attack could not be concealed, and it immediately attracted Hashim’s attention. This state of affairs was, however, also favourable to the Muslims, who were utterly sick and tired of sitting helplessly outside Mihran’s fortifications, So, to facilitate pitched battle, Hashim withdrew his forces short distance to the south and allowed his Persian adversaries to cross their own entrenchments, thereafter arraying for battle opposite. The actual order of battle at Jalula is obscure to us, but we do know that two former ‘apostate’ chiefs - Amr bin Madi Karib of the Zubaid family and Tuleiha bin Khuleiwad of the Banu Asad, were given command of the cavalry and infantry respectively. Now that the Persian rear was anchored by their own ditch, the only direction to move was forwards, and that is just what happened. At Mihran’s command, the Battle of Jalula proper began with full-scale Sassanid attack along the entire front, with archers and javelineers loosing their projectiles before melee troops made contact. The charge struck with devastating impact, but Hashim’s Muslims nevertheless resisted stalwartly for time, refusing to give an inch of ground. This didn’t last long however, as the ferocious assault, fired up by constant shouts swearing vengeance for Qadissiyah and Ctesiphon, began punching small holes in various places along the Muslim line. These successful thrusts endangered the integrity of the entire Muslim front, and it was immediately clear to Hashim that the danger of total collapse was very real, and perhaps imminent. To resolve the problem, Sa’d’s nephew rode along his buckling line to speak inspirationally to those units which were weakening, proclaiming that if they persisted, this was the last battle they would have to fight. The present clash between Sassanid and Muslim troops became increasingly brutal as both sides’ missile units ran out of javelins and arrows, instead taking up melee weapons and charging into the slog themselves. Both armies had units battered into non-functionality by the extended fighting, but when this happened the Persians were able to replace them, while Hashim had no such luxury. Because of this numerical disadvantage, one Islamic unit gave way and routed to the rear at about noon, leaving potentially fatal vacuum in the Muslim line. However, either because Mihran did not notice the opportunity or due to his soldiers’ exhaustion, an attack on the position was not ordered and Hashim scraped together some men to fill the position. Witnessing the flight of this unit, Qaqa rode back and restored order, returning it to the battle. Almost unbearable desert heat and the brutal fighting led to the Persians halting their offensive just after this, and both sides disengaged. After short rest, Mihran planned to keep piling on the pressure, but Hashim had other plans. As his enemy had before, the Muslim general ordered his warriors to charge across the entire front, spoiling Mihran’s assault and initiating another gruelling clash which lasting for over an hour without decisive moment. Just before sunset, however, the wind whipped up and storm rolled in from the south, weather phenomenon which affected the Persians more than the hardy desert nomads. As the wind was now at the Muslims’ back, granting them momentum in the advance, Hashim signalled Qaqa ibn Amr to embark on maneuver they had prepared beforehand. While his general kept Mihran occupied in front, the buccaneering Arab warrior took regiment away from the left wing unnoticed and managed to circle around the Persian rear. Instead of attacking immediately, Qaqa left most of his outflanking force in sheltered area to stop them being seen, then took few outriders and man with an incredibly strong voice close to the main crossing point over the Persian trench. Following the call, multiple things happened at once. First, the Muslim army, deceived by their own into believing that their general had reached the trench alone, attacked with renewed vigour and peak morale. At the same time, worried that large numbers of Muslims were now behind them, individual Sassanid units, who did not have strategic overview of the field, panicked, lost cohesion but did not break. The coup de grace was administered by Qaqa himself, whose flanking force charged upon hearing the shout, whirling into Mihran’s flank like thunderbolt. At the impact, the Sassanid line was rolled up before being encircled entirely. Still, however, the Persian forces were stalwart, refusing to collapse utterly despite their unwinnable situation. Muslim forces continued attacking the encircled but still resistant forces of Mihran all day, losing troops as they did. However, the Sassanid soldiers were only human. At sunset, as the sky began to darken, everything fell apart and the Persians routed, only to be cut down as they fled. great mass of them, driven into the ditch and their own iron stakes by Hashim’s army, perished terribly. Up to half of the Sassanid army perished at Jalula, while the remainder, including the town garrison, fled in the direction of Hulwan, and the town itself fell in December 637. Shortly after, Qaqa rode in pursuit of the retreating enemy and defeated them first at Khaniqeen, before besieging and capturing Hulwan in January 638. Emperor Yazdegerd retreated beyond the Zagros. When Qaqa subsequently wrote to the caliph asking permission to operate deeper in Persia, Umar would have absolutely none of it. Forbidding the operation, he replied “I wish that between the Suwad and the hills were wall which would prevent them from getting to us and prevent us from getting to them. The fertile Suwad is sufficient for us, and prefer the safety of the Muslims to the spoils of war.” Expansion to the east was halted, but the Muslims were now looking towards the jewel in the Roman imperial crown - Egypt. Despite winning all of Syria and Iraq for Islam in series of stunning victories, the caliphate’s military situation remained unstable. Fierce Persian resistance continued in the mountainous to the northeast, while Emperor Heraclius was hindering the Muslim advance as much as he could. To stall for time while he created an impenetrable dead-zone between the Anatolian plain and enemy-occupied Syria, Heraclius sent envoys to his Christian Arab allies in the Jazeera area requesting that they attack the Muslim army in Syria. They obeyed the emperor’s orders, crossing the Euphrates and arriving outside Emesa in March 638, where Abu Ubaidah had concentrated his forces to meet them. However, Umar, in his typically hands-on fashion, reacted to this news by sending orders to Sa’d, in Persia, for three columns to invade Jazeera from Iraq. When this group of Muslim warriors launched their attack and began plundering, the Christian Arabs retreated. In the aftermath, forces under Sa’d turned and annexed Jazeera completely. At the same time, multiple mounted raiding parties were sent by Abu Ubaidah into Roman lands. Khalid, the commander of one of these contingents, captured Marash in Autumn 638, and hauled vast quantities of loot back to his base at Qinnasrin. However, Khalid wasn’t man accustomed to hoarding wealth, routinely distributing his personal share of battle spoils to others. On one occasion after his raid on Heraclius’ lands, an Arab chief and excellent poet - Ash’as bin Qais - recited beautiful piece for Khalid, and in return was given 10,000 dirhams. Unknown to the poet’s benefactor, this act of generosity was in fact to herald the end of his peerless military career. Caliph Umar had been concerned about Khalid for years by 638, specifically that his personal brilliance and constant victories were enticing the Muslims to worship him, rather than god. So, when Umar received reports of his general’s extravagance, Umar used it as an excuse to dismiss the Sword of Islam from his post and bring him to Medina. When the two formidable men came face to face, the caliph spoke the words: “You have done, and no man has done as you have done. But it is not people who do; it is Allah who does.” After this, Khalid left Arabia for Chalkis, where he lived just four more unhappy, unremarkable years before finally passing away in 642. As the undefeated victor of hundreds of clashes leaves our story, another bold but historically unappreciated Arab general enters the limelight. That was the forty-eight-year-old Amr ibn al-As, who won distinction during the battles at Ajnadayn, Yarmouk, and many others. When Abu Ubaidah appointed the conquered regions to his subordinates, Amr received all of Palestine. Upon moving into the area, he forced the surrender of Gaza and several other Roman garrisons which had remained unconquered after the Fall of Jerusalem. In early 639, plague spread rapidly throughout the Levant. The Arabs, unaccustomed to this kind of terrible disease because of their nomadic lifestyle, died in the thousands, including generals Yazid, Shurahbil, and Abu Ubaidah himself. It is worth noting that upon Yazid’s death, his younger brother Muawiya was appointed as governor in his place. Amr, who survived, was given command of the army, and this gave him golden opportunity to propose an idea to the caliph Having visited Alexandria multiple times earlier in his life, Amr was well aware of just how prosperous the Nile region was, and believed it would be easy to conquer. The new commander put forward his plan to seize Roman Egypt for Islam, confidently declaring to the caliph: “It is the richest of lands, and the weakest in defending itself!” Although Umar, who wished to consolidate Muslim gains after years of incessant warfare and plague, was initially reluctant, believing Amr was underestimating the task, his eloquence and persistence eventually led the caliph to relent. Restricted to just 4,000 troops, mainly cavalry, Amr set forth from Jabiya that same night in total secrecy, under the condition that he would withdraw if instructions to turn back reached him before he crossed into Egypt. However, if Amr’s army was already inside Egypt when these instructions arrived, it could keep going. Convinced almost immediately that this expedition was too risky, Umar sent camel rider off to Amr carrying sealed letter, ordering him to pull back. When it reached the general at Rafah, just few miles from Egypt, Amr understood that the letter would doom his expedition before it even began. So, Amr left the message unopened and moved into Egypt and only then opened the letter, and since the army was already in Egypt when Umar’s orders were revealed, Amr reasoned that it could keep going. The timeless province of power and riches was incredibly vulnerable, weakened by years of military laxity and alienated from the imperial authorities in Constantinople by long-standing cultural and religious differences. The primary factor was that the Copts - Egypt’s native population - adhered to different form of Christianity to the empire at large Emperor Heraclius in particular persecuted any perceived heretic in manner that made religious division inevitable. The Roman authorities in Alexandria were alerted to Amr’s presence, responding by raising troops and sending some of them to reinforce Pelusium - the ‘key to Egypt’. Setting forth from Arish in late December 639, the Caliphate’s small army of veterans soon reached Pelusium, besieging it by land. However, Roman naval superiority meant that the city garrison could be reinforced and supplied, and this led to two-month-long siege which was only brought to conclusion when the Muslims repulsed sortie and stormed the city in mid-February 640. After taking Pelusium, to the alarm and astonishment of the government in Alexandria, Amr marched unopposed along the Nile Delta’s eastern fringe until he reached the citadel of Bilbeis. The defenders resisted under blockade for month, giving the Romans time to shift their forces around. Aware that the marauding 4,000 Arabs were aiming for the Memphis area Egypt’s prefect and Patriarch of Alexandria, Cyrus, marched 20,000 strong army to reinforce the nearby fortress called Babylon. Commanded by Augustalis Theodorus and garrisoned by 5,000 soldiers, Babylon was one of the Nile’s strongest defensive bastions, standing 60 feet high in places and possessing walls up to six feet thick. By the time Amr starved the Bilbeis defenders into surrender in the spring of 640, the Romans were prepared for his inevitable assault. Bypassing Heliopolis on their left, the Muslims arrived outside Babylon in May. Due to its sheer size, only some of Theodorus’ army were manning the battlements, while most were encamped outside of the northern wall of the fortress, protected by deep arcing ditch. Fortifying this secondary protection even further were spikes in front and undug sections around the perimeter to act as sally points. Shortly after arriving and witnessing the Roman strength arrayed inside Babylon, Amr launched his 4,000 against the Roman units directly in front of the trench. After hard-fought skirmish, the Muslims were repulsed with relative ease and set about finally making camp. Observing that his plan to keep Theodorus on the defensive was paying off, Amr mounted daily raids against the Roman positions all along the ditch. Furthermore, in an attempt to conceal just how tiny his forces were, the Muslim commander split and spread it over large area. This state of affairs lasted for two months - the Muslims constantly assailing the Roman positions and the Romans remaining hunkered down behind the ditch, presumably believing they would be able to win without fighting. By July, no opportunity to gain decisive victory had shown itself to Amr and his men were slowly tiring. So, having put the eventuality to the back of his mind, the man who had proclaimed that taking Egypt would be simple, wrote to the caliph asking for reinforcements. Rather than chiding his overly optimistic general, Umar mustered and sent him 4,000 reinforcements to conclude the campaign, who reached Amr few weeks later. With these new forces, the Muslim attacks on Babylon were renewed with even greater force, killing large numbers of Roman soldiers but failing to break the bastion’s resistance. Even more hesitantly than the first time, Amr sent another request for Umar’s aid. This time, further 4,000 troops were dispatched under the leadership of Zubayr bin Al-Awwam who, despite being offered Amr’s command by the irritated caliph, merely stated that he wished to help the Muslims engaged in Egypt. These new troops arrived in late September. After conducting personal reconnaissance mission around the area, Zubayr pointed something out to Amr which the general seems to have missed: still present about 10 miles behind the Muslim army was the Roman-garrisoned city of Heliopolis. If coordinated correctly, these troops could smash into the Muslims from behind if Theodorus launched any attack from Babylon. To remove this potential threat, Amr led large portion of his 12,000 total soldiers to Heliopolis, leaving just enough at the fortress to keep the Romans on their toes. Upon approaching the walls, however, some of the garrison’s cavalry contingent emerged from the city and beat some of Amr’s horsemen in brief engagement. Nevertheless, they were forced to pull back inside the walls as the city was besieged. Only short time after investing Heliopolis, Zubayr and small unit of handpicked warriors scaled the walls in dashing maneuver and breached the city. Seeing this, and realising that the result of the clash was inevitable anyway, Heliopolis’ garrison sued for peace and paid the Jizya, after which Amr and Zubayr returned to Babylon. In their absence, the Romans had driven away the Muslim detachments closest to the trench and re-established their positions beyond it. Theodorus, likely realising that he wasn’t going to have the luxury of simply waiting the invaders out, began employing the Muslims’ own tactics against them, launching daily raids through the Roman bridgeheads. Although the Romans generally lost more men in these scattered engagements, they could afford to, while Amr could not. The stalemate went on relatively unchanged until revered Arab officer - Kharija bin Huzafa - approached Amr with risky but potentially decisive plan to win the battle. That night, Kharija was given cavalry regiment and ordered to lay his trap, which he did by riding around to the southern spur of featureless ridge on the eastern side of the field. After quietly taking up concealed position relatively close to the Romans’ ditch, the Muslim cavalry waited. As Huzafa suspected, when morning came the Roman forces crossed the trench in force and deployed for battle - the Muslims arrayed opposite them. When both sides were ready, Theodorus launched his attack across the front, pushing Amr, who ordered his army to retreat from Babylon with suspicious ease. It was, in reality, feigned retreat. When the melee had moved far beyond Babylon’s defensive trench, Kharija’s mounted contingent galloped out from their hiding place behind the ridge and occupied the crossing areas which Theodorus would have to use for any retreat. Amr, seeing that his horsemen were in place, countercharged with immense ferocity, driving the Romans back towards their own fortifications. Hearing the given signal, Kharija also launched his assault, crashing straight into Theodorus rear, hemming the Romans in and then encircling them. Many defenders were killed, but few Roman units turned and burst through Huzafa’s cavalry, managing to resecure the crossing points. The remnants of the Roman army at Babylon retreated across the trench, pursued closely by Amr’s forces, who continued their attack up to the very walls of the fortress. Fighting continued in the space between the ditch and the citadel proper until the gate was closed from inside. Those who got in were the lucky ones, as not single Roman soldier remained alive on the field of battle The morale of Cyrus, who was not military man by profession, and the Roman soldiery as whole, was completely shaken by this stark defeat, and to the prefect it was clear that peace had to be concluded. To make matters even more dire, Amr somehow got his hands on few catapults and used them to launch deadly boulders, softening up the defences. When this began happening, Cyrus departed Babylon with small escort and took up residence on the midriver island of Rauda, from which the fortress was being resupplied. Then the Coptic prefect dejectedly sent word to the Muslims that he wished to treat with them. Envoys were exchanged back and forth between the two sides, and Heraclius’ viceroy attempted to offer Amr lavish bribe if the Muslims left Egypt, but the Arab commander responded by giving 3 options - conversion to Islam, payment of the Jizya, or death. Cyrus favoured capitulating in some form, but his Egyptian colleagues wouldn’t have any of it, so the stalemate continued outside the impenetrable fortress. Since coming to terms with Cyrus was impossible, Amr went into Babylon with few companions in order to speak with Theodorus. However, when he was entering the fortress, Roman soldier muttered to him scornfully “You have entered, now see how you get out.” Correctly believing orders had been given for him to be killed upon exiting the conference, Amr tricked his way out of the fortress, convincing Theodorus that he was going to bring even more of his generals unwittingly into the trap. These attempts at ending the siege failed and the gridlock outside Babylon continued. But finally, in mid-December, the observant Zubayr noticed that, since most of the fighting had taken place on Babylon’s northern side, the riverside Gate of Iron and its two guard towers were relatively undefended. Just like that, the Muslims had found key to Theodorus’ citadel. Swiftly putting his infiltration plan into action with Amr’s blessing, Zubayr assembled unit to conduct the operation. On the moonless, clear night of December 20th 640, most of the Muslim army arrayed quietly outside the Gate of Iron while Zubayr and his comrades climbed ladders up the wall. Then, when some of his men were gathered on top, deafening Islamic battle cry was sounded and echoed by the entire army, causing shock and panic amongst defenders who had no idea what was happening. Amidst the chaos, Zubayr slew the gatehouse sentries and broke the chain which held the gate closed, allowing Amr and the Muslim army to flood inside. While some of the more elite Roman formations made brave last stand, most of their comrades routed towards the Nile. Once they reached the riverbank, the soldiers crossed to the safety of Rauda on pre-prepared boats, which ferried soldiers back and forth throughout the night. Among those who fled was Theodorus, who managed to escape Amr’s grasp and run back to Alexandria. The next day, Cyrus sued for and obtained peace for the Copts on Muslim terms, agreeing to pay the Jizya and submit the entire country to Islamic rule. The Romans in Egypt could either accept and remain, or reject and depart. Unsurprisingly, when Heraclius received letter from Cyrus seeking the imperial stamp of approval for his peace with Amr, the emperor was furious and categorically refused, responding with message full of scorn and insults. To ensure that an active defence of Egypt continued despite the prefect’s treachery, Heraclius had other messages ordering firm resistance delivered to all of his Roman generals in Egypt, who obeyed their sovereign without question. Cyrus, disavowed by the Romans, put himself and the Copts under Amr’s command, promising the Muslims administrative and engineering assistance. Memphis was now secure, and the push towards Alexandria could begin. After the fall of Babylon to Rashidun forces in December 640, Amr Ibn al-As kept his army stationed in the area for while, dispatching word to caliph Umar of his triumph and requesting permission to continue the conquest towards Alexandria. This pause also gave his army much-needed rest. In Constantinople, the elderly and sickly Emperor Heraclius reacted to the latest Muslim victory by ferrying several thousand more imperial reinforcements to Egypt over the Mediterranean. They had clear orders - protect Alexandria at all costs. Upon making landfall at the provincial capital, these reinforcements and the existing Alexandrian garrison, possibly under Theodorus’ command, began working to strengthen the city fortifications and fanning out to defensible positions en route to the city. Reports of these preparations made it south to Amr. At about the same time, messenger arrived from Arabia with the caliph’s order to advance and seize Alexandria. So, leaving small garrison to hold down Babylon and keep the Memphis region in check, Amr gave orders for his men to break camp. The 12,000 strong Muslim army headed northwards in February 641. Marching along the Nile Delta’s western fringe immediately adjacent to familiar desert climate, the Muslims overcame light Roman resistance at Tarnut and Kaum Shareek before turning northwest, away from the river. After subsequently capturing Sulteis, Amr then won bloody victory at Kiryaun, just 12 miles away from Alexandria, and chased the defeated Roman forces to the city’s eastern approach. The march to the sea had taken just 22 days. Alexandria had been built by Alexander the Great and his Ptolemaic successors on relatively narrow strip of land, bounded to the north by the Mediterranean Sea and in the south by Lake Maryut. Since the main transportation routes ended east of the city, the only truly vulnerable approach was the northeastern one. The Muslims made camp outside weapon range and then deployed for battle, slowly advancing towards the recently reinforced Alexandrian walls. Unfortunately for Amr, such careless preliminary move allowed the expert Roman artillerists to disrupt and scatter his units with volley after volley of massive catapult stones. This bombardment sent Amr and his warriors back to camp, dodging missiles all the way. Such attacks continued with intermissions, and in these intermissions the Roman defenders would instead launch sorties out of the city and attack the Muslim army, aiming to throw it back and end the siege. Despite the ferocity and competence of the men carrying them out, these attempts failed consistently and ended up being pushed back into the city. At some point during the first months of indecisive action, the defenders sortied out against section of the front manned by the Arabian Mahra tribe and fierce clash began. It seems to have concluded as an indecisive draw, but the Mahra lost man whose head was subsequently cut off and taken away by the Romans, much to the Arabs’ fury. The next morning, the same thing happened. Roman officer, probably made confident by the previous day’s action, launched an attack on the Mahra, but this time the outcome was very different. After being killed in the fighting, his head was taken by the Arab warriors and used as bargaining chip to get their comrade’s head back. After brief negotiation, both sides made an exchange and buried their kinsman with honours. At the height of summer, around two months after Amr initially constructed his camp, the Sahmi tribal commander decided to shift it forward for reasons which we are not aware of. However, as his forces were moving, the Roman defenders sensed an opportunity and mounted daring cavalry attack, which nevertheless was easily repulsed. reckless Muslim cavalry detachment set out in hot pursuit of the fleeing Romans and actually got inside the city just before the defenders could close the gates behind them. Heavily outnumbered, they fought fierce skirmish at the so-called Church of Gold. in which some of them were killed and the rest were pushed out of Alexandria. Heraclius, who maintained constant contact with Alexandria, was all too aware that the Muslims were gaining momentum. Worried that all of Egypt was about to be lost, he gathered formidable army from across what remained of the empire, together with equipment and supplies. Just before this giant, emperor-led relief armada was about to set sail, Heraclius died in Constantinople at the age of 66, leaving his eldest sons, Constantine III and Heraklonas, as joint-heirs. This initiated round of imperial politicking which didn’t allow the empire to react at the worst possible moment. As senior emperor, Constantine attempted to get ahold of the increasingly dire situation in Egypt. His untimely death only short time later derailed those plans entirely. If that wasn’t bad enough, some Byzantine generals, including one Valentinus, took up arms in support of Constantine’s son Constans II, believing that Heraklonas’ mother - Martina, had poisoned Constantine. This dynastic struggle would not conclude until late 641, ensuring that no reinforcements would be sent to Alexandria. Politicking also infected the soldiers defending the Egyptian capital, causing infighting and massive morale loss. When the siege had dragged into its sixth month with no sign of ending, Amr received letter from the caliph chastising him for taking so long. So, after conferring with his generals, Amr selected the experienced Ubada bin As-Samit to lead an assault. In late October 641, the entire Muslim army assembled for midday prayer and then deployed for battle. Then, led by Ubada, Amr’s forces finally captured Alexandria by storming gate near the Church of Gold. Of Muslim achievements to this point - 20 years since Hijra - the seizure of Alexandria ranked alongside events such as Yarmouk and Al-Qadissiyah in its importance. The caliphate acquired an invaluable naval base while diminishing Roman seapower and conquered land of immense riches and culture. Perhaps most importantly for the future, possession of Egypt allowed the Islamic armies to penetrate even further south and west into Africa. The wealth, beauty, and luxury of Alexandria ensnared the Arabs and their general in equal measure, but Amr could not make his headquarters there without the caliph’s permission. So, he sent an emissary back to Medina asking Umar whether or not he could stay in the metropolis. Unfortunately for the conqueror of Egypt, one of the Rashidun ruler’s many quirks was the absolute contempt and distrust in which he held large expanses of water, such as the Nile. The single occasion on which Umar allowed one of his commanders - governor of Damascus known as Muawiyah, to embark on naval operation, the entire force had been destroyed. So, Umar refused Amr’s request, explaining: “I do not wish the Muslims to take up their abode where water intervenes between them and me, in winter or summer.” Disappointed, Amr moved south and laid the foundations for his new city, the first capital of Islamic Egypt - Misr al-Fustat - the City of the Tents, or Fustat for short. The country’s new governor was occupied for the next few months attending to the administration of the Caliphate’s newest territory. As 641 gave way to 642, Amr settled grievances among his warriors and the locals, revitalized previously abandoned pieces of infrastructure, including canals, and even dispatched food aid to famine-ridden Medina at Umar’s request To extinguish any remaining embers of resistance against Muslim rule, Amr sent out three columns to the areas around Damietta, Heliopolis, and Fayyum, while fourth ensured that the remainder of lower Egypt was obedient. All of them had an easy time, accomplishing their task without bloodshed by mid-642. With Egypt firmly in his grip, the adventurous Amr Ibn al-As turned his focus towards Christianised Nubian kingdom called Makuria to the south. Makuria, ruled by king called Qalidurut from his great citadel at Dongola, was rising and expansionist power in Subsaharan Africa. In fact, its monarch had only recently annexed former regional rival Nobatia. literate society with vibrant culture of their own, the Nubians were renowned as hardy, ferocious warriors. In particular, their formidable reputation for horsemanship and archery was known around the Mediterranean world. At some point during the scorching African summer of 642, Amr sent his cousin Uqba bin Nafe and 20,000 horsemen into Nubia, where they quickly began suffering at the hands of the local inhabitants. Unable to resist the Muslims in pitched battle, lethal but unarmoured Makurian archers - mounted and on foot, launched constant hit and run attacks which gradually sapped Uqba’s strength before darting back unharmed into the wilderness. As the Islamic army pushed deeper into Nubia and encountered guerilla-style attacks in increasing numbers and ferocity, the hawk-eyed Makurian archers would frequently call out to the Arab invaders: “Where would you like me to put an arrow in you?” When one of the Muslim warriors skeptically pointed at an area of their body, our sources state that an arrow would indeed strike there, injuring or killing the man in question. When Uqba and his diminished forces finally neared the Makurian capital at Dongola, they found smaller enemy army of around 10,000 waiting for them, forced into defending their central city by Uqba’s movements. Eager to destroy the Nubians’ fighting potential now that he had them all in one place, Amr’s cousin began arraying his troops for battle. As the Muslim advance towards Qalidurut’s line began, it was almost instantaneously hit by an utterly merciless barrage of Makurian arrows that struck the attacking army with pinpoint accuracy. Uqba’s assault was stalled in its tracks by the hail of missiles just as soon as it began and his soldiers, 250 of whom had lost at least one eye in the battle, suffered terribly. Unable to close with the Nubian archers and swiftly losing men to grievous injury, Uqba withdrew his warriors from the field. Forever after, Muslims would call the Nubians ‘the archers of the eye’ because of their penchant for loosing arrows with deadly accuracy into the eyes of their enemies. Unwilling to continue such difficult campaign in land which promised them little gain from plunder or future land, the Muslims continued retreating all the way back to Fustat. Although not exactly decisive defeat, an army of the Caliphate had been defeated for one of the first times in history. After month or two of recuperation, Amr assembled his armies from their bivouacs and personally led them west into the desert during September of 642. After month of hard marching, the Muslims eventually arrived at still-Roman city known as Barca which, having no arrangements for defence, quickly surrendered. This was the first act of the decades’ long Islamic conquest of region which is now called the Maghreb. Amr had Uqba ride inland from the coast, where he successfully pacified the area of arid desert between Barca and Zawila without violence. The poor population quickly proved law-abiding and reliable in their payment of taxes, so Amr decreed that part of the revenues coming in from the entire Fezzan region would be spent to alleviate poverty there. Then in spring 643, the Muslim army advanced on and blockaded the Roman-garrisoned city of Tripoli. Amr set up his camp on an elevated section of terrain east of the city and waited, realising that such coastal settlement could be navally resupplied for an extended period of time. Lacking siege weapons, he also lacked the ability to reduce fortifications. After two months of relative inactivity, eight of Amr’s warriors galloped off west of the city for hunting trip. When these hunters began making their way back around noon, the sheer heat of the day led them to ride back along the coast. All of sudden, they came upon Tripoli’s western boundary, where the city wall met the sea, and discovered that the section was only thinly protected. In display of bravery or foolishness, these eight intrepid opportunists used Tripoli’s vulnerable flank to infiltrate their way inside the city. Before the defenders even realised what was happening, the Muslim group reached the city centre and began slaying enemies. Such unexpected violence triggered bout of extreme panic within the city, both among the civilians and Tripoli’s defending forces. In fact, large number of the armed soldiers within the city believed that large enemy contingent had somehow gotten inside and, because of this, took refuge aboard number of anchored ships in the harbour. Amr caught wind of the pandemonium taking place inside the city and so quickly set about exploiting the weakness. Arraying his warriors with haste, the Arab commander ordered full-scale assault to scale Tripoli’s enfeebled walls. In yet another action of which we have left no detail, the Muslims managed to get inside and joined their eight-strong vanguard. Unwilling to fight any further, the Roman defenders took whatever they could carry and departed aboard their ships, leaving Tripoli to Amr’s army. While most of the army stayed in the city for while, the conqueror of Egypt sent swift detachment of cavalry about 40 miles to the west, where the population of town known as Sabrata were still carefree. They had heard rumours of fighting for neighboring cities, but it would be while before the war reached them, if ever. The next morning, Sabrata’s Roman guards opened the gates of their city as its population began leading animals out to graze for the day. Unfortunately for them, it was at this moment that the Islamic cavalry unit struck completely by surprise, getting through the gates, killing the majority of defending troops, and sacking the town. With that done, they returned to Tripoli. Having succeeded, Amr longed for more, and eagerly penned another letter to Caliph Umar containing both the good news of victory and request to continue his conquest. This was rejected, as the caliph was worried about overextending his forces. And this time, there was no loophole or clever ploy that Amr could use to bypass Umar’s decree and continue his relentless campaigning. Therefore, after allowing his army to recuperate in Tripoli for time, Amr travelled back to Fustat and remained there, quietly administering his Egyptian domain and dealing with whispers of future rebellion. Although Umar had spared the rest of Byzantine Africa for the time being, that wouldn’t last long. However, as the combat in North Africa was winding down, the situation on the Persian front was becoming heated again. Sa’d army was eager to pursue Yazdegerd across the mountains, however, Umar’s refusal halted any further eastward expansion for the time being. At the Caliph’s command, Sa’d began combing Iraq for place where he could establish permanent military garrison. Eventually, after receiving guidance from the locals, Sa’d found promising area of land in Suristan ‘where the land is both dry, well-watered, and is overgrown with thistles and constructed colony that would eventually grow into the city of Kufa. Far to the southeast, another Arab raiding force of 800 led by Utba bin Ghazwan began searching for base of their own and came across an arid area covered in rocks, and it was there that Utba began work on settlement which eventually developed into modern Basra. It seemed as though the frontier between the caliphate and the Sassanid Empire would calcify at the Zagros mountains, allowing Sa’d and Umar brief time to consider administrative questions. However, the post-Jalula status quo wouldn’t last for long. Unwilling to accept the permanent loss of their Mesopotamian heartland due to haughty imperial pride, the Sassanids continued backing military action against the Caliphate led by Hormuzan, head of one of Persia’s premier families. During the retreat from Qadissiyah, Hormuzan had split off from the main column with his personal levy of survivors and marched back to his estates in Khuzestan. This territory formed vulnerable bulge, being the only remaining imperial Sassanid territory west of the Zagros Mountains. With little chance of resisting concerted Muslim invasion of his lands, Hormuzan decided to go on the attack. From forward base at the greatest city of his province - Ahwaz - the Persian general began launching quick raids into the area of Maysan in 638. As these attacks increased in frequency, Hormuzan established two additional bases even further west near Manazir. Utba was unable to deal with the Persian attacks with his mere 800 troops and appealed to Sa’d for aid. In response, the commander-in-chief ordered Nu'man bin Muqarrin with few thousand warriors to bolster Utba’s strength. The combined Muslim force launched lightning campaign that defeated Hormuzan’s army in its forward bases and pushed the frontier east to the Karun River. Suitably chastened by the reverses his soldiers had suffered, the Persian general concluded an unstable peace with his two Muslim counterparts, claiming to submit to the Caliphs’s suzerainty. The remainder of 638 passed without further warfare on the Persian front except for single act elsewhere - the so-called Fiasco of Fars. One of Sa’d rivals and governor of the uneventful province of Bahrain - Ula bin Al Hadrami - sought to increase his own status and launched reckless amphibious assault across the Persian Gulf. Landing on the coast of Fars, the Arab force headed towards Persepolis, managing to defeat small militia in costly battle before being surrounded and trapped by the Sassanids. The naval warfare despising caliph found out what Hadrami had done and was furious, but nevertheless sent Utba to rescue the beleaguered governor, after which he was dismissed from the position. Hormuzan used the respite granted by his truce with the Muslims to levy more soldiers and, in that time, also received imperial reinforcements from Hulwan. Now reinforced, he took advantage of the treaty’s unclear boundary terms as an excuse to reinitiate hostilities in early 639. The new governor of Basra - Abu Musa - was aware of his caliph’s command to avoid taking any further Persian territory, so he wrote to Umar explaining the situation and asking for guidance. Umar responded with an order to take Ahwaz and stop Hormuzan’s attacks. This prompted Musa to march his forces to the river Karun and face off against the Persian Lord across its breadth. Feeling confident about his chances, Hormuzan invited the Arab army across the river with the aim of facing and crushing it in pitched battle. Musa gladly accepted, crossing by bridge north of the city, defeating the Sassanid provincial force in grueling fight and forcing Hormuzan into flight to Ram Hormuz. typically aggressive pursuit force of Arab cavalry forced the overwhelmed Persian commander to retreat even further east. From strong position behind yet another river, Hormuzan parleyed for peace with the Muslims, offering to recognise their conquest of Ahwaz while retaining remnant of his own district. Still, the Sassanid reinforcements were pouring into northern Khuzestan in such large numbers that the preparations for another military campaign could no longer be kept secret. At this point, Sa’d was replaced as governor at Kufa by Ammar bin Yasir, who sent troops to Musa to subdue the Persian threat without delay. From Ahwaz, Musa launched his thrust against Hormuzan’s forces at Ram Hormuz, defeated them in brisk engagement and subsequently captured most of eastern Khuzestan. Hormuzan retreated north to the Sassanid concentration point at Shushtar - highly fortified, walled city in the Zagros foothills. Unsure about his ability to take on such stronghold with his current strength, Musa had thousand fresh warriors sent to him from Kufa. With these additional warriors, Musa advanced north, captured Shushtar and Hormuzan along with it, followed relatively quickly by the truly ancient city of Susa. Returning to Basra after this victory, Musa sent subordinate to capture the final garrison in Khuzestan; this was Junde Shapur, who succeeded by late 641. With the seizure of this final city, all of Khuzestan and Sassanid territory west of the Zagros was now under Muslim rule. Despite the loss of Iraq, Sassanid Persia east of the rocky barrier was still cohesive and powerful empire with loyal territories as far off as India. After the fall of Khuzestan to Musa’s army, Yazdegerd1 dispatched urgent orders to all of his remaining provinces to raise troops and send them to Nahavand, city on primary transportation artery west. Throughout the later part of 641, contingents from cities across Iran and beyond, such as Isfahan, Rayy, Hamadan, and many others arrived at Nahavand, until, at the turn of 642, an army of around 60,000 had come together. At the same time, this fearsome force was Yazdegerd’s final chance to turn the war in his favour. If he lost now, he would lose everything. Sassanid general named Mardanshah was appointed to lead the army, who quickly warned the men that Umar “Is coming for you if you do not go for him. He has already destroyed the seat of your empire and plunged into the land of your emperor.” Persian frontier commander in service to the Caliphate noticed this massive military buildup and, alarmed, sent word to Ammar bin Yasir in Kufa, who immediately forwarded the information to Umar. Addressing the people of Medina on the issue, the caliph’s pronouncement that “This is the day on which the future depends” left no doubt as to the importance of the upcoming clash. The ever-active caliph declared his intention to oversee the battle but was talked out of it by his advisors, who pointed out that this was unnecessary. more contentious issue was the assignment of military resources. Uthman wanted the whole army of the caliphate concentrated, but Muhammad’s son-in-law - Ali Ibn Abi Talib - disagreed, reminding Uthman that depriving the other frontiers would just invite the Byzantines, Ethiopians, and others to retake their old provinces. Instead, he suggested the troops at Kufa, Basra, and along the Persian border form the core of field army, supplemented by fresh levy of raw recruits and veterans from Arabia. Umar concurred with Ali and gave command of the preemptive strike to the veteran of Qadissiyah and conqueror of Susa - Nu'man bin Muqarrin. Upon enthusiastically receiving the caliph’s decree, Nu'man assembled his troops, marched east from Kufa, and crossed the Tigris, rendezvousing with number of other frontier units along the way. Trekking northeast from Ctesiphon along the Diyala River, the Muslims pivoted at Qasr Shereen and dove into the Zagros Mountains, eventually reaching concentration point at Tazar in December 641. With 30,000 Muslim warriors assembled, Nu'man sent scouting detachment into the Nahavand Valley to establish where exactly the Persians were. By nightfall it returned having observed little to no sign of Sassanid activity in the rocky, uneven terrain between Tazar and the Persian base. Nu'man immediately seized the opportunity and decamped, marching his entire army to small town known as Isbeezahan, just ten miles northwest of Nahavand itself, and its Persian occupants. When, not long after, Mardanshah learned that the invader was closing in, he responded by bringing the entirety of his own army out of the city. In preparation for the final battle, he deployed Sassanid Persia’s great retribution field force in an L-shaped hook formation, ‘wrapped’ around high terrain feature known as the brown ridge. While his soldiers advantageously faced down the slope, Mardanshah himself took up position atop the heights, where the imperial commander had brilliant view of the entire area. This adroitly selected defensive position had multiple terrain features amplifying its strength: in front of the Sassanid front line was small stream, along the bank of which Mardanshah placed minefield of cavalry-crippling caltrops. Furthermore, his right2 - the short edge of the reverse formation - was anchored on fortified village and the 3,000-foot-high Ardashan ridge, while the longer, southeast-facing left flank3 was protected by fork in the stream. Confronted by this natural fortress and with few other options, Nu'man drew up his warriors along Mardanshah’s entire front, just across the stream and facing up the slope. The Muslim general’s brother Nueim led the L’s short section, Hudayfah bin Al-Yaman commanded the right, and Qaqa bin Amr headed the Caliphate’s cavalry reserve. Nu'man himself was in the centre. The Caliphate’s deployment gave Mardanshah potential opportunity to launch preemptive assault at the unprepared Muslim lines. However, either due to overconfidence in his prepared fortifications or cautious of leaving them due to the previous defeat at Jalula, the empire’s field commander remained where he was, allowing Nu'man to finish bringing his forces up. This inaction likely did not seem like blunder - the Muslims were far away from their bases in Iraq and could either smash their heads against the dangerous Persian fortifications or wait, chew through their supplies and retreat in deadly conditions. An hour after the Islamic noon prayer, as the sun reached its highest point in the sky, the entire Muslim army began its attack straight at Mardanshah’s defensive belt. Upon reaching the Wadi stream, the attackers’ infantry and cavalry alike were met with deadly rain of Persian arrows, loosed by archers who had the luxury of shooting downhill. Worse still, Qaqa’s horsemen galloped headlong into the caltrops, leading to the maiming and immobilisation of many horses. Nevertheless, Nu’man’s men pushed on across the entire front, weakened all the way by arrow fire. Then, charging uphill, the Muslims crashed into the Sassanid ranks and the two sides met in ferocious melee combat. grinding clash of attrition began with little room for flair or tactical brilliance, only numerical weight, personal prowess, strength, and discipline. On some sections of the line, perhaps those under Nueim’s command where the slope was more gradual, the Muslims managed to temporarily push Mardanshah’s soldiers back, but each time were counterattacked and shoved to their original positions by the Persians. In other areas - near Zarrameen where the slope was steepest - the Persians even managed to haul the Caliphate’s forces back across the Wadi, but they in turn counterattacked and fought back to where they were. The battle’s outcome rested on knife-edge, with dead and dying of both sides littering the field - either laying still or shouting in terrible agony. This mass slaying continued until nightfall when the Muslims, with no prospect of breaking the Persian line that night, pulled away and withdrew to their camp. The night hours passed without contact, with both sides recovering their fallen comrades and tending to the wounded. When dawn broke on the second day, however, Nu'man formed his army up and, somewhat inexplicably, launched another frontal assault across the stream lasting all day. After what historian Akram poetically described as ‘tragic harvest of death’, the Muslims again retreated, unsuccessful and badly bloodied. Both armies formed up again at dawn on the third day, but mixture of the horror, tactical sanity, and possible mutiny kept the Muslim general from attempting his human wave assault for third time. Instead, he waited for the Persians to emerge from their fortifications and launch an attack of their own, but Mardanshah was wily commander aware that time was his champion, and refused to budge. After tense two-day standoff, the Sassanid regimental commanders began raiding the Muslim line with small contingents. These limited attacks would inflict damage on personnel and supplies before swiftly pulling back behind their defences, leaving the Islamic forces frustrated. While constant assailment and the cold conditions struck blow after blow to Muslim morale and strength, Mardanshah began absorbing steady stream of reinforcements and provisions from nearby Hamadan. The situation could not continue as it stood, and so Nu'man called council of war only few days after his previous attack. The eldest companion present4 advised that the Muslims ought not to attack at all, and to merely destroy those raiding parties which came to attack them. As all the officers were eager to get stuck in properly, this proposal was met with disapproval. Another more gung-ho leader suggested that the frontal attacks actually be resumed regardless of consequences. This too was quickly shot down. Then spoke Tuleiha bin Khuleiwad - former enemy of Islam and one of the architects of Jalula - who put forward clever stratagem. The Muslims, he said, should “Put the cavalry in position to outflank them, and show weak front, making as if to withdraw. Let the Persians hope for victory and advance against us. Then we turn and fight them.” This plan was approved by most of those present, and put into motion. With the purpose of making the illusion of weakness more convincing, at Tuleiha’s proposal the Muslims also began circulating false rumours that Caliph Umar was dead. Over the next few days, word of Umar’s ‘death’ proliferated around the overjoyed Persian army like kind of virulent mental plague, provoking hopes of an offensive against their now surely demoralised enemy. The Friday after Nu’man’s last attack, Sassanid sentries began observing the abandonment of Muslim positions across the stream: tents being pulled down in the Muslim camp, baggage being loaded, and small contingents of men marching west. Everything Mardanshah could see appeared to suggest that the invading army was vulnerable and about to retreat. So, the general opened series of gaps in the caltrop belt on his right flank according to pre-prepared plan and began having his soldiers cross to the outside5. Lead elements halted just beyond the caltrop field, waiting for the rear ranks, and began forming up there. According to our sources, Mardanshah might have restored the caltrop field so his troops could not run. The ‘retreating’ Muslim infantry span around upon seeing that they were about to be struck from behind and hastily deployed for battle, somewhat further back than before. Of course, this was all part of Tuleiha’s plan - the Persian general had swallowed the bait hook, line, and sinker. Unbeknownst to the Sassanid army, Qaqa and his cavalrymen were concealed in gap behind the Ardashan ridge, ready to attack. Two hours before noon, Mardanshah ordered his army to advance slowly towards the stationary enemy line. When the Persians entered missile range, they began loosing arrow volleys with the aim of softening the Muslims up at greater range than Arab bows could operate at. Forced to defend themselves with only their shields, many of the Caliphate’s warriors were chomping at the bit to close with the Sassanids and fight them in melee, but Nu’man, with wider view of the strategic situation, ordered them to remain steady. After while weakening the Muslims with missile fire, Mardanshah launched full-on charge. This was the key moment of the battle, as this attack finally un-anchored the imperial right flank from the Ardashan ridge and its nearby fortified village. Remaining on the defensive, Nu’man restrained his forces from effectively pushing back, withdrawing slowly in similar manner to Hannibal’s centre at Cannae. Then, after some time of suffering this, Nu’man ordered counterattack just after midday and, at the same time, Qaqa’s cavalry swept out from behind the ridge and drove wedge between the Persians and their obstacles. However, Mardanshah detached unit of reserves that met and held the Muslim cavalry before the encirclement was completed. On the front line, Persian forces were gradually pushed back under the weight of Nu’man’s counterattack. But then, the Muslim general was struck by an arrow, fell from his horse, and was spirited away from the fight, with Nueim impersonating him to maintain morale. Although Sassanid resistance was absolutely unwavering, by late afternoon the Muslim forces, half encircling their foe, were clearly in the superior position. Suddenly, as the sky began to darken, the majority of Mardanshah’s army collapsed and routed, able to do so because the forces opposing Qaqa were still resisting. Amidst this chaos, Tuleiha was also slain. relatively large number of Persian troops managed to escape the battlefield, but many, including Mardanshah, were killed by their Muslim pursuers, fell victim to the re-strengthened caltrop belt, or were taken prisoner. Hudayfah took command of the Caliphate’s army after Nu’man’s death and advanced the following morning, defeating the Sassanid remnant at Darazeed. Part of the defeated army retreated into Nahavand itself after the second defeat, where the new imperial commander, Dinar, surrendered the city unconditionally. Nahavand was the final great battle between Islam and Persia, making the point at which there was no longer any doubt - the Sassanid Empire would fall. For this, Nahavand is known to Muslims as the ‘victory of victories’. It would take another decade to subdue all of the far-flung Persian territories in Central Asia and Eastern Iran, but by late 644 as author Peter Crawford states, Yazdegerd III was effectively “a king without kingdom.” On the Egyptian front, after Amr returned from his expedition against the so-called Pentapolis in late 643, he travelled back to Medina in order to meet with Umar, with whom he already had somewhat tense relationship. Mistrusted by the caliph, Amr received frosty reception from the very start. The tension between the two men wasn’t helped by the fact that Umar, who always kept close eye on his governors via an internal spy network, suspected Amr of unjustly appropriating Egypt’s wealth. So, when the latter returned to his province, the caliph dispatched trusted inspector - Muhammad bin Maslama - to appraise Amr’s assets. The latter produced an account of his assets and he was found guilty of taking too much. The excess was confiscated and taken back to Medina. That wasn’t the end of the caliph’s incessant prodding. short while thereafter, unsatisfied at the lacklustre revenues flowing into the treasury from Egypt, Umar had heated debate with Amr by letter. After that ended in deadlock, Copt was sent to Medina to inform the caliph of his province’s financial situation. He bluntly informed Umar that previous rulers of Egypt had seen to the land’s prosperity before taking anything from it, while Muslim governors only extracted. In response, Umar carved Egypt into two separate administrative districts during late 644, giving Amr Lower Egypt to govern from Fustat, while Upper Egypt would be ruled from Fayyum by Abdullah ibn Sa’d ibn Abi Sarh, the foster brother of Uthman. Predictably, Amr was, once again, infuriated at this deliberate diminishing of his authority. Back in Medina deadly plot had formed, centring around Hormuzan, who had converted to Islam and used his vast experience in Sassanid administration and governance to become one of Umar’s key advisors. Despite this, the Persian noble never forgot the injury done to his home. It seems that Hormuzan made contact with Firuz, Sassanid soldier who was enslaved after Qadisiyyah or Nahavand and brought to the Caliphate’s capital, and in November of 644 Firuz knifed Umar. Before passing away three days after, the second caliph appointed shūrā - or “counsel” of six men1 - to appoint his successor from among their ranks. After deep debate, they decided that Uthman would become the third Rashidun caliph. It is worth noting that while Sunni Islam views Uthman as one of the rightly guided caliphs, Shia Muslims believe this election should not have occurred at all and Ali was to be the next in line. Shortly after, Amr Ibn al-As visited Uthman in order to lobby for his Upper Egyptian colleague’s removal. The new caliph refused outright, prompting him to declare that he wouldn’t return to Egypt until Abdullah ibn Sa’d was removed. In response to this threat, Uthman appointed his foster brother governor of all Egypt2, further deepening the dispute between the two men. The Romans in Egypt were not happy with Amr’s policies, but Abdullah’s attempts to increase the incomes from the province were even less popular. Alexandria in particular bore the brunt of this new lust for revenue, leading its notoriously riotous population to undertake drastic measures. group of prominent Romans dispatched messages to the new emperor Constans II. These letters outlined the outrages of Muslim rule and its jizya tax, but also pointed out that Abdullah had let the Nile realm’s defence slip into pitiful state and the city was only garrisoned by paltry thousand men, and could be easily taken. Perceiving an opportunity to regain control of Egypt and remedy the wound which its loss had dealt to his empire and his pride, Constans began secretly amassing great strikeforce of 300 ships and many thousands of soldiers, command of which he bestowed on eunuch known as Manuel. Constans’ fleet was ready after almost year. Because the reduced Byzantine Empire was still the dominant naval power in the Mediterranean - the Caliphate having not yet developed any seaborne capacity - there was nothing to stop this fleet from unexpectedly sailing straight into the harbour at Alexandria in early 646. As the Roman sympathisers predicted, the thousand strong Muslim garrison was no adequate defence against this shock assault from the sea. When Roman forces landed almost unopposed, Alexandria’s population simultaneously rose up against the occupying Arabs. Most of the city’s garrison was slain in the brief clash that followed. However, while the invasion army began ravaging the vicinity around Alexandria, some of the Muslims that escaped travelled to Fustat and informed the governor what was happening. Abdullah ibn Sa’d didn’t even have chance to react. Lacking confidence in their new viceroy’s martial ability, the Muslims of Egypt sent delegation to Caliph Uthman, urging him to send Amr back so that he could put an end to the crisis. Understanding that Amr was both man of formidable military talent and feared by the Romans, Uthman bit his tongue and asked Amr to take his post back. Wasting no time, the man who had conquered the Romans once before travelled to Fustat as quickly as possible with the aim of emulating his previous achievement. Upon his arrival, the morale of Islam’s warriors was boosted significantly and they prepared for war eagerly, while Amr started planning. Informed by spies and agents that the Romans were advancing leisurely from Alexandria to Fustat, many of Amr’s brash officers pressed for their commander to attack and confine the enemy to the treacherous Mediterranean metropolis before all Egypt revolted against the Muslim regime. Amr did not agree with this appraisal, as he believed that this advance would stretch Roman supply and communication lines to the limit. Manuel and his army marched under the close observation of Amr’s informants, who constantly reported the Romans’ position and strength. The land forces made their way up the eastern bank of the Nile accompanied by large flotilla of supporting warships sailing parallel to them on the river itself. Byzantine indiscipline began causing problems almost immediately. Roman soldiers moved from town to town and the population was not happy with their behaviour. When Manuel neared the halfway point between Alexandria and Fustat, Amr began countermarch with 15,000 warriors of his own, moving on direct collision course with the Romans. Both armies finally came into contact with one another near large town known as Nikiou, or Naqyus. After resting for the night in their respective camps, the Romans and Muslims deployed on the cultivated, featureless, and flat terrain just south of Nikiou. Amr’s left - cavalry regiment under the command of Shareek bin Sumayy, rested on the Nile River, as did the Roman right. In addition to their organisation in neat formations, large number of Roman archers also embarked on the riverine ships. Once his preparations for battle were complete, Manuel ordered the Byzantine ground forces into effective bow range before coming to halt and unleashing destructive barrage of arrows against the Muslim position. On the river, Manuel had prepared clever stratagem. His ships continued sailing until they passed by Amr’s flank, at which point their on-board archers struck the Muslims in the flank as well. Amr’s men had already been struggling to deal with the frontal volley, and so suffered terribly from the multidirectional bombardment. Sumayy’s regiment in particular was almost totally decimated, having been positioned closest to the river, but even Amr had horse shot out from under him. Despite this punishment, however, the Muslims were unwilling to surrender the battlefield, and so endured the storm with considerable tenacity. Once Manuel believed that his enemy was sufficiently weakened, he called back the flanking vessels and had their on-board troops fall into ranks behind the main army, and then began yet another arrow attack against the Muslim line. The moment after the Byzantine eunuch general ordered halt to his preliminary barrage, he directed his infantry to advance into spear and sword range. Although early Muslim armies were generally portrayed as being most comfortable in this kind of close quarters engagement, the Roman soldiers nevertheless impacted Amr’s battered host with considerable ferocity, cracking their already faltering line. Sumayy’s regiment, which had endured the brunt of Manuel’s seaborne missile attack, actually did break and run. Amr hastily pulled the remainder of his men away from the Romans’ attack and halted only short distance away, in order to regroup as best he could. However Manuel, believing that the Muslims were already beaten, did not advance and finish his enemy off, instead simply waiting where they were. After brief, eerie pause in the fighting, magnificently dressed Roman champion, clad in gold-studded armour, rode out into the open space between the two armies and challenged the Muslims to single combat. This would give the latter time to take breath, reform and reorganise. So, one of Amr’s favoured mubarizun - an Arab known as Haumal - accepted the Roman offer and strode out to meet the enemy fighter. With the remainder of both armies bearing witness, their respective champions initially clashed with spears, and neither combatant was able to score decisive blow. Dropping their polearms after certain amount of time had gone by, the champions clashed with sword and shield, but again neither warrior could get an edge over the other. This continued until the larger Roman duelist managed to disarm and severely wound Haumal with series of fierce thrusts. As the hulking Roman was about to finish Haumal off, the Arab champion unsheathed his short dagger and plunged it into his unsuspecting counterpart’s throat with prodigious speed. Although Haumal managed to win the duel by the skin of his teeth, he died of his wounds few days later, much to Amr’s sorrow. This traditional single combat had given the Muslim general time to get his army back in order, and by the time Haumal had won, Amr was ready - Sumayy’s routed regiment even returned to the battlefield and formed up. When the whole Muslim army was ready, they charged and engaged in grinding melee with Manuel’s forces, combat which they were far better suited to. After few hours of Roman resistance, the eunuch’s soldiers broke and ran, pursued and hunted all the way to Alexandria. Amr brought up number of catapults and launched boulders at the recalcitrant city, whose own artillerists fired back. The defences nevertheless held firm under such bombardment, until one of the gatekeepers - Ibn Bassana - offered to let Amr’s troops inside if he, his family, and property were retained, terms which the Muslim commander found agreeable. Therefore, at some point in the middle of 646, Alexandria’s gates were opened and the Islamic army poured inside. Any Roman unit opposing the incursion was swiftly dealt with, and even those coming up to reinforce the breach were pushed away. As the rebellious city began falling victim to sacking, the surviving imperial soldiers withdrew to their ships and sailed away. Before the vengeful Arabs could truly wreak havoc on the ancient Mediterranean metropolis and its vanquished inhabitants, an unknown Muslim approached Amr and beseeched him to stop the violence. Although the conqueror of Egypt was by no means merciful man by nature, his kinsman’s words had such an impact that Amr immediately ordered the cessation of hostilities. At the very spot where this was proclaimed, mosque was constructed known as the ‘Mosque of Mercy’. Still, large numbers of Romans including Manuel died in the battle and the revolt was quelled. In the aftermath of the Second Siege of Alexandria, Amr ripped down the walls and made the city, in his words “Like the house of an adultress, accessible from all sides.” The neglect of Egypt’s defence was also remedied with the new division of its Muslim garrison into four parts - two in Fustat, and one each in Alexandria and on the northern coast to be moved around where necessary. It would also be rotated and the troops replaced every six months. Not only had Amr ibn Al-As both conquered and reconquered Egypt in difficult circumstances, he had built the foundations of rule that would secure Muslim hegemony over the fruitful country. For this, Amr well expected to be rewarded by Uthman, but he was to be disappointed. Uthman wanted his tax fiend of brother to occupy the plum position, but was aware that Amr probably deserved some reward for his deeds. So, summoning the conqueror to his place of residence, Uthman enquired if he would like to remain in military command of Egypt while Abdullah ibn Sa’d managed civilian administration. Amr responded with the witty barb: “In that case would be like the man holding the horns of the cow while another milks it.” For the remainder of Uthman’s caliphate, Amr would bear potent grudge and even oppose him publicly. This mutual resentment was to have serious consequences for Islamic history in the near future. By the end of 646AD, the entire near-east had been transformed into completely different geopolitical entity than it was just two decades before, and had been for many centuries prior. On its eastern wing, four-century-old dynasty - the Sassanids - were now all but dust, its last true Shah1 pursued across Iran by eastward driving Muslim armies and its ancient territory devoured. In the north, Rashidun forces reached the Caucasus Mountain barrier, enclosing the once insurmountable Byzantine Empire within its Anatolian heartland in the process. Now that all major battles against Rome and Persia were at an end, Islam’s armies began seeking another direction in which to conquer. Once Constans II’s counterattack against Egypt was decisively repelled, Caliph Uthman’s foster brother Abdullah ibn Sa’d began launching raids into the Roman-Berber lands west of his new province. These small expeditions quickly proved stunning success, returning with vast quantities of slaves, cattle, and other riches. Judging that Roman Africa would yield an easy and generous bounty if squeezed, the Egyptian governor wrote to Uthman, asking for permission to launch major campaign to the west. Uthman agreed with Abdullah’s assessment and decreed the formation of 10,000 strong force in Arabia composed of warriors from various tribes. It was relatively young army, and in its ranks marched one son of Amr, two sons of Umar and two sons of Umayyad chief Al-Hakam - one of whom was the future Marwan The freshly mustered Arab force was ready for war in early 647 and marched for Egypt2, joining Abdullah ibn Sa’d at Fustat few weeks later. There, the 10,000 newly arrived Arabic fighters were merged with further 10,000 from the governor’s Egyptian army, resulting in total strength of 20,000. With this mostly camel and horse-mounted invasion force at his back, Abdullah marched west. This part of the Mediterranean seaboard bore witness to some of the ancient world’s most dramatic events during the course of several centuries. Emperor Heraclius’ father had previously served as ruler of this sizeable ‘Exarchate of Africa’ before his son’s ascension to the Byzantine throne in 610, upon which the elder governor died. Close to the emperor’s death in 641, Heraclius himself appointed as Exarch patrician known as Gregory, However, dynastic chaos following the death of Heraclius, and Constans II’s inability to repel Muslim attacks, particularly in nearby Egypt, were all too much for Gregory. In 647, as Uthman’s army was in the process of readying to attack him, the Exarch declared independence from Constantinople amid surge of popular support from Romanised Africans and native Berbers alike. Abdullah ibn Sa’d meanwhile, crossed the Nile from Fustat and took his army up the west bank until he neared Alexandria, at which point he drove northwest and cut across the desert as shortcut. After few more days, the viceroy’s 20,000 hit the Mediterranean coastal road and marched along its course until, finally, after six-week journey, Abdullah reached Barca - the city which his predecessor Amr seized years before. The Muslims then marched further seven hundred miles along the Mediterranean coast around the Bay of Sirte, enduring the scorching privations of North African summer. The Arabs were used to such arid conditions and thrived in them, an advantage which helped them conquer the Near-East. When the Rashidun army finally reached Tripoli, closer to the heart of Gregory’s realm, its warriors found the heavily fortified city barred against them, contrary to the friendly reception they’d received in Cyrenaica. As Amr did half decade earlier, Abdullah blockaded Tripoli on its landward flank and placed it under siege. In order to slow or prevent any resupply or reinforcement by ship, Abdullah stationed artillery at both points where the city wall met the water, They were ordered to strike any enemy vessel which attempted to enter the harbour and effectively rendered the seaport unusable. Gregory, who was readying the main Exarchate army at his inland capital of Sufetula, had naval reinforcement armada dispatched from Carthage to Tripoli. However, rather than disembarking at the port on arrival as they would have liked, the transport ships were forced to disgorge their human cargo on segments of the beach which were outside of Abdullah’s artillery range and outside the wall’s protection. Although this prevented Rashidun catapults and ballistae from carving bloody holes into their ranks, it made the tired and disorganised soldiers easy prey for Muslim infantry, which charged at them from two different angles. Exhausted from the long sea voyage and without any time to deploy adequately, Gregory’s reinforcements were scythed down to man on the beaches of Libya. Remaining vigilant against any further attempts to prop Tripoli up, Rashidun forces nevertheless were unable to breach the well-provisioned, nigh impregnable fortress. As his army languished outside the walls, Abdullah ordered riders to scout in the direction of Sufetula to observe any military activity going on there. few weeks later two things were clear to the Muslim governor. First: Tripoli was still long way aways from opening its gates to him and remaining static outside its walls seemed pointless. Second: reports from his scouts made it apparent to Abdullah that the newly independent Roman Exarch was readying for fight. Possibly convinced Tripoli was just delaying action which only served to grind down his own army’s strength and will to push on, the Muslim governor lifted his siege and spirited away to the west. The Rashidun army and its thrifty commander plundered their way through the wealthiest region of Roman Africa, unmoored from any supply train and therefore unconcerned about the Tripoli garrison behind them. At Sufetula, Gregory was made aware of the Muslims’ location the moment they passed through Gabes and reacted to the news immediately, with the intent of engaging his enemy well away from his interim inland capital. To do this, the Exarch ponderously shifted his heavily-equipped, primarily infantry-based army, which probably matched that of the Muslims in size, to blocking position at Faiz - 30 kilometres from Sufetula - and set up camp there. Part of the Exarchate’s army was placed slightly forward of the camp as covering force. However, only short time after Gregory’s force went into camp, the Rashidun light cavalry advance guard fell on its Roman counterpart, sending it reeling back to the main camp in flight. Unnerved by such strength of the Muslim mounted units, Gregory ordered his army to withdraw all the way to Sufetula, believing his position at Faiz was too vulnerable. About four miles east of his capital the Exarch turned and readied for battle. Such close proximity to its base granted the Roman army logistical supremacy, prevented wide flanking maneuvers from the mobile opposing army, and permitted them safe retreat inside if they needed it. The Muslims arrived soon after and made their own camp short way from Gregory’s front line. One rejected emissary later, both sides deployed for battle on the arid plain about four miles from Sufetula. The Roman army’s posture was defensive, its line anchored to the north and south by two high ridges. Abdullah, realising the observation potential of these terrain features, successfully sent forces to occupy them. Unlike his more iron-willed predecessor, Abdullah ibn Sa’d was considered personally weak by the warriors under his command, an accountant and bureaucrat rather than general or soldier. Lacking Amr’s bravery, Abdullah retreated to safe position behind the line where he was not likely to suffer any personal threat once the army was deployed to his liking. Fortunately, Gregory was kindred spirit in that he wasn’t bold frontline commander either, choosing to oversee the clash from throne inside the walls of Sufetula. Subordinates and lower-level officers fought the battle for him on tactical level. At the dawn the next day, fighting commenced. Details about the first days of Sufetula are unclear and sparse in our sources, but it is evident that the combat was incredibly fierce, uninterrupted, and bloody. Although the actual battlefield was flat plain, the ridges on either flank prevented any outflanking maneuvers or fancy tactical flair. Moreover, the uninvolved nature of both army’s skittish commanders further paralysed the situation. After few days of such indecisive fighting, Gregory decided to attempt an assassination of the enemy leader in order to sever the head from the Muslim serpent, but obviously wasn’t going to do the deed himself. Instead, he offered to wed his legendarily beautiful, intelligent, and valiant daughter to the Roman warrior who killed Abdullah. Morale in the Exarch’s army skyrocketed at this news, with each warrior - whether they were Roman, Vandalic, Greek or Berber, steeling themselves with the aim of gaining the princess’ hand. Word of this also spread throughout the Muslim army and in particular to Abdullah himself. Not at all comfortable with being marked man, his confidence suffered an even further decline. To counter Gregory’s offer, the Muslim commander announced to his army that he would grant the Exarch’s daughter to any warrior who personally killed her father, before withdrawing to his tent. Still however, the next few days continued as deadly stalemate of bitter violence, brought to crescendo by the offer and counteroffer between generals. This continued without end until one of Abdullah’s officers - Zubayr - was approached by Berber defector from Gregory’s army. He told the Muslim captain that because fighting had until that point been quite far from the walls, the Exarch’s position, near Sufetula’s northern gate, was actually very thinly defended. Alerted to this crucial information and the best route which he should take in order to exploit the opportunity, Zubayr put forward his plan to the demoralised Muslim commander, and was granted leadership over the army’s mobile reserve - about 2,000 strong. The invaders’ spirits were buoyed due to the dynamism and boldness of this dashing young officer, who spent the remainder of the day setting his scheme into motion. Swarmed by warriors who desired to embark on the risky venture with him, the younger Zubayr eventually selected thirty of the fiercest, most capable, and valiant combatants his army could offer as an attack squad. When asked what they were to do, Zubayr replied - “I am attacking, defend me against those who assail me from the rear and shall defend you from the front!” During the near soundless hours of night, after issuing all necessary orders, Zubayr positioned himself, his 30 stalwarts, and the mobile reserve horsemen behind Sufetula’s northern ridge. Then when morning came, both armies closed with one another and fought as though nothing had changed. At noon, with an especially hot day weighing down on them heavily, both armies broke contact and withdrew - the Romans quickly, the Muslims suspiciously sluggishly. Distracted by the din of war, Gregory, his attendants, and guards did not notice as Zubayr and his band of daredevils galloped into the city through what became known as the ‘gate of treachery’. Realising what was happening, the Exarch’s guard formed hasty line, but the 30 Muslim warriors broke it and allowed Zubayr clean run at the African ruler. In the confusion, Gregory initially believed this lone mounted figure to be an envoy, and so did not react. Gregory was killed and his head sliced from his body. Word of their leader’s death quickly reached the retreating Roman infantry, causing terrible confusion and disheartening the soldiers. Then, at the perfect moment, Zubayr’s large mounted reserve crested the North Ridge, rode at gallop and charged into the disorganised Exarchate army’s left wing with saber and lance before wheeling around the battlefield. Simultaneously, the bulk of the Muslim infantry turned about and advanced, locking their tenacious enemy into an unwinnable fight. Pressured from the front by Arab infantry and outmanuevered by swift Muslim horsemen all around, the Roman army collapsed and its soldiers scattered in all directions in their attempts to flee. Zubayr’s cavalry reaped an especially bloody toll and, within short time, the battered corpses of Romans, Berber, Vandals, and Greeks littered the plain outside Sufetula. Despite the slaughter, several thousand of Gregory’s soldiers managed to retreat intact towards the capital, believing its walls would grant them safety. It wasn’t their lucky day. Zubayr, having handily dealt with the Exarch, sent small squadrons to hold each of Sufetula’s gates, preventing entry or exit. When the retreating columns of exhausted Roman soldiers reached the city therefore, they were viciously attacked by Muslim cavalry coming the other way and cut to pieces. The Rashidun triumph at Sufetula is frequently touted as the point at which Roman Africa was forever lost to the Empire, and while it was back-breaking moment for the province, this is far from true. Once the vast quantity of captured silver, gold and cattle was accumulated and distributed, Abdullah ibn Sa’d moved on the Exarchate’s real capital - Carthage. Upon putting the millennia old city to siege, the Muslim commander and local leaders within the city came to an impasse. There was no chance that the besiegers would be able to take Carthage with their overextended supply lines and barely functional siege train, but at the same time, there was no way for the inhabitants of Carthage to make them go away. However, with exaggerated reports of Gregory’s fate fresh in their minds, they asked for terms after only few days. Always with income on his brain, Abdullah ibn Sa’d accepted vast quantity of Roman gold as payment to leave Africa alone keeping only what they had so far conquered. After subsequent eastward journey of about three months, the Muslim army arrived back in Fustat by late 647, bringing with it vast hoard of wealth which further swelled the treasury in Medina. Regardless of the gathered loot, Abdullah had effectively won victory and then given up the ghost before the conquest was concluded. At about this time - late 648 - the governor of Syria Muawiya launched naval expedition of unknown scale on Cyprus in order to neutralise any potential threat that it posed as staging point for future Byzantine attacks. Muawiya landed on the Mediterranean island and seized it without opposition, exacting tribute of 7,000 dinars annually. With the North African front winding down, most expansionist movement within the Rashidun Caliphate came to halt. Three years passed in relative quiet until Abdullah ibn Sa’d led another attempt to conquer Nubia in 652, failing once again due to the country’s ‘Archers of the Eye’ Because the situation on land between Eastern Rome and the Caliphate had calcified at the Taurus Mountains, both sides began looking to the sea for an advantage. If Constantinople maintained its naval supremacy, it would have the ability to land force in Syria, Egypt, or Africa at will. However, if the Caliphate usurped this control, they could make the Mediterranean Muslim lake and even threaten the great imperial city. To that end, both the Egyptian governor and Roman emperor refocused their efforts on constructing vast fleets of ships with which to dominate the sea. In 654AD, the Arab and Roman fleets met off the Lycian coast at what became known as the Battle of the Masts. Abdullah ibn Sa’d revealed himself to be veritable sea wolf compared to his feeble reputation on land, crushing Constans II’s navy in the first true Muslim naval triumph and clearing the way for an attack on Constantinople. Initially, the reign of Caliph Uthman ibn Affan was time of progress for the growing Rashidun Caliphate. The governor of Egypt, Abdullah ibn Sa’ad, had used the new standing navy of the Caliphate to secure steady tribute from the island of Cyprus in 649, before defeating the Eastern Romans at sea in the Battle of the Masts. Meanwhile, the advancing armies of Ahnaf ibn Qais and Abdullah ibn Aamer were making further headway in the rapidly-crumbling Sassanid Empire. Yazdegerd III, last of the Persian King of Kings, had been reduced to little more than fugitive, fleeing from city to city ahead of the conquerors. After the fall of Fars province between 649 and 650, attempts to raise support in first Kerman and then Sakastan each failed, with the governors of these provinces refusing to pay taxes to destitute and powerless Emperor or harbour him from the advancing Arabs. Withdrawing finally to Merv, he made last-ditch effort to stem the tide by appealing to his allies among the Hephthalite principalities. Some soldiers were indeed sent to support him, but they would never see battle against the Arabs - unwilling to continue throwing lives away in hopeless war after the desertion or surrender of Yazdegerd’s vassals, his last general Farrukhzad abandoned him in 651, with Merv’s governor Mahuy Suri turning against him as well shortly after. With his last supporters defeated by Suri’s own Hephthalite allies, the King of Kings finally met his end hiding in the home of humble miller outside Merv, murdered for his jewelry. While local resistance would continue in Tabaristan for years to follow, the once-great Sassanid Empire had ceased to exist, its dynasty continuing only through family of exiles taking refuge in China. But for all the military victories of the Caliphate during Uthman’s twelve-year reign, its domestic policies would soon beget internal turmoil for the young and rapidly expanding state. The aging Caliph’s nepotism and unpopular economic policies created growing opposition to his rule from various strands of society. During Umar’s reign, laws had been set in place forbidding Arab soldiers from buying land in conquered territories, keeping soldiers strictly separated from local populations both to prevent foreign influences on the faith of his victorious armies and to protect the property of the conquered. Under Uthman, these restrictions were removed, causing many soldiers in the caliphate’s armies to buy up huge tracts of land in Syria and Iraq, in some cases abusing their power and authority in order to drive inhabitants out and resell the same land at large profits, creating new class of wealthy ex-soldiers establishing lavish estates across the Caliphate. This new taste for luxury among the conquerors drove up taxes and created great resentment among both non-Muslims and non-Arab converts. On top of economic friction, Uthman also created for himself theological controversy through his creation of unified, official version of the Qur’an. Prior to this, the ad-hoc nature by which the Prophet’s revelations were recorded and transmitted by his closest companions meant that many Qur’ans had minor variations in the text from one to the next, undermining faith based on an eternal and infallible word of God. To correct this, Uthman had gathering of religious scholars determine the canon account of the Prophet’s words, gathering and burning as many of the variant Qur’ans as possible. The Qur’an of Uthman remains unchanged as the holy text for Muslims around the world today - but during his reign, some Muslims disagreed with the decisions Uthman’s scholars reached or saw the destruction of any Qur’an as sacrilegious, adding their voices to the growing opposition to his rule. The long-simmering resentment against Caliph Uthman boiled into open rebellion in 656. In Egypt, Kufa and Basra, disaffected soldiers from local garrison towns gathered and marched on Medina to demand Uthman’s deposition and the election of new Caliph. Having been told by agents that the grievances against him were frivolous and revolt unlikely, Uthman was caught unprepared when the bands of soldiers converged on Medina. Though he refused to step down as Caliph, Uthman attempted to reach peaceful settlement, sending Ali ibn Abi Talib - the Prophet’s son-in-law and one of the first Muslims - to negotiate with the rebels on his behalf. The smaller Kufan and Basran detachments were convinced to make peace with Uthman, while the larger Egyptian force was mollified with promise to remove their unpopular governor, Abdullah, from governorship, in favour of Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr, the son of the first caliph. With Ali as guarantor of the agreement and ibn Abi Bakr leading them, they began their return to Egypt, apparently ending the immediate danger for Uthman. But on their return journey, the soldiers waylaid messenger bound for Egypt with orders to have the rebel leaders executed. Taking it as sign of treachery on Uthman’s part, the rebels returned to Medina and surrounded Uthman’s home, besieging him within and once again demanded his resignation. Whether Uthman really ordered the rebels executed is unclear, with most accounts crediting the message not to Uthman, but to his cousin and secretary, the future Caliph Marwan ibn al-Hakam. Whatever the truth of the matter, the rebels cut off water to Uthman’s house and gave increasingly threatening demands for his abdication, until one of Marwan’s servants slew one of the rebel spokesmen with stone from the balcony on June 16th, making bloody end to the affair all but inevitable. Abandoned by most of his Umayyad clan, with the Iraqi rebels and notables of Medina remaining neutral, Uthman ordered his remaining defenders to stand down in hopes of avoiding bloodshed between Muslims when the rebels attacked the house the following day. Regardless, Marwan and the children of Ali refused this order and attempted to save the life of their Caliph. As Uthman sat for his noon prayers, Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr and few of the Egyptian rebels climbed into his home from the roof of neigboring house, threatening the Caliph at swordpoint. Though accounts differ on the specific events and on ibn Abi Bakr’s role in particular - the final outcome was the same. Uthman was the first Caliph to be murdered by his fellow Muslims, an event that would shake the Muslim world to its core. Following the murder, the rebel bands effectively controlled Medina, and under their influence, particularly the Iraqis, Ali was elevated to the role of Caliph. As the Prophet’s son-in-law and one of the major candidates in the previous election, Ali seemed safe and popular choice. However, his reign would be saddled with the scandal of Uthman’s murder, and demands for justice placed the new Caliph in difficult position. Given Ali’s efforts to defuse the rebellion and the injuries his own son Hasan suffered in Uthman’s defense, it is incredibly unlikely he had any role in his predecessor’s murder. But many of the rebels who had opposed Uthman were now his most important supporters, so punishing them would have alienated his powerbase and potentially led to his own demise. Stuck in trap, Ali allowed Uthman’s murder to go unpunished, which led to accusations of weakness and complicity, particularly from Uthman’s powerful Umayyad clan, laying the groundwork for the first Islamic civil war. The first stirrings of conflict came from Talha ibn Ubayd Allah and Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, Ali’s main competitors in the election that had brought him to the throne. In the past, the two had fought alongside Ali as comrades. But, despite Talha’s own previous opposition to Uthman, they had been among the most vocal for action against the rebels, and were quick to make common cause with another of Ali’s detractors - Aisha, the widow of the Prophet himself. With Aisha as the unifying spiritual figurehead of the rebellion, funding from numerous Umayyad governors deposed by Ali at the beginning of his reign, and several prominent Muslim leaders including Marwan and the murdered Caliph’s son Aban ibn Uthman flocking to her banner, Aisha’s rebel army represented significant challenge to Ali’s leadership. Unfortunately for the so-called Mother of the Faithful, number of crucial mistakes would undermine her cause. great deal of effort was wasted trying to rally support in Iraq, despite most of the region being loyal to Ali. Then, when rebel leadership left Mecca to gain support in Basra in mid-October 656, internal discord fomented within their cause. Talha and Zubayr were jockeying against each other for authority, while the secrecy of the army’s destination created resentment from Marwan and the Umayyad clansmen within the army, who saw the insurgency more as blood feud than rebellion and would have preferred to simply march to Medina and execute the conspirators who had slain Uthman rather than waging campaign to topple Ali. The anti-Ali movement was dealt another blow in December, when Aisha and her followers arrived in Basra. After hearing the speeches and calls to arms of Zubayr and Talha in the marketplace outside the city, the reaction of the Basran populace was divided, with some offering support while others denounced her. The first fighting of her rebellion occurred immediately after, when numerous market goers loyal to Aisha or Ali began to scrap in the marketplace and strike each other with the soles of their shoes. More important than any marketplace brawl, however, was the response of Basra’s governor Uthman ibn Hunayf, who remained loyal to Ali. However, reluctant to bring bloodshed to his city, he allowed the rebels to camp the night while he waited for word from Ali, who was now on his way from Medina. message from the Caliph soon arrived, instructing ibn Hunayf to give the rebels an ultimatum of loyalty to Ali or warfare, but by then, Aisha’s army had already managed to entrench themselves in defensible camp near the local garrison’s storehouse. It should be noted that even after Caliph Uthman’s murder, the thought of outright warfare between Muslims remained almost unthinkable to most, and so the prominent poet and scholar Zalim ibn Amr al-Du’ali was sent to make last entreaty for peace and an end to the rebellion. When it was refused, Basra’s cavalry commander Hukaym ibn Jabala stormed out with the governor’s local forces. short and bloody battle around Aisha’s camp ensued, many on both sides died, but the rebels were not dislodged. Afterwards, an uneasy ceasefire was signed, intended to last until Ali’s arrival. The ceasefire would be short-lived, however. If Aisha remained unwilling to submit, Ali’s arrival would only leave the rebels hopelessly outnumbered, so on Talha’s advice, party of rebels captured the Basran governor in surprise raid as he led the evening’s prayers in the mosque, giving him 40 lashes and plucking his beard and eyelashes before imprisoning him. The following morning, Zubayr’s son Abdallah led the rebels in an attack on the storehouse, killing forty converted ex-slaves from Sindh who had been posted as guards and seizing the grain meant for the townsfolk’s winter provisions. Hukaym arrived shortly after in great rage, demanding Abdallah release the governor and berating him for the killing of Muslims innocent of any role in Uthman’s murder. When Abdallah refused, Hukaym attacked with the 700 men remaining to him, finding himself quickly surrounded and overwhelmed by the larger rebel army. Though he fought fiercely until the end - fatally striking one of the rebels with his own severed leg, according to one rather fanciful account - Hukaym, his son, and many of his soldiers were killed, with the rest fleeing or surrendering and leaving the rebels in full control of Basra. With Ali en route, the victorious rebels had little time to gather support for their movement. Though control of the city and its treasury brought most of the surrounding tribes at least nominally under Aisha’s banner, emissaries sent North to Kufa had less success. While the province’s governor Abu Musa ibn Asha’ari attempted to remain neutral, Kufan notable Zayd ibn Suhan, after receiving message from Aisha fondly addressing him as beloved son as befitting her title of Mother of the Faith, responded that her beloved son would prefer her to stay safely at home. Ali’s efforts were more fruitful. Sending his son al-Hasan to Kufa, Abu Musa was soon deposed, and more than six thousand men were gathered for the retaking of Basra. With these joining Ali’s 700 from Medina and close to two thousand who had gathered from various tribes along the caravan route, Ali arrived at Basra on December 5 with just under ten thousand men, met by Aisha’s comparable army of Basrans and Meccans. After three days of standoff and attempts to sway the Basran tribes, horseman was sent between the armies by Ali with Qur’an at the end of his lance to exhort both sides to an honorable combat. When he fell dead, pierced by arrows, battle was joined and the two cavalry-heavy armies came crashing together like thunder. Despite Aisha having, by most accounts, at least as large an army as Ali prior to his arrival, defections of several Basran tribes both before and during the battle weakened her force significantly. In the center of Ali’s army, Abu Qutada al-Nu’man led the Kufan foot soldiers while Ali’s son Muhammad ibn Hanafiyyah carried his father’s standard. On the right wing of Ali’s army, Malik al-Ashtar led the bulk of the Kufan cavalry, soon routing the tribesmen of the Banu Hanzala leading Aisha’s left. And on Ali’s left, the storied companion Ammar ibn Yasir is said by some to have driven Zubayr, who had been given overall command of the rebel army, to abandon his army and leave without fighting. Zubayr’s desertion is matter of some mystery - despite his past victories and talent as commander, all accounts agree he abandoned his army and retreated very early in the battle, though there are variety of reasons given. Some suggest that secret correspondence from Ali convinced him he had taken the wrong path, or that the Prophet had once said that Ammar would die at the hands of band of wicked men, leading Zubayr to question his role when the two came face-to-face on the battlefield. Others point to Aisha’s refusal to acclaim him as Caliph on the eve of the battle, suggesting that she favored Talha and that Zubayr’s role in rebellion had been self-serving grab for the throne. Either way, his desertion left Talha to take command of rapidly-worsening situation. Leading strong force of Basran cavalry, he made number of charges against Ali’s left and center, at first with great success. But once Ali’s right wing punched through his lines, he found his mobile cavalry bogged down and risking envelopment. Turning about to withdraw and regroup for another charge, he was mortally wounded by an arrow to the back of his knee - not at the hands of Ali’s forces, but of his supposed ally Marwan, apparently as spiteful act of vengeance for Talha’s opposition to Uthman now that their alliance to punish Ali and Uthman’s murderers had come to naught. After firing the treacherous shot, Marwan was taken prisoner by Ali’s victorious forces, while Aisha’s leaderless forces collapsed. Named the Battle of the Camel after the camel Aisha had observed her defeat from the back of, this climactic battle in Basra had ended the first major challenge to Ali’s caliphate, though further conflict remained ahead. Various figures are given for the casualties, with generally accepted figures hovering around 400 for Ali’s army and 2500 for Aisha’s, the latter number being particularly high given that Ali pardoned all but one of the prisoners taken after the battle, but still plausible given the accounts of many rebels fighting on long after the army had fallen into disarray and defeat out of zealous devotion to Aisha. Of the three rebel leaders, only Aisha survived the battle and its aftermath, being escorted back to Medina by her brother Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr, where she would live her days out in comfort but with her political activity greatly curtailed. Zubayr was found shortly after the battle’s end by trio of tribesmen and murdered while apparently trying to escape to his ally Mu’awiya, the governor of Syria. At its foundation, the Caliphate had been ruled and organized largely through the consensus of the companions in Medina, but for all Uthman’s merits, his reign brought definite shift away from the ideals of justice and Islamic unity the early Caliphate inherited from the Prophet. In Pre-Islamic Arabia, life had been divided sharply along clan lines, but under the Caliphs Abu Bakr and Umar, brotherhood under Islam had superseded the tribal loyalties that existed before their faith. In his speech upon becoming the first Caliph, Abu Bakr had emphasized to the gathered Muslims of Medina that he was not the greatest among them, and that he would welcome the help and truthful advice of his subjects, even if meant speaking against his own suggestions - and though Abu Bakr had adult sons, he had passed the Caliphate on to his advisor and fellow Companion Umar rather than attempt to create ruling dynasty. Umar had famously lived the same humble lifestyle as Caliph as he had before his coronation, sleeping on bed of palm leaves and taking part in the same labours as his subjects in service of the needy. Under Uthman, however, the nepotistic clan politics of the pre-Islamic past began to return to the fore. Relatives of Uthman were frequently granted positions of wealth and authority, with first his foster brother Walid ibn Uqba and later his uncle Sayyid ibn Aas being given governorship of Kufa. And while few could accuse Abdullah ibn Sa’ad of incompetence after his conquests in North Africa and victories at sea in the Mediterranean, the fact that he had replaced Amr ibn Al-Aas, Egypt’s conqueror and previous governor, largely by virtue of being another of Uthman’s foster brothers did much to stir discontent among other companions of the Prophet and long-serving Muslims of Medina who saw themselves being denied advancement in favour of Uthman’s Umayyad clan. Thanks to these and several other Umayyads appointed to prominent positions, the clan swiftly grew to become one of the most powerful political entities within the Caliphate, with governors of numerous far-flung provinces tied by family bonds and ready to resist any threat to the power they shared. The most prominent figure in this narrative, however, is Uthman’s cousin Mu'awiya, once minor regional governor during Umar’s reign who Uthman had granted lordship of all Syria. It had been on Mu'awiya’s suggestion that Uthman had ordered the Caliphate’s navy built, and its raids in Cyprus, Rhodes and Crete brought significant wealth pouring into Syria’s coffers, making Mu'awiya the most powerful out of powerful family and the most likely rival to Ali in the wake of Uthman’s killing. Conflict between Mu'awiya and Ali had long been an inevitability, as one of the first actions Ali had taken after his election as Caliph had been to order Mu'awiya and many of Uthman’s other appointed governors deposed. Mu’awiya alone had been sufficiently powerful and secure in his position to refuse the order, and those governors that had been successfully deposed had flocked to back Mu'awiya with whatever wealth or support they could offer. Confident in his power, Mu'awiya had publicly rebuked Ali over Uthman’s murder and tacitly claimed the Caliphate as the murdered Caliph’s next of kin, effectively declaration of war. Mu'awiya’s position was further strengthened by an unlikely ally: Amr ibn al-As, the conqueror and former governor of Egypt. Despite Amr’s previous enmity towards Uthman, his popularity in Egypt made him perfect candidate to tear the richest province in the Caliphate out of Ali’s hands. With Amr promised lifetime governorship of Egypt in exchange for his support, Mu'awiya removed Egypt’s current governor Qays ibn Sa’d through masterful piece of deceit. He forged letter from Qays to himself agreeing to join his cause, and ensured Ali’s spies learned of it. Deceived by this forgery, Ali deposed the competent and, by most accounts, loyal governor shortly after, with the inexperienced Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr taking his place too late to muster significant Egyptian support for Ali in the battle to come. Amr also helped Mu’awiya forge an important alliance with the most powerful tribe of Yemen, the Himyar, who had once ruled powerful independent kingdom in pre-Islamic times. With Amr as his closest advisor, allies across the Caliphate rallying to his banner, and Ali weakened by Aisha’s recent rebellion, Mu'awiya was in an incredibly secure position. Thus, when Caliph Ali departed Medina in late May 657 with his armies behind him to depose the recalcitrant governor, he would have far tougher fight ahead of him than he perhaps expected. Before the two main armies met in battle, series of cavalry pursuits and skirmishes took place at Harran and Raqqa, pitting Malik al-Ashtar against Abd al-Rahman ibn Khalid, son of the unrivaled general Khalid ibn al-Walid, as Ali’s army tested Mu'awiya’s strength and resolve and found both unbending. The first true struggle would take place at Siffin, on the banks of the Euphrates river. When Ali’s army arrived on June 5, they found Syrian cavalry blocking them from reaching the only accessible watering area for miles. This was against the advice of Amr, and proved to be blunder on Mu'awiya’s part. When rallying his armies for the campaign against Mu'awiya, Ali had found it difficult to motivate his men, many were reluctant to see so much more bloodshed between brothers in faith to bring governor back into the fold. But Mu'awiya’s ill-advised attempt to deny his foes water in the desert heat lost him any sympathy he or his forces might have enjoyed in Ali’s ranks, and set the stage for vastly bloodier confrontation than had stained the sands at Basra. The numbers involved are matter of debate. Al-Tabari puts Ali’s army at 70,000, likely inflated number, given that it counts more than 60,000 Kufans under his banner while al-Hasan had only been able to raise tenth that number for the Battle of the Camel. But even taking more conservative estimate of twenty to thirty thousand for Ali with Mu'awiya’s army slightly larger, the Battle of Siffin was one of the largest and most impactful battles of Islamic history, and played out in number of phases over the weeks to follow. Upon finding the accessible water blocked, Ali’s advance guard led by Al-Ash’ath ibn Qays fell upon the Syrian force blocking their path with vengeance, driving them back and securing the water for the thirsty army behind them. Following the Day of the Euphrates, as this small victory was known, the armies stood for two days of tense standoff and failed negotiation, followed by more than week of daily raiding and personal duels between noble commanders lasting until June 18th, each army testing the other’s mettle but reluctant to commit its full strength. June 19th saw new ceasefire agreement forged, lasting more than month, in last attempt to reach peaceful agreement or at least convince opposing leaders to defect, but these overtures were no more successful than the previous ones - envoys went back and forth for weeks between the two armies with messages and bribes, but the stalemate remained largely unchanged. Finally, on July 26th, the two armies met in battle that would last three days and three nights nearly unbroken. The first day of the battle was inconclusive, mostly consisting of exchanges of arrows and cavalry raids, with casualties mounting but neither side gaining an overwhelming advantage. The second day saw Mu'awiya come very close to routing Ali, with Habib ibn Maslama leading massive attack that drove Ali’s right wing to flight and pushed hard against his center, driving his army into disarray before reinforcements led by Malik al-Ashtar could halt the Syrian advance. Abd’Allah ibn Budayl, who had been in command of Ali’s right, attempted to press their momentary advantage by bringing his cavalry in charge towards Mu'awiya’s tent only to be surrounded and killed by Mu'awiya’s elite forces. Also killed was Ammar ibn Yasir, whose presence had so frightened Zubair in the Battle of the Camel - fulfilling, according the hadith, the supposed claim of the Prophet that Ammar would die at the hands of wicked band of men. The third day saw Mu'awiya redouble his efforts to break Ali’s right wing, sending his Himyarite allies against it under the leadership of Ubayd’Allah ibn Umar: the disgraced son of Caliph Umar, whose name had been tarnished by an unlawful honor killing, but whose parentage nevertheless made him useful political prop for the would-be Caliph Mua’wiya. This time, however, Ali’s right held firm, killing both Ubayd’Allah and chief Dhul-Kala of the Himyar and inflicting terrible casualties. As the day drew on, the two armies were finally drawn into general melee, the duels, maneuvers and archery exchanges that had defined the previous days giving way to confused clash of swords and lances that continued through much of the night. As morning approached after the bloodiest night of the civil war, Ali’s army appeared to have the upper hand, having driven Mu'awiya’s forces back and even forced him to relocate his tent to safer location after another charge on his camp. But it would not, in the end, be strength of arms that decided the battle’s outcome. As morning arrived, number of envoys from Mu'awiya rode between the armies, Qur’ans on their lances as flag of truce, appealing Ali to allow binding arbitration to settle his and Mu'awiya’s dispute. Though Ali held the advantage in battle, many of his soldiers, exhausted after the long battle and reluctant to continue fighting their brothers in faith, felt the offer provided an honorable alternative to further fighting and ignored the encouragement of Malik al-Ashtar and others to continue fighting. His hands tied, Ali accepted Mu'awiya’s truce and call for arbitration, bringing an end to the battle. While he had been on the verge of winning the war, Caliph Ali now stood on the brink of losing everything in the peace to follow. Each side nominated an arbitrator - Amr ibn al-As for Mu'awiya and, strangely, deposed Kufan governor Abu Musa al-Ash’ari for Ali, who despite his personal enmity with Ali, was popular choice among Ali’s largely Kufan army. The two armies departed the battlefield, with agreements for the two arbitrators to meet over the coming months to judge the murder of Uthman and rightful Caliph fairly with the Qur’an as their guide. However, portion of Ali’s supporters staunchly opposed the arbitration, seeing it as betrayal of God to put the decision in the hands of fallible humans rather than allowing God to pick victor on the battlefield. Before Abu Musa departed for the first round of arbitration, two of Ali’s followers, Zur’ah ibn al-Burj and Hurqus ibn Zuhayr, confronted Ali demanding he abandon the negotiations and return to war with Mu’awiyah. Ali rebuked them, claiming that he would have preferred to fight on at Siffin but was now bound to honor the covenant he had reached. Unsatisfied, they took up the slogan “Authority belongs to God alone”, with new adherents converting to their viewpoint over the months to follow. Following the return of Ali’s forces to Kufah, these al-Khawarij or Kharijites, as they would later be called, would prove major thorn in Ali’s side, heckling and criticizing him as he led the prayers from the mosque and declaring both Ali and Mu’awiyah unfit to rule. As this discontentment grew, the two arbitrators met twice over the year that followed, both times for weeks on end, finally returning verdict in Mu'awiya’s favor ordering Ali deposed as Caliph in April of 658. Ali refused to abide by the decision, declaring it political attack rather than true religious judgment, but the decision greatly damaged his legitimacy and weakened his position in the ongoing cold war against Mu'awiya. Meanwhile, in Kufah, the Kharijite movement was developing from mere vocal opposition into new rebellion, with Abdallah ibn Wahb taking command of the movement. Departing Kufah in small groups to avoid detection, ibn Wahb regrouped his forces by the bridge crossing the Nahrawan, great canal drawing water from the Tigris River north-east of al-Mada’in. Meanwhile, other bands of Kharijite sympathizers across Iraq, having received secret letters from the leadership in Kufah, departed their homes to join ibn Wahb’s band with savage fighting breaking out near Basrah between loyalists to Ali and band of five hundred departing Kharijites. It seems ibn Wahb intended to continue marching once his forces had assembled, to conquer al-Mada’in or carve out an independent powerbase among the Zagros mountains. However, after compelling his remaining supporters to reaffirm their oaths of loyalty to him, Ali was quick to depart Kufah in pursuit of the Kharijites, arriving at Nahrawan in July 658. Despite their treachery, Ali attempted to avoid battle, pointing out that he now stood poised to return to war with Mu’awiyah as they had wished and requesting they return to his cause. Some did, but majority of the roughly two thousand rebels remained stubbornly entrenched, leading to some disagreement within Ali’s ranks. Many of his followers felt the Kharijites were minor problem, and should simply be ignored until after Mu'awiyah’s defeat. But after several local villagers were slain by Kharijites, Ali’s reaction would be swift, with his much larger army engaging the Kharijites on July 17th. Zealously devoted to their cause, the Kharijites did not falter, but with now less than two thousand facing fourteen thousand, the outcome could be little in doubt. Ali’s horsemen formed his front line under the command of Abu Ayyub al-Ansari, with archers and footmen lined up behind them. When the Kharijites charged, Ali’s horsemen split into two groups down the middle and rushed off to the left and right, allowing the archers to shower the onrushing Kharijites with arrows as the horsemen wheeled about and fell on their flanks. After short, bloody, and largely one-sided confrontation the rebel army was broken - little of the mercy Ali had shown Aisha’s rebels after the Battle of the Camel would be forthcoming, and the majority of the Kharijites to take the field would perish. The Battle of Nahrawan was decisive victory for Ali, but also hollow one, with the embattled Caliph forced to put his own former followers to the sword as Mu’awiyah grew ever more powerful. The following two and half years of uneasy truce saw Mu'awiya take great strides, toppling Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr in Egypt and rewarding Amr ibn al-As’ loyalty by returning him to power as promised while also securing new alliances across the Caliphate, many now seeing him as the legitimate Caliph. By the beginning of 661, after receiving the counsel of his remaining supporters, Ali decided to embark on second invasion of Syria while he still had the strength to challenge Mu'awiya, gathering his forces in preparation for another campaign. The planned offensive would never take place, however. Meeting in Mecca, three Kharijite conspirators made pact to assassinate the three men they viewed as responsible for the civil war - Ali, Mu'awiya and Amr ibn al-As. Two of the three assassination attempts failed, but on January 28th, as Ali sat praying in the Great Mosque of Kufa, the third assassin - Abd al-Rahman ibn Muljam- struck him from behind with poisoned sword, mortally wounding the Caliph and avenging his comrades fallen at Nahrawan. With Ali dead, few remained who could deny Mu'awiya the Caliphate - Ali’s eldest son al-Hasan was pressured into surrendering his claim to the throne, and Mu'awiya took power nearly unopposed. Beyond the simple change in leadership, the First Fitna, as the civil war came to be known, would have massive impact on Islam’s history. It split religious and cultural movement that, united, had conquered mighty empires. Even today, the divisions between the major sects of Islam can still be traced to the First Fitna and the death of Ali. Ali’s closest supporters denied the legitimacy of Mu'awiya and his successors, elevating Ali and his family line to the role of divinely-inspired Imams. Known as the Party of Ali or Shi’at Ali, their movement remains strong today as Shia Islam, now divided into sects of its own. The majority of Muslims, accepting Mu'awiya’s ascension, are known as Sunni - harkening to the Sunnah, the traditions and examples derived from the Prophet. Spreading and taking hold in North Africa, the Kharijites remained maligned, antagonistic force often in conflict with their fellow Muslims and what they saw as corrupt and illegitimate Caliphs. Though their sect remained small, it would be at the heart of numerous uprisings and rebellions during the Umayyad period and in the following centuries as well. It was from within their ranks, though, that the more moderate and neutralist Ibadi community would arise, faith now dominant in Oman. The nature of leadership in the Caliphate would be forever changed as well, with the elections that had chosen the first four Caliphs giving way to dynastic succession - power would remain within the Umayyad clan for the following 90 years, marking the end of the Rashidun Caliphate. During the early years of the Umayyad Caliphate the reigning Emperor in Constantinople was Constans II, who faced an increasingly dire situation on numerous fronts. In 655 he had commanded the fleet that met disaster at the Battle of the Masts, only narrowly escaping with his own life. Uthman’s murder and the beginnings of the First Fitna the following year might have seemed like an opportunity for Constans to avenge his previous defeats against divided foe - but Constans’ attention was primarily turned to the West, where the Slavs and Lombards threatened Byzantine holdings in Greece and Southern Italy. Not only did these European threats prevent him from taking advantage of the Islamic civil war, but they also necessitated rise in taxes in provinces such as Sicily and North Africa and the seizures of church assets in Italy, sparking discontent and resentment towards Constans among both the provincial populations and the court in Constantinople. This political turmoil was worsened by another sort of conflict in the capital - growing religious schism dating back to the reign of Heraclius. Efforts to reconcile differences between the Armenian and Greek Orthodoxies led to the creation of the Monothelite movement, sort of religious compromise followed which failed to sway the majority of the Byzantine populace. By Constans’ reign, this movement that had been intended to reconcile Armenian and Greek religious divides had simply created new divides within the capital, with Constans’ attempt to quell the schism by banning all discussion of the controversy - even forcing Pope Martin into exile after his condemnation of Monothelitism - only creating new enemies for the embattled Emperor. In 663, two years after the end of the First Fitna and the renewal of Arab attacks into Anatolia, Constans abandoned Constantinople and its hostile court and moved the Byzantine capital to Syracuse in Sicily. Unfortunately, the move would not long forestall his downfall. After relocating the capital, Constans moved into Italy with all the forces the Empire could muster in hopes of defeating the Lombards and securing Southern Italy. His efforts were foiled at every turn, however, with the Lombards defeating him in series of battles and forcing him to withdraw in shame back to Syracuse while his son and co-Emperor Constantine IV kept order in Constantinople. His legitimacy tarnished, he was unable to prevent Armenia from falling back into Arab suzerainty, and despite its new prominence as the seat of the Byzantine Empire, Sicily would suffer devastating naval raid in 666 led by Abdullah ibn Qais that saw huge amounts of plunder enriching Muawiyah in Damascus. Caliph Mu’awiyah, veteran of the Battle of the Masts himself and staunch enemy of the Byzantines, was now making increasingly aggressive moves at sea with his expanded navy, with similar raids carried out on Rhodes while Arab fleets secured naval bases along Asia Minor’s Mediterranean coast in preparation for planned siege Constantinople. Even among Constans’ own subjects he faced danger at every turn, and in 667 he was forced to contend with an Umayyad-backed rebellion by the turncoat Armenian general and would-be Emperor Saborios that briefly took control of much of Anatolia. The rebellion would soon come to naught after Saborios’ accidental death in riding mishap shortly before battle near Hexapolis, but this would not be the end of Constans’ woes, as Fadalah ibn Ubayd - an experienced Muslim general who had briefly operated as liaison and ally to Saborios - soon laid siege to Constantinople’s Anatolian suburb of Chalcedon. Though they succeeded in capturing many prisoners, lack of supplies and support caused this first siege attempt to founder - in their original plan, they would have been operating in territory under the sway of their rebel ally, able to rely on local supply routes and bolstered by Saborios’ own forces. Forced to operate alone in hostile territory, disease and hunger soon set in and the army was forced to withdraw, with even the arrival of reinforcements under Muawiyah’s son Yazid failing to turn the tide. It does appear the initial Arab intention was to return to besiege Constantinople proper the following year, as sizable garrison - 5,000 according to Theophanes the Confessor - was left behind in the captured fortress of Amorion to provide forward base for later attack. However, Amorion would be recaptured during the bitterly cold winter that followed, with eunuch chamberlain named Andrew leading force through the heavy snows that regained control of the fortress and put its garrison to the sword, delaying the planned attack on Constantinople and denying the Arabs their first major inland foothold in western Anatolia. This small victory was to be Constans’ last, however, with the Emperor not long outliving his would-be usurper. Constans II was struck on the head with bucket and assassinated by one of his servants as he took his bath early in 668, with further rebellion breaking out in Sicily as the conspirators in his murder acclaimed general Mezezius their Emperor in opposition to Constantine IV. The young Constantine would thus be forced to confront both the rebels in Sicily and the still-looming Arab attack on Constantinople in the first years of his solo reign. Of these two challenges, the rebellion of Mezezius would be the swiftest dealt with, though it would still leave the Empire weakened in ways that would soon cause further disaster. Constantine called troops up from the embattled frontiers of North Africa and Italy, bringing an end to the rebellion in Sicily after seven months and ending its brief heyday as the Empire’s capital. With Constans’ murder and Mezezius’ acclamation so closely tied to the ongoing religious schism, the general failed to command widespread support in Sicily beyond the soldiers under his command or rally supporters beyond the island’s shores - by the account of Theophanes the Confessor, even Mezezius himself had not wished to become Emperor, and had been chosen as figurehead leader against his will on account of his good looks. But however easily the rebellion might have been suppressed, the recalling of soldiers from North Africa did leave the Byzantine forces in Carthage far less able to resist the pressure of the Arabs in Tripoli, creating an opportunity for the conquest of the Maghreb - stalled since before the First Fitna - to resume. 668 and 669 saw renewed Arab raids capture many thousands of prisoners from the remaining Byzantine territories in modern Tunisia as the uneasy stalemate the two sides and their respective Berber allies had settled into broke down, with the continuing Arab presence in Anatolia further distracting the overstretched Byzantines from the defense of their frontier provinces. Meanwhile, despite Mu’awiyah’s Western focus and enmity towards the Byzantines, smaller conquests still continued apace along the former frontiers of the Sassanid Empire. In 670, Muhallab ibn Abi Sufra conquered Kabul and took at least nominal control of all Khorasan, one of the only regions formerly under Persian domination to have remained outside of Arab control. And despite some staunch resistance from Turkic hill tribes that nearly saw one force surrounded and wiped out during its return to Kabul, he also successfully penetrated the Khyber Pass to begin the first inland conquests into modern Pakistan, previous Muslim incursions into the Indian subcontinent having been limited to the more easily-traversed coastal lowlands. Politically, some unrest still continued to flare up as Mu’awiyah attempted to crack down on lingering support for Ali, with the respected general Hujr ibn Adi and several of his compatriots being executed for refusing to denounce the deceased Caliph, an act shocking to most. Still, the next major prize for the largely unified Caliphate - and the single-minded focus that would define Mu’awiyah’s later years as Caliph - was Constantinople, with the campaign to take it beginning in earnest in 672. massive Umayyad fleet was outfitted and launched, wintering in the naval bases prepared in Smyrna and Cilicia while the Byzantines hurried constructed great biremes and dromons for the city’s defense, equipped with new and deadly anti-ship weapon - Greek fire. With the coming of the spring, the fleet embarked for Constantinople, clashing almost daily with Byzantine ships in the waters just South of the Dardanelles from April until September. Compared to the Battle of the Masts, which saw the Arab fleet score victory in pitched battle between two massed fleets, the presence of greek fire would have made any full fleet-on-fleet engagement near-suicidal for the Arabs despite the greater size of their navy, leaving it infeasible for the Umayyad fleet to attempt to break through the Dardanelles or bring its full force to bear against Constantinople. Under the command of Yazid, Umayyad armies were ferried to land to surround the city, but lack of effective naval support made overcoming the city’s formidable defenses truly daunting task. Though Arab forces under Yazid, Fadalah and Abdallah ibn Qays did see success in various skirmishes in the surrounding region and in Crete, and were able to honor the passing of the venerable commander Abu Ayyub al-Ansari by pushing to the Theodosian Walls themselves to bury him at their base, for five full years of campaigning the Umayyads failed to break through the Dardanelles and cut Constantinople off from supplies while the Greek Fire-equipped ships inflicted mounting casualties with every engagement. Finally, ten years into Constantine’s tumultuous reign in 678, flagging morale and large rebellion of Mardaite Christians and escaped slaves in the Nur mountain range North of Alexandretta forced Mu’awiyah to abandon the campaign, the greatest military disaster the seemingly unstoppable Caliphate had suffered since it had first exploded onto the world stage some four decades prior - yet the successful defense did little to change the overall balance of power, with the struggling Romans still on the defensive against the still-expanding Arabs. The following years would give much-needed, if brief, reprieve to the Byzantines as Caliph Mu’awiyah’s death in 680 was swiftly followed by new period of turmoil and civil war. At the center of the new conflict was Mu’awiyah’s attempt to secure the succession of his son Yazid, when Caliphs had been chosen by election prior to his reign. Yazid was indeed acclaimed as Caliph in Medina, but when the governors and notables of the Caliphate were summoned to give him their oaths of allegiance, two important figures refused to swear the oath - Husain ibn Ali, son of Caliph Ali, and Abdullah ibn Zubayr, son of the Zubayr who had opposed Ali at the Battle of the Camel some 24 years prior. Despite the rivalry of their fathers, the two men were united in their opposition to Yazid, and fled from Medina to Mecca to raise rebellion against him. Offers of support soon arrived from Ali’s former powerbase of Kufa, giving Husain hope his murdered father’s cause could be revived. cousin of Husain’s, Muslim ibn Aqil, was sent to Kufa ahead of Husain and his party to determine the strength of their support in Kufa and out of suspicion the offers might be trap by Yazid or local notable attempting to curry his favor. Upon his arrival, he found the offers of support genuine, and as many as 12,000 flocked to Muslim’s side to pledge their loyalty to Husain. Upon receiving this news, Husain departed Mecca to join his cousin in Kufa - journey he would never complete. Despite his recent, rocky succession to the throne, Caliph Yazid was determined to stamp out the rebellion before it could grow to challenge him, and upon learning that Kufa’s governor Noman ibn Bashir had chosen to remain neutral and allow Husain’s supporters to gather, swiftly took matters into his own hands. Noman was transferred to different province, with Yazid’s loyal supporter Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad replacing him and initiating harsh crackdown on the growing rebel band, with Muslim ibn Aqil and several of its other leaders being murdered and the demoralized rebels being scattered under intense pressure from local military forces. By the time Husain received word of this disaster he was already near today’s Rifai, far from the safety of Mecca, with only few supporters around in him increasingly hostile territory. Husain might still have turned back and returned to Mecca at this point, but opinions among his supporters were divided, with some of his tribal supporters offering him sanctuary in the mountains of Northern Najd while many in his own family encouraged him to continue to Kufa and avenge his murdered cousin. Eventually, Husain took the latter decision, and though many of his supporters deserted him, his march towards Kufa continued. Soon, at the plains of Karbala, his tiny band of supporters was chased down by Ubaidallah’s army. Husain requested to be allowed to return to Mecca, while Ubaidallah demanded Husain surrender and pledge his loyalty to Yazid. When Husain refused, the Umayyad forces surrounded Husain’s party, cutting them off from the water to force their surrender. When this too failed, the surrounding army attacked on October 10, 680, killing Husain and his supporters in hopelessly unequal struggle. The battle had been short, and its outcome little in doubt, but the killing of Husain - the Prophet’s grandson - would shock the Muslim world, with the date of the battle immortalized by Shia Muslims as day of mourning and Karbala as pilgrimage site. Galvanized by Husain’s martyrdom, major revolts led by Abdullah would arise in Mecca and Medina in the following years, with Yazid’s experienced Syrian forces under Muslim ibn Uqba inflicting defeats on the rebels but failing to regain the loyalty of the populace - the siege and bombardment of the holy city of Mecca itself in 683 only created further outrage, with Yazid dying the same year under unexplained circumstances. His son and successor, the sickly Mu’awyiah II, would rule only few months before abdicating, leaving an empty throne and Caliphate divided once more, ushering in the Second Fitna. The years to follow would see numerous figures claim the Caliphate. In the Hijaz, Abdullah ibn Zubayr was acclaimed Caliph, with majority of the Muslim world initially backing him. Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad, the general who had martyred Husain at Karbala, established powerbase in Basra and briefly claimed the Caliphate as well, but failed to win the same widespread support and was soon driven from Basra by an uprising of Kharijites. And in Syria, the only region still loyal to the Umayyad dynasty, Muawiyah II was eventually succeeded by Marwan, Caliph Uthman’s secretary and cousin, with Yazid’s young but popular son Khalid being sidelined. Ubaidallah would return to Umayyad service after the failure of his own bid for power, seizing eight million dirhams from Basra’s treasury before he fled, and would lead Marwan’s armies in the coming struggle. Marwan’s first challenge in defeating the more popular Adbullah was to secure his hold over Syria against powerful foe uncomfortably close to home - Dahhak ibn Qays, the governor of Damascus province, who had loyally served Mu’awiyah during the First Fitna, even leading his infantry at Siffin, but had now defected to Abdullah in opposition to the Umayyads, bringing much of Syria with him. Marwan did have several major advantages - though some fighting broke out in the streets after Dahhak and the young Umayyad prince Khalid ibn Yazid each delivered speeches in favour of their faction during the leading of prayers, the Umayyads retained control of the city of Damascus itself and by extension the vast treasury of the Caliphate, allowing Marwan to win the loyalty of many local tribes through bribery. Dahhak also retained some degree of loyalty to the dynasty he’d served so long, even briefly returning to Umayyad service after negotiating with Khalid and Ubaidallah, making him rather reluctant and indecisive opponent spurred on only by pressure from his overwhelmingly anti-Umayyad supporters in the Qaysi tribal confederation. Even so, Dahhak and the Qaysi were able to amass sizable army of 20,000 or more at Marj Rahit, at the edge of the desert to the East of Damascus, joined by supporters from across Syria. Marwan, on the advice of Ubaidallah, gathered his own loyalists from the Kalb confederation and from the remnants of the once-powerful Ghassanids and rode out to challenge him, with the two armies meeting on July 29th, 684. With his own supporters numbering some 6,000, Marwan was outnumbered greatly by Dahhak’s forces. Nevertheless, his infantry-heavy army was able to hold firm over the course of nineteen days of raiding and skirmishing from Dahhak’s largely mounted force. Marwan’s left was commanded by Ubaidallah and his right by ‘Amr ibn Sa’id, also known as al-Ashdaq, an Umayyad clansman whose ambitions would lead him to attempt his own grab for the throne in the years following. Dahhak gave command of his right to Ziyad ibn Amr, with other notable commanders including Thawr ibn Ma’n of the Banu Sulaym, on whose insistence Dahhak had finally broken from the Umayyads. On August 18th, the fighting grew fiercer, and the skirmishing gave way to charges and hand-to-hand combat. Despite coming from so many disparate groups, the morale and discipline of Marwan’s forces won out, with his hard-pressed infantry weathering numerous disorganized attacks until mighty champion from among the Kalb named Zuhnah ibn Abdallah slew Dahhak in the midst of heated melee. Neither side at first realized the governor had fallen, with Zuhnah throwing himself back into the fray unaware of the victory he had won. But another soldier, marveling at the warrior’s prowess, soon discovered Dahhak’s body and returned his head to Marwan. Despite still holding numerical advantage, the Abdullah loyalists quickly dissolved after their leader’s defeat, the cavalry of the various tribes under Dahhak’s banner melting away and returning home or swearing obedience to Marwan. Many battles still lay ahead for the Umayyads - even with Syria now firmly in their grasp, most of the Caliphate still recognized Abdullah as Caliph, and as the Second Fitna drew on more factions and challengers would arise to complicate the struggle for the throne. But with his victory at Marj Rahit Marwan had rescued his dynasty from the edge of total defeat, and with the armies of Syria and the treasury of the Caliphate behind him, he now stood poised to reclaim the empire Yazid had lost. In many cases throughout the Empire, local notables had nominally sworn loyalty to ibn al-Zubayr while remaining functionally neutral, using the breakdown of authority to avoid Umayyad taxation. In others, Zubayrid authority was reliant on unsteady alliances with Kharijites and Shi’ites, and though these groups might have made common cause with ibn al-Zubayr at first in order to topple the Umayyads, an alliance with the Kharijites would never be lasting one unless he adopted their beliefs - alienating his other supporters in the process - and the Shia refused to name him Caliph, seeking for descendant of the murdered Caliph Ali to take his place on the throne. Thus, while Marwan controlled secure Syrian powerbase and the Caliphate’s treasury, ibn al-Zubayr struggled to create united front among his supporters, leaving the Umayyads stronger and the Zubayrids weaker than their lopsided territorial control would suggest. Indeed, shortly after the Umayyad victory in the Battle of Marj Rahit, Marwan was able to take Egypt largely unopposed, with his clansman Amr ibn Sa’id entering Fustat and rallying its population back to the Umayyad cause while Marwan stood in standoff with Egypt’s Zubayrid governor Abd al-Rahman ibn Jahdam outside the city - major step towards reunifying the Caliphate and sign of ibn al-Zubayr’s hollow authority. Meanwhile, other outbreaks of civil strife were occurring across the Caliphate, most prominently in the Khorasan region. With Abd Allah ibn Khazim having never been appointed governor by any Caliph, instead forcing out Umayyad governor Salm ibn Ziyad thanks to anti-Umayyad sentiments among the army, the power vacuum allowed numerous local communities and factions within the army to drive out officials and seize control across Khorasan. However, ibn Khazim’s effectiveness and brutality in suppressing both rebels and opportunistic Hephthalite raiders - reportedly ordering his forces to execute prisoners until the sun set after one victory - quickly ended any opposition, allowing him to rule with little regard for either faction during the following years of civil war. And in Kufa, militant Shi’ite movement known as the al-Tawwabin or Penitents was gathering steam. While the death of al-Husayn had caused shock and outrage across the entire Muslim community, the impact had been greatest among the Shia community of Kufa, whose support Husayn had been travelling to enlist, with many seeking either vengeance or martyrdom to compensate for failing to aid him. With the outbreak of the Second Fitna, propagandists were sent to garrison towns across Kufa, calling for vengeance and the turnover of power to the family of the Prophet. The movement began to split, however, with the arrival of Mukhtar al-Thaqafi on May 7 684. Mukhtar claimed to be follower of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah, son of Caliph Ali through different wife than the Prophet’s daughter Fatimah. Al-Mukhtar’s claims that ibn al-Hanafiyyah was the promised mahdi or the guided one, and the prospect of serving an heir to Ali, served to sway portion of the Penitents away from their leader Sulayman ibn Surad and create bitter divide. When the Zubayrid governor Abdallah ibn Yazid arrived on May 15, it was all he could do to prevent violence breaking out between the two factions or against their erstwhile Zubayrid allies. Further weakening ibn al-Zubayr, his Kharijite allies in Mecca deserted him during this same period. Tiring of al-Zubayr’s vague claims of ideological support, they relocated to Basra and the Al-Yamamah region to raise rebellion of their own under the leadership of Abu Talut. They would remain major thorn in the side of the Zubayrids, even conquering much of the Arabian peninsula in the coming years. Of all these groups, the first to engage in major campaign would be Sulayman ibn Surad’s Penitents, who began their long-awaited invasion of Syria on November 15, 684. However, despite the lingering grief over Husayn’s death and years of propaganda work, Sulayman was greatly disappointed by the turnout when this call to arms finally came, with only 5,000 out of 16,000 whose support had been promised materializing and many of these deserting in the coming months. Nonetheless - despite Abdallah ibn Yazid’s attempts to convince them to remain in Kufah in unity with the Zubayrids - he wasted no time in departing, leaving Kufah on the 17th, first to Husayn’s tomb at Karbala for day and night of mourning and then on to al-Qarqisiya. Here they were provided supplies and information by the sympathetic Qaysi chieftain Zufar ibn al-Harith, one of the Zubayrid commanders during the disaster at Marj Rahit. The Umayyad army, returning from the subjugation of Egypt, had recently left Raqqa and was marching towards the town of Ayn al-Warda on their way to invade Iraq. Informed of their whereabouts by Zufar and enjoying superior mobility with his mounted army, Sulayman made haste to reach the site before his foes, arriving five days before the Umayyads and camping to the West of the city in order to cut them off from food and water. Having reinforced in Egypt and numbering close to 20,000, the Umayyad army held an advantage in numbers, but was divided against itself. While Ubaydallah ibn Ziyad was in overall command of the army, he was not present during its march through what was thought to be friendly territory, leaving two of his commanders - al-Husayn ibn Numayr and Ibn Dhi al-Kala - to squabble over leadership, traveling and camping separately as they marched unknowingly towards the Penitent’s ambush. When they arrived at the beginning of January 685, it was Ibn Dhi al-Kala’s smaller contingent that first saw battle, with the Penitents being led to his camp by local bedouin and launching surprise attack. Though outnumbered, surprise and confusion allowed Sulayman’s charging horsemen to put al-Kala’s forces to rout, with many being run down and slain and their camp abandoned to be looted. This initial engagement would do little to even the odds, however, and ibn Numayr was sent with larger force of 12,000 on January 4. During brief standoff before the battle, the demands of each side were conveyed, with the Penitents demanding ibn Ziyad be turned over to them for his role in Husayn’s death, and the Umayyads demanding Sulayman swear fealty to Marwan - but these demands were little more than formality, the two armies coming together in battle after their refusal. The Penitents put their mobility to good use, following advice from Zufar, reinforcing or withdrawing contingents as they came under attack rather than confront the larger Umayyad force head-on. Both commanders led their respective centers, with elements of Sulayman’s horsemen dismounting to support their comrades from the ground where the fighting was thickest. This skirmishing was won by the Penitents in the short term, though not without losses, and ibn Numayr’s forces withdrew in good order to regroup with those of Ibn Dhi al-Kala. Now reunited, with ibn Ziyad chastising al-Kala for his earlier defeat and stripping him of command to end the feud, the Umayyad army now stood poised to bring their full numbers to bear, leading to day of bloody fighting on the 5th that took heavy toll on the already outnumbered Shia. When fighting resumed on the 6th, the exhausted Penitents soon found themselves pressed from all sides, unable to prevent the Umayyads from flanking and surrounding their separated cavalry contingents, the same tactics that had previously enabled them to avoid the full weight of the Umayyad numbers now allowing them to be defeated piecemeal. Sulayman ibn Surad and several of his close companions were slain by punishing volleys of arrows, with series of spirited charges by Sulayman’s second in command al-Musayyab ibn Najabah and the late arrival of reinforcements from Basra doing nothing to turn the tide. The destruction of the Penitent cause brought the Umayyads one step closer to recovering their Caliphate, though Marwan would not long outlive it, dying in the Spring of 685, either by plague or assassination carried out by his queen, depending on which accounts you believe. He was succeeded by his son Abd al-Malik. Ayn al-Warda did not mark the end of Shia participation in the Second Fitna, however - with their leaders dead, survivors from Sulayman’s movement turned to Mukhtar al-Thaqafi, who had been growing in power in Iraq by appealing to traditionally disadvantaged non-Arab converts. Though he continued to characterize himself as mere follower of ibn al-Hanafiyyah, their actual ties remained tenuous, with Mukhtar even using falsified letter of support from his figurehead to sway local leader, Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar, to back his coup according to some accounts and acting to isolate ibn al-Hanafiyyah from the movement championing him - but whatever Mukhtar’s motivations, October saw him break any remaining ties with ibn al-Zubayr and oust his governor, Abdallah ibn Muti, taking control of most of Iraq and Armenia. Further Kharijite uprisings toppled Zubayrid authority in Southern Persia and Bahrain, leaving both sides of the Persian Gulf in Kharijite hands and ibn al-Zubayr’s would-be Caliphate smaller than ever. But as weakened as he may have been, he was still far from helpless, defeating both an Umayyad push on Medina under the Quda’a tribal leader Hubaysh ibn Dulja and Kharijite attack on Basra to secure his remaining holdings, leaving the final victor of the civil war still in doubt. The next few years would see some of the Umayyad’s momentum reversed. The invasion force that had routed Sulayman’s Penitents made slow progress after this victory, delayed by Marwan’s death and uprisings from the Qaysi tribes that had supported Dahhak at Marj Rahit. When they finally launched their invasion of Iraq year and half later in the summer of 686, al-Mukhtar was at something of disadvantage, as his attempts to appease both the Arab tribal nobility and non-Arab converts, or mawali, had fallen through and led to attempts by the tribal nobility to depose him over perceived erosion of their privileges. This conflict was further stoked by ibn al-Zubayr’s brother and governor of Basra, Mus’ab, who courted these disgruntled Kufan nobility in an attempt to regain Iraq. The death of one of Mukhtar’s commanders to plague shortly after his victory over an Umayyad probing force near Mosul sparked rumours his army had been defeated, with an opportunistic revolt breaking out in late June. Nevertheless, the besieged Mukhtar was able to both put down this coup attempt - holding out in his palace long enough for Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar’s army to return from the Umayyad front and relieve him - and mobilize large army of predominantly Persian-speaking mawali and Shia partisans to confront the Umayyads, meeting them at the beginning of August some 15 miles East of Mosul on the banks of the Khazir River. While Ziyad’s army has been estimated to number as high as 80,000, this figure is far out of proportion with the same army’s numbers during the Battle of Ayn al-Warda or similar armies raised out of Syria, and is likely reflective of historian Abu Mikhnaf’s anti-Umayyad leanings - though no fully reliable figure exists, the true number was likely little higher than 30,000, even allowing for reinforcement from the remains of the failed push on Medina. Even so, the Umayyads held definite numerical advantage over the 13,000 under Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar - but were as weakened by division as before. The commander of their left wing, Umayr ibn al-Hubab, held meeting with Ibrahim the night of August 5th to offer his defection in the coming battle. Following Umayr’s advice, ibn al-Ashtar wasted no time in bringing the battle to the Umayyads the following morning, ignoring the normal protocol of raiding and skirmishing as his smaller army came crashing into their larger yet still disorganized foe. The initial stages of the battle went in the Umayyads’ favour, with the Umayyad right wing under ibn Numayr slaying the commander of ibn al-Ashtar’s right and putting them to flight. However, the fallen banner was quickly taken up by Abdallah ibn Warqa, nephew to one of the Prophet’s companions, who rallied enough of the fleeing soldiers back to his side to stall the Umayyad advance. On the Umayyad left, accounts conflict on Umayr’s role, with the historian al-Kalbi claiming the promised defection never materialized and Umayr remained loyal to ibn Ziyad, while others hold he deserted the battlefield - As he and ibn al-Ashtar conversed peacefully after the battle, the latter is likely closer to the truth, but either way he took rather passive role, his inaction leaving the Umayyad center open for the Kufan right and center to launch desperate flanking attack. Crucial in this effort was Sharik ibn Jadir al-Taghlibi, warrior who had fought under Caliph Ali in the First Fitna, whose furious cavalry charge carved open path to Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad and toppled the Umayyad banners. With the death of ibn Ziyad and the continuing dissension and rivalry within the Umayyad ranks, the great army quickly dissolved, Umayr’s forces departing peacefully while many others drowned trying to flee across the Khazir River. The short but brutal battle would delay any further Umayyad move against Iraq for several years, but do little to secure Mukhtar’s unstable position, with the Zubayrids and his own tribal nobility still conspiring against him. Some months later, most likely in the late autumn of 686, Mus’ab ibn al-Zubayr would march out of Basra for his own invasion, bolstered by exiled Kufan noble rebels. Given little time to recover, Ibn al-Ashtar’s army made haste to meet them, though without the leader that had carried them to victory against the Umayyads. Ibn al-Ashtar himself - now the Zubayrid-friendly governor of Mosul - abandoned Mukhtar’s cause under unclear circumstances in Khazir’s aftermath, the coinciding defection of Umayr suggesting likely pact between the two. Ahmar ibn Shumayt took command, though lacking his predecessor’s experience his army soon met with disaster just north of Basra at Madhar, with resentment among the tribal nobility in both armies towards the mawali making up the bulk of Mukhtar’s forces coming to the fore in gruesome fashion. While non-Arabs were traditionally barred from serving as mounted warriors, Mukhtar had relaxed this rule and increased their pay to earn their support - yet at the Battle of Madhar, ibn Shumayt once more required them to dismount and fight as foot soldiers. When ibn Shumayt was slain and his army routed, the Kufan horsemen escaped while huge numbers of the mawali infantry were run down and slaughtered by the vengeful exiles, suffering massively disproportionate death toll with few escaping and no prisoners taken. This disaster shook faith in Mukhtar’s messianic movement, and total collapse was not long in coming. The Zubayrid invasion force made haste by boat and horse towards Kufa. Hastily assembling another army and attempting in vain to delay the invaders by flooding the canals along the Euphrates, Mukhtar would personally lead his army in the second desperate clash against the Zubayrids at Harura on Kufa’s outskirts. Mukhtar and his forces fought bravely, with the battle initially in the balance - Muhammad ibn al-Ash’ath, leader of the Kufan exiles fighting under Mus’ab, was slain, and the highland Hejazi tribesmen making up fifth of the Basran force fled early in the battle. However, these initial successes would be brought to naught when the Basran left wing - which, under the cautious al-Muhallab abi Sufrah, had initially held back from the fighting - swung forward, crushing and routing Kufan forces already bloodied and exhausted from most of day’s fighting. Though Mukhtar narrowly escaped, his army and hopes were destroyed and his supporters executed en masse by the victors, with the four month palace siege in Kufa only dragging out the inevitable. On April 3, 687, Mus’ab’s forces stormed his palace and executed him, swiftly restoring Armenia and Iraq to the Zubayrid fold. Other than Kharijite raiding and small border confrontations, the resulting Umayyad/Zubayrid stalemate would persist for the next four years, with both sides exhausted by the long civil war and no major battles between the two occurring until 691. During this time, the long-neglected frontiers saw action once more, with an Umayyad army under Zuhayr ibn Qays dispatched to the mountains of Algeria where the Byzantine-allied Berber king Caecilius had taken advantage of the civil war to overrun much of Ifriqiya. Defeating and killing him in 688, Zuhayr retook Kairouan and reestablished the Caliphate as the dominant force in the region, with only the Byzantine stronghold of Carthage remaining threat. And Abd al-Malik remained active against his Zubayrid rivals during the apparent lull as well, engaging in intrigue and diplomacy with Zubayrid supporters across the Caliphate, taking advantage of ibn al-Zubayr’s weakness and the growing apathy towards his predecessors’ misdeeds after nearly decade of war to chip away at his foes’ support base. Though his next attempt to invade Iraq in 689 was interrupted by his kinsman Amr ibn Sa’id short-lived coup attempt, the end of the civil war would almost come as an anti-climax after the fierce battles of its first years, with the majority of Mus’ab’s army defecting and abandoning him to die when Abd al-Malik finally recaptured Iraq in October 691. Abd al-Malik had Mus’ab and his son Isa buried with honor, lamenting the tragedy of the civil war, but despite his poetic words he remained ruthless in rooting any remaining opposition, besieging Mecca and mopping up Abd Allah ibn Zubayr’s last supporters the following year. Though putting down the Kharijite rebels and independents such as ibn Khazim would take several more years, the Umayyad Caliphate had emerged victorious against its first would-be usurper. The Second Fitna had been long and bloody affair, and marked further departure from the unity of the Rashidun era - even during the First Fitna, the prospect of Muslims fighting Muslims remained painful aberration, with concerted efforts at mediation preceding battles and the conflict being brought to religious arbitration. But during the Second Fitna, the sectarian schisms arising out of the First and the blood feuds that accompanied them made violence and retribution all too easy to accept. But shaken though it might have been, the Caliphate remained whole, with further victories still lying ahead in Africa, Asia and even the unsuspecting Visigothic Kingdom of Iberia. Following Ibn al-Zubayr’s death and the surrender of his forces at the end of an eight-month-long siege of Mecca, the immediate aftermath of the Second Fitna would see Caliph Abd al-Malik dispatch armies to suppress the Kharijite uprisings that had been such thorn in his would-be usurper’s side. The Kharijite army ruling Yemen and central Arabia had already begun to fragment and dissolve even before the Umayyad victory in the civil war, with their leader Nadja ibn ‘Amir al-Hanafi having been executed by his own disillusioned forces over his supposed secret negotiations with the Umayyads. Many of the Kharijites dispersed before the Umayyad reconquest, making for Persia or North Africa. With that said, the Kharijite remainder led by Abu Fudayk put up staunch resistance to general Umar ibn Ubaydallah’s Iraqi army when they met in battle in Bahrain, driving back the Basrans making up the Umayyad left wing and seriously wounding Umar. However, they were held at bay by the Kufan right wing and the Syrian cavalry making up the center, then driven back to their camp when the Basrans rallied and returned to the fray. With the wind at the Umayyads' backs, the Kharijite camp was set alight, with the smoke and heat panicking horses and reducing the Kharijite defence to chaos. With Abu Fudayk slain on the battlefield, those of his followers that remained fled to the fortress of al-Mushaqqar, but with no relief or reinforcement coming, the walls of the ancient fortress did little more than entrap them - lacking supplies, surrender came swiftly, and little mercy was shown, the mass executions of most of Abu Fudayk’s followers ending the brief period of Kharijite dominance in Arabia in grisly fashion. Though Kharijites still held sway in parts of southern Persia and would be behind further uprisings in the future, this would be their last major bid for power within the Caliphate. more serious challenge to the reunified Umayyad realm would come in the North, with the breakdown of the peace treaty with Byzantium. Under Emperor Justinian II’s leadership, the Byzantines had not been entirely uninvolved in the Caliphate’s civil war, extorting tribute from the Umayyads and even taking control of Armenia from the Zubayrids. They also backed and supported uprisings of Christians within the divided Caliphate. In the Nur mountains, where Anatolia and the Levant meet, the Mardaite community had risen up along with thousands of escaped slaves in 688, launching raids into Syria and forcing the overextended Umayyads to make even greater concessions to quell threat uncomfortably close to their seat of power. Though no major battles were fought and it is unlikely this Byzantine involvement greatly impacted the civil war’s course, Justinian II was able to secure great deal of tribute - and, more importantly, the Mardaites themselves, who were relocated to regions of Southern Anatolia left depopulated by Arab raiding to help rebuild the Byzantine powerbase. However, while the relocation of the Mardaites was major economic boon for the flagging Byzantine Empire, it also removed an obstacle from the path of renewed Caliphate offensive after the civil war’s end. Surprisingly, despite the favorable terms of the 689 treaty, it was Justinian that broke it and made the first move, attempting to regain full control of Cyprus and its revenues after decades of shared ownership. This action could be seen as defensively-minded preemptive strike, with Justinian expecting Abd al-Malik to break it as soon as his strength was replenished - or Justinian may have simply underestimated the Caliphate’s strength, hoping to secure even greater concessions after battlefield victory. Either way, the renewal of hostilities quickly backfired for the Romans. Though precise dates are unclear, the later months of 692 saw two clashes take place - smaller army of 4,000 invading Armenia under Uthman ibn al-Walid, and push into Anatolia by the bulk of the remaining Umayyad armies under the Umayyad prince Muhammad ibn Marwan, younger brother of the Caliph. Both of these clashes would end in Umayyad victory. The latter and larger battle would see Muhammad opposed by the Byzantine general Leontios and sizable, but rather irregular, army. The bulk of the force was composed of Slavs, recently conquered and relocated by Justinian from Macedonia to Opsikion, with sizable tribute of soldiers among the terms imposed by Justinian upon their defeat. The forced resettlement of these Slavs did little to encourage loyalty, however, and at Sebastopolis their leader Neboulos, spurred by generous bribes, defected to the Caliphate with the majority of his soldiers. The battle that had initially seemed in Leontios’ favor, swiftly turned into crushing defeat and in short order undid the years of gains the Byzantines had made during the Caliphate’s civil war. Interestingly, the greatest damage to the Byzantine empire to come as result of Sebastopolis was dealt not by Muhammad ibn Marwan, but by Leontios. After his defeat to Muhammad at the Cilician town of Sebastopolis, Leontios was imprisoned as punishment by Justinian, who also harshly punished the remaining loyal Slavic soldiers for the battlefield defection of their kin, selling many families into slavery. These insults did not long go unavenged, though, as after Leontios was released in 695 he soon deposed Justinian through rebellion and seized power as Emperor himself, setting off period of instability that saw six Emperors rise and fall in relatively quick succession over the next twenty-two years. On the home front, Abd al-Malik worked aggressively to consolidate power in former rebel strongholds. figure of central importance during this period was Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, who rose to prominence as the leader of the Caliphs’ personal forces and became famous for his keen military mind. Following the Second Fitna, he was rewarded with the governorship of Yemen and the Hejaz - major display of Abd al-Malik’s trust for the general, given the lingering anti-Umayyad sentiments in the former Zubayrid powerbase. Though only in the position two years, Al-Hajjaj swiftly reasserted Umayyad control through harsh, unforgiving leadership and displays of force that both helped cow the rebellious nobility of the Hejaz and allowed Abd al-Malik to demonstrate his mercy through occasional more lenient interventions. Leaving Arabia behind in 694, he was sent next to Iraq, taking over as governor of Basra and Kufa from the Umayyad prince Bishr ibn Marwan and working to reassert control over fractured and rebellious Persia, where he would soon find himself on the frontlines of another rebellion. Meanwhile, on the western frontiers’ expansion was beginning anew. While the Caliphate had been the dominant power in North Africa for decades, the continuing Byzantine presence in Carthage left their hold over the region tenuous at best. Additionally, outside of fortified cities such as the aforementioned Carthage and Qayrawan, the native Berbers held effective control of most of the Maghreb, with different groups entering into alliances with either the Caliphate or Byzantines based on shared religion or political expediency. So long as the Byzantines represented an opposing power bloc, they could forge alliances with Berber kingdoms and tribes that had not yet converted to Islam and back native opposition to the Caliphate’s expansion. To finally stamp out this threat, Abd al-Malik dispatched Hassan ibn al-Nu’man with 40,000 Syrian, Egyptian and converted Berber soldiers in 694 to capture Carthage. Initially, the invasion met only success, with the city’s fleet and garrison abandoning Carthage for Sicily before Hassan’s arrival in early 695 and allowing the city to fall without resistance. Hassan had more enemies in North Africa than he knew, however - following the death of King Caecilius, or Kusaila, to the armies of Zuhayr ibn Qays, new ruler had emerged to reunite the Berber kingdom Zuhayr had shattered. Known as Queen Dihya to the Berbers, she was called al-Kahina - the oracle - by the Arabs, with rumors of her future sight mark of her strategic prowess. As Dehiya united many Berber groups across religious lines in opposition to Hassan’s advance, she entered into an alliance with Constantinople cemented by her marriage to Greek husband. Learning of Dihya’s prestige and determined to suppress Berber resistance, Hassan swiftly departed Carthage to march against her in Algeria, seemingly expecting another easy victory. Instead, when he engaged the large army Dihya had raised near Baghaya, he saw the previous year’s progress rapidly undone in shocking military defeat. The precise details of the so-called Battle of Meskiana, named for the shallow river valley the two armies clashed in, are rather unclear - though it is known that even among converted Muslim Berbers sizeable portion favored Dihya’s cause, chafing at the inferior treatment non-Arab converts within the Caliphate’s military received just as the Persian converts of Iraq had during the Second Fitna. The defection of Berbers in Hassan’s army before or during the battle could go some distance towards explaining the defeat of his larger and better-armed force, though whatever the cause of this disaster, the stung Hassan would abandon the campaign to await reinforcements in Tripolitania, not to challenge Dihya for another five years. He did, however, clash once more with the Byzantines during his retreat, who under general Apsimar had recaptured Carthage by sea in surprise attack while Hassan had been marching against Dihya. This time, Hassan took no chances - after years of Byzantine resistance and fleet activity out of the city, he chose to raze the Carthage to the ground as Scipio Africanus the Younger had centuries prior, conclusively ending the Byzantine foothold in the Maghreb and stripping Dihya of crucial ally. For his part, rather than continue the resistance in North Africa, Apsimar commandeered the Carthage fleet for voyage to Constantinople, where he overthrew Emperor Leontios and seized the throne as the new Emperor Tiberius III, compounding the internal strife and instability that had already weakened the Byzantine resistance over the past years. Accompanying these temporary setbacks in the West was new breakout of rebellion in the East. The Hephthalite-descended Zunbil kingdom of Afghanistan was proving formidable roadblock to governor al-Hajjaj’s expansion attempts, and the first campaign against them in 698 ended in utter failure when Ubaydallah ibn Abi Bakrah’s army was lured into the heart of the mountainous kingdom, cut off from retreat, and destroyed. The greatest threat to al-Hajjaj and the Umayyads would not come from the Zunbils, though, but from the general sent to lead the second invasion - Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn al-Ash’ath. When he attacked the Zunbils in early 700, they fell back without battle, abandoning large swathes of their territory to the invaders. Fearing the same trap that had doomed Ubaydallah’s army, al-Ash’ath opted not to push on into their mountainous heartland, planning to consolidate his conquests and continue cautiously expanding over the years to follow. But when al-Hajjaj learned of this, he accused Abd al-Rahman of cowardice, demanding he complete the conquest of the Zunbils before he or any of his men would be allowed home to Iraq. Here the harshness he had so often shown while subduing the Hejaz would backfire, as the soldiers in Abd al-Rahman’s army, wary of the danger ahead and angered by their poor treatment, opted to follow Abd al-Rahman back to Iraq to depose al-Hajjaj rather than pressing on into Afghanistan as ordered. Reaching an accord with the Zunbils - promising them tribute exemption should he be victorious, in exchange for safe haven should he be defeated - he began his march West through Persia, defeating al-Hajjaj’s loyal commander Atiyyah ibn Amr al-Anbari in series of cavalry engagements along the way. At this point, Abd al-Rahman’s rebellion was strictly targeting al-Hajjaj, and no threats towards Abd al-Malik or claims for the title of Caliph had been made. But after receiving word of the mutiny, Abd al-Malik opted to back his unpopular governor, sending several thousand experienced Syrian cavalry with all haste to Basra to reinforce him. In last-ditch effort to turn back the rebels, al-Hajjaj sent two thousand of these new arrivals to block the mutineers from crossing the Dujail river in the lowlands of Khuzestan. But while they initially saw success against three-hundred strong advance force, the rebel army - raised and outfitted for conquest, and certainly outnumbering the Syrians, even if the reported strength of 100,000 is clear exaggeration - soon forded the shallow river, forcing their way across and putting the Syrians to rout. In the aftermath of this clash, the rebels expanded the scope of their movement, now disavowing Abd al-Malik and seeking his overthrow along with that of al-Hajjaj. It is possible Abd al-Rahman had intended this from the beginning and simply used the battle as justification, but whether this was the case or not, he now represented major threat to the overextended Caliphate, with so much of Abd al-Malik’s core Syrian army away fighting in North Africa. Arriving in Basra in February of 701 after al-Hajjaj had fled North towards Kufa, Abd al-Rahman took advantage of the departed governor’s unpopularity to secure oaths of loyalty from much of Basra, fortifying the city and engaging in month of skirmishing with al-Hajjaj’s forces before sallying forth to do battle in mid-March. Initially, the Iraqis held the upper hand. Though the two armies met in the open, al-Hajjaj’s loyal forces - drawn from the Qurayshi and Thaqif tribal confederations of the Hejaz - and the caliph’s Syrian reinforcements were soon forced to retreat to the defensive trenches they had prepared to foil the enemy’s cavalry charges. Fierce fighting took place for most of the day, with the spearmen on al-Hajjaj’s flanks falling back in disarray and the center on the verge of rout. But on the very brink of defeat, an unexpected charge by Sufyan ibn al-Abrad al-Kalbi - leading the forces of Syria’s powerful Kalb tribe, one of the few to remain loyal to the Umayyads at the start of the Second Fitna - impacted the Iraqis’ right wing, the trench fighting breaking up formations and confusing their defense. With the pressure lessened, the Syrian and Hejazi forces rallied, splitting the Iraqi army in two and setting them to flight - Abd al-Rahman immediately retreating North with the Kufan soldiers and most of his cavalry, while one of his lesser commanders - ibn Abd al-Muttalib - led the Basran forces in three-day fighting retreat before finally escaping al-Hajjaj’s pursuit and taking off after his departed general. But despite this defeat and al-Hajjaj’s subsequent recapture of Basra, Abd al-Rahman’s mutiny was still major concern for Caliph Abd al-Malik, especially once the people of Kufah rose up to depose al-Hajjaj’s loyal overseer, Ibn al-Hadrami, and offer Abd al-Rahman their support upon his arrival. year later, when al-Hajjaj marched North again after pacifying Basra and receiving further Syrian reinforcements, he found greatly bolstered rebel army awaiting him outside Kufah. With both forces now wary of decisive engagement, they each entrenched themselves on April 4, 702, with weeks of low-intensity raiding and probing attacks following. This drawn-out exchange favoured the Iraqis, who could easily resupply from Kufah while al-Hajjaj’s army struggled to feed itself in the unfriendly territory - and when word of the ongoing stalemate reached Abd al-Malik, he went as far as offering to remove al-Hajjaj in exchange for peace. Yet surprisingly, Abd al-Rahman and his companions chose to refuse this offer, his army redoubling the pressure on al-Hajjaj’s trenches with daily attacks. This back and-forth skirmishing between the trenches continued until mid July, though the morale of the rebels began to flag after the death of their cavalry commander Jabalah ibn Zahr. With no quick victory in sight, some of Abd al-Rahman’s commanders began to question the wisdom of refusing the Caliph’s peace offering, with some possibly reaching out in secret to the Umayyads in hopes of receiving pardons for their defection. When the two armies finally came together again in pitched battle on July 15th, both armies held firm through the fierce fighting until midday, seemingly evenly matched. But like in the previous battle, it would be charge by al-Kalbi that decided the outcome - rushing out with his cavalry from behind the Syrian right wing, he attacked the Iraqi left wing under the command of al-Abrad ibn Qurrah, leader normally noted for his bravery. Here, however, ibn Qurrah fell back in retreat almost immediately, leading to unconfirmed accusations in some accounts that his desertion had been negotiated with the Umayyads before the battle. With the collapse of the left wing, many in the rebel center began to flee as well, despite Abd al-Rahman’s best efforts to rally defense. After an impassioned call to arms from his pulpit, his commanders and some of the retreating infantry flocked to his side for last stand, but with the tide of battle now firmly in their favor, the Umayyads simply showered him and his defenders with arrows rather than charge the well-defended trenches. With his position besieged and the battle lost, Abd al-Rahman fled East to the safety of the Zunbils, marking the end of his attempt on the Caliphate. Back in the Maghreb, though seemingly unchallenged following her victory at Meskiana, Dihya unwittingly planted the seeds of her own downfall by embarking on scorched earth campaign in the territory she had driven Hassan from. Likely viewing the Caliphate’s renewed invasion as simply ambitious raiding, she may have hoped to dissuade them from returning by stripping the border regions of plunder, or to demoralize them further after their defeat with display of brutality. Unfortunately, this move would quickly backfire, for many under Dihya’s banner, especially those who lived in the affected lands or used them for grazing, were angered by the wasteful and self-destructive action - and without the immediate unifying threat of the Caliphate Dihya’s Berber kingdom began to fragment. As these events are filtered through the interpretations of non-Berber outsiders, it is even possible the fragmentation had begun earlier, and what Arab observers saw as scorched earth campaign was in reality an attempt to stamp out brewing tribal rebellion. Thus, despite her massive victory in battle, Dihya would never reach Qayrawan as her predecessor Caecilius had, with her dominance of the Maghreb reduced to little more than her homeland in the Aures Mountain highlands by the time Hassan returned with reinforcements in late 702. Dihya mustered what loyal forces remained to her, picking an advantageous battleground to await Hassan’s arrival - Tabarka, on the coast north of the modern Tunisian city of Jendouba, where the Aures mountains and Mediterranean sea formed natural chokepoint. The choice of the battlefield was sound - the terrain would constrain and hamper the numerically superior Muslim army, while the presence of the Byzantine fleet at Sicily prevented Hassan from simply bypassing the chokepoint by sea. Nevertheless, when the battle was joined early in 703, Dihya would see first her army and then her kingdom shatter - with no more Byzantine gold to sway tribes to her banner and with her actions having alienated most of the lowlanders, many of those who had fought with her at Meskiana deserted her or chose to join Hassan now that the Caliphate was the only remaining power bloc in the region. Though she narrowly escaped the disastrous defeat, she was pursued into the Aures mountains and slain soon after, ending the years of back-and-forth fighting to conquer the Maghreb. To aid in the rebuilding of the devastated region after Carthage’s razing and Dihya’s scorched earth campaign, thousands of Coptic Christians were resettled from Egypt, taking up residence in newly-founded Tunis to work in Hassan’s new shipyards for the growing Caliphate. In cruel twist of irony, though, Hasan would not get to enjoy the spoils of his great victory any longer than Dihya had, as dispute over jurisdiction with Abdulaziz ibn Marwan - governor of Egypt and brother to the Caliph - ended with Hassan losing his hard-earned governorship and returning to Syria in disgrace and poverty scarcely year later, while Abdulaziz expanded his own power on the back of Hasan’s success by installing his loyal servant Musa ibn Nusayr in his place. It was Musa, not Hassan, who would push West to the Atlantic coast in the following few years, converting and assimilating most of the Berber tribes in his path and waging war against those that refused, finally standing poised for the next great conquest of the ever-growing Caliphate - Visigothic Spain. In the East, meanwhile, the unrest sparked by Abd al-Rahman’s rebellion would continue for years, with his former companions splitting up and raising later uprisings in Sistan and Khorasan even after the Zunbils caved to the Caliphate’s demands and executed him. Iraq and Persia would remain centers of anti-Umayyad discontent, and Afghanistan unconquered, for the rest of the Umayyad era - with the same racial and sectarian tensions that had fueled first al-Mukhtar’s and later Abd al-Rahman’s rebellions eventually leading to their downfall. Hitting the Atlantic ocean was huge milestone for the Umayyad Caliphate. Not only had the power of the caliph and the practice of Islam reached one of the ends of the earth, but this would have felt like an even vaster achievement given the difficulty of travel from the eastern deserts to the western seas. As Musa stood on the shores of northwestern Africa, any business he had in any city of the caliphate, or at home, was world away. He needed one extra piece to complete his power, and it would be well over thousand years before it came along: he needed NordVPN, and he needed to go to nord vpn dot com slash kings and generals for special deal. Then he would be able to do his banking in Cairo, buy dyes from Tunis, and see show in Bagdad, since NordVPN connects you to IP addresses the world over to access local services. But more importantly for Musa, it would be completely secure; impossible for his enemies to intercept any sensitive information he needs transferred across the world to conduct his business. If you’re going to be traveling, using unfamiliar networks, or simply want access to piece of the internet reserved for someplace else, download NordVPN at NordVPN dot com slash kings and generals. With this link you’ll get four bonus months added on top of two year plan, with thirty day money back guarantee to make it risk free. Check it at the link in the description, and you’ll be ahead of Musa already. The years immediately following the Berber Queen Dihya’s defeat would be marked by both victory and some turmoil, particularly in Khorasan and Transoxiana, where Caliphal authority had still not been fully restored since the Second Fitna. Between 692 and 705 the largely independent governor, Musa ibn Abdallah, had expanded his powerbase: first by conquering local Hephthalite and Sogdian city-states, even clashing with forces of the Tibetan Empire over influence in the region, then later forging local alliances in order to expand at the expense of other Arab governors in the region despite his nominal loyalty to the Caliph. Musa was eventually brought to heel and slain in campaign ordered by al-Hajjaj and led by al-Mufaddal and Mudrik, both sons of Khorasan’s previous governor al-Muhallab ibn Abi Sufra, with the aid of the Arab-friendly monarch Tarkhun, ruler of Samarkand and the most powerful of the Sogdian rulers. However, the episode highlighted the increasing difficulty of maintaining control over such distant frontiers, and much of the following decades would see the Umayyads attempting to centralize their vast realm with varying degrees of success. different sort of turmoil simmered in the capital during this same period, with Caliph Abd al-Malik now aged and sickly, thorny questions surrounding his succession began to arise. Though Abd al-Malik favored his sons al-Walid and Sulayman as successors, his brother Abd al-Aziz, governor of Egypt, was the preferred candidate for many despite his advanced age, particularly as their father Caliph Marwan, now dead twenty years, had previously declared that Abd al-Aziz should succeed his brother. Abd al-Malik’s request for his brother to renounce this claim and withdraw from succession drove wedge between the two, with Abd al-Malik seemingly fearing another civil war as evidenced by his attempts to compel tribute from Abd al-Aziz and chip away at his traditionally very autonomous power base. These fears were quelled when Abd al-Aziz died in late 704, though the continuing uncertainty surrounding succession spurred Abd al-Malik to make an unprecedented move: summoning his vassals to take their oath of allegiance to his son al-Walid while he still lived. Though power in the Caliphate had now been dynastic for 24 years, swearing fealty to designated heir before his succession marked further departure from the elective tradition of the Rashidun and was disliked by many, with the respected judge and scholar Sa’id ibn Musayyib even being jailed and beaten for his refusal to swear the oath. Despite this dissatisfaction, al-Walid’s reign would be one of the most successful of any Umayyad caliph, and he took the throne after his father’s death in October 705 without serious opposition. New conquests would swiftly follow on three main fronts. In the East, governor al-Hajjaj, trusted companion and advisor to the new Caliph, would grow ever more influential, ruling Iraq and Persia like kingdom of his own and appointing his own governors to oversee further expansion. The most significant of these frontier governors were Qutayba ibn Muslim, who replaced al-Mufaddal as governor of Khorasan and continued the conquest of Transoxiana, and Muhammad ibn al-Qasim, governor of Fars, who would oversee the greatest Arab victories in India to date. In the West, Musa ibn Nusayr ruled the frontier as Governor of Ifriqiya, with Visigothic Spain the next target of the Caliphate’s unstoppable march. The first conquests of al-Walid’s reign would be undertaken by Qutayba, who skillfully took advantage of the feuding and conflict between the Sogdian principalities of the region to bring them into the Caliphate’s sway. Tish al-A’war, ruler of Chaghaniyan, was facing aggression from the neighboring principalities of Shuman and Akhrun to the North at the base of the Hissan mountains. To preserve his throne, he offered his tribute and fealty when Qutayba’s army arrived in late 705, lending his strength to that of the Arabs in their swift campaign against his rival princes and against Balkh, the power center of the Tokharistan region. The disunity of the many princes of Transoxiana made it relatively easy for Qutayba to compel tribute from the region and bring it under the suzerainty of the Caliphate, though his power in the region remained delicate balancing act, as demonstrated by difficult campaigns such as his months-long conquest of Paykand, mercantile city whose great wealth allowed it to attract soldiers and mercenaries from across Sogdh to resist Qutayba for some time before its fall and brutal sacking. Indeed, he would be forced to wage several costly campaigns over the next few years as individual rulers or small coalitions came into conflict with the new lords of the Oxus, with further fighting in Bukhara following Paykand’s sacking. 706 also marked the beginning of new set of hostilities against the Byzantines, undertaken by al-Walid’s son Abbas ibn Al-Walid and half-brother Maslama ibn Abd al-Malik. For the most part, resistance to these raids was on local basis, the same Syrian Mardaites that had been resettled two decades ago by Justinian II fighting without significant aid from Constantinople. One exception, and the largest clash during this period of hostilities, was the siege of Tyana, near today’s Kemerhisar, in either 706 or 708. Tyana was well-fortified, and crucial strongpoint in the Cappadocian frontier, and Maslama’s siege would not be an easy one nor challenge the Byzantines could ignore. The past years of civil strife had not been kind to the Byzantine army, though. Justinian II, whose overthrow at the hands of Leontios had set off the crisis, had since returned to power with the aid of the Bulgars and had embarked on purge of any he saw as complicit in his downfall or as threats to his recently-regained throne. This purge had ended the lives or careers of many capable officers, with many hanged from Constantinople’s walls even as the war-weary empire needed their talents most. This purge, and Justinian’s fear of single military leader winning glory and prestige enough to overthrow him, meant that the relief army sent to Tyana was hampered by ineffectual and divided leadership. The two officers in command, Theodore Karteroukas and Theophylact Salibas, are recorded as jockeying with each other for authority and disagreeing on tactical matters, undermining the army’s morale and cohesion. Furthermore, the poor state of the army showed in the presence of sizable but untrained peasant militia making up portion of the Byzantine ranks, far cry from the well-organized system themes normally entrusted with defense on the frontiers. In the end, the relief army’s arrival would mean more harm than help for the defenders of Tyana. Not only did its disorganized attack on the besieging Arabs fail, with the Byzantines being routed with great loss of life, but the supplies seized from the relief force allowed the hungry besiegers to wait out the defenders until Tyana finally surrendered. Having suffered from significant supply problems through the winter, the Arabs would likely have otherwise abandoned the siege and withdrawn, but after nine-month siege Tyana finally surrendered, by most accounts in the spring of 709. Victorious, Maslama had the fortress razed and the bulk of the Mardaites resettled into Syria once more, leaving the Cappadocia region depopulated and defenseless. Following these victories, the Caliphate would enjoy four relatively peaceful years, with al-Walid appointing new governors and ensuring his authority as the new Caliph was recognized across his vast realm. However, the years 711 and 712 would see two major campaigns erupt almost seven thousand kilometers away from each other, on opposite sides of the Caliphate. While on the western front, Musa ibn Nusayr and Tariq ibn Ziyad brought the might of the Caliphate to Visigothic Hispania, the topic of our next video, recent string of failures in the East had galvanized al-Walid and al-Hajjaj to redouble their efforts in India. Sindh had long been base for pirates, who preyed on vessels in the Indian Ocean, and of further concern was the sanctuary many Sassanid loyalists and various defeated rebels had received upon fleeing Umayyad territory for India. The apparent inciting incident for the campaign occurred when pirates seized eight ships traveling from the Kingdom of Anuradhapura in modern Sri Lanka, whose hulls contained jewels, pearls, slaves, and other gifts from King Manavamma to the Caliph, as well as Muslim women on pilgrimage, who were taken captive. Details on the first punitive expedition are scarce, but following the seizure of the ships and King Dahir of Sindh’s refusal or inability to have them recovered from the pirates, Hajjaj petitioned reluctant al-Walid for support in an invasion, which was finally granted. Led by general named Buzail, 3,000 men sailed to the port city of Nerun, near Pakistan’s modern city of Hyderabad, before marching with vengeance on the prominent pirate haven of Debal. The garrison and local forces would crumble rapidly before the small Arab army, but this initial victory would last only until the arrival of Prince Jaisiah of Sindh with 4000 men, mounted on camels and accompanied by war elephants. Though the Arabs fought valiantly, the elephants drove many of the Arab cavalry’s horses to panic, including Buzail’s own steed, leading to the general’s death and the defeat of his already outnumbered army. Dahir and Sindh’s victory would be very short-lived, however. Even before the launching of the second invasion, cracks were beginning to show in the kingdom. Fearing another invasion, the governor of Nerun began paying tribute to al-Hajjaj, sign of the breakdown in central authority in Sindh that had allowed the kingdom to become such haven for pirates, and which would later see the Caliphate gather significant support from within its borders. In addition, various tribes and communities existed effectively independently within Sindh borders, most notably the nomadic Jat people and the Meds of Balochistan, who lived along the coasts as fishermen and pirates. During the reign of Rai Chach, who established the Chacha dynasty in Sindh around the same time Islam was first emerging in Arabia, humiliating and discriminatory decrees had been leveled against such tribal groups, the Jat in particular. These included bans on their wearing of silk and carrying of swords, with children of prominent Jat leaders held hostage to enforce these rules. By the time of al-Walid and Dahir, these grudges still ran deep, but the crown of Sindh seemingly no longer had the power or authority to control its coasts or its populace, leaving large minority populations and disloyal vassals within the nation ready to take up arms against the state at the first showing of weakness. This opportunity would come swiftly when in late 711, second army was raised with al-Walid’s direct support, al-Hajjaj using the soldiers from Buzail’s army still held prisoner in Sindh as further grievance to goad the Caliph into war. Under the leadership of Muhammad ibn Qasim, the still-teenaged governor of Fars and al-Hajjaj’s brother-in-law and counting 6,000 horsemen from the Caliphate’s core Syrian army, an equal number of camel-mounted irregular warriors joining at Shiraz, and further 3,000 at Makran lead by the province’s elderly and sickly governor Muhammad ibn Harun, this army would greatly outnumber Buzail’s. And though his family ties and personal loyalty to al-Hajjaj seem to have contributed more to the young governor’s selection as leader than his military experience, particularly with al-Hajjaj having suffered near-defeat at the hands of one rebel general already, he would rapidly prove his skill as commander in the years to follow. From Makran, the army marched into Sindh with vengeance, first conquering the Balochi city of Armanbelah: today’s Bela, Pakistan. Despite his youth and his larger army, ibn Qasim proceeded with far greater caution than Buzail had, wary of the Sindhi prince’s army that had foiled the first expedition and constructing series of fortified camps as he advanced to guard against ambush. Reaching Debal on October 28th, 711, ships arrived to unload vast siege engines and catapults, along with frequent correspondence from al-Hajjaj, and the ever-cautious commander dug trenches around the besieged city to guard against any relief army or sortie before beginning bombardment. While the 13th Century Chach Nama’s account of the siege to follow is rather fanciful, featuring magical battle standard that rendered the city unconquerable until its flagpole atop the temple was shattered by catapult stone, among other obvious embellishments, the basic overview of the brief siege is simple enough. After seven days of bombardment from mangonels and the enormous catapult known as the ‘little bride’ the Caliph had provided, the defenders of the city attempted to sally forth against the besieging army, only to be driven back easily. The following day, ibn Qasim’s army assaulted the battered walls from every direction, soon scaling the walls and storming the city. brutal sack followed, with the city nearly razed, many killed as they sought refuge in the temple, and far more carried off as captives. Leaving the recently-freed prisoners from Buzail’s army in charge of Debal, along with their former jailer Kublah, who was spared thanks to his kind treatment of the Muslim prisoners and swift conversion to Islam upon their victory, the great army swiftly departed their conquest to push on towards Nerun, where Jaisiah was still encamped. Outnumbered by the approaching army and receiving word of the fall of Debal, the prince opted to withdraw to his father’s side, commanding Nerun’s governor to resist the approaching Arabs unaware of the tributary agreement he had already reached. When ibn Qasim arrived in Nerun soon after Jaisiah’s departure, he found no resistance, instead being allowed to rest and resupply while Jat and Med tribespeople, hostile to the Chach monarchs and hearing word of Qasim’s victory, flocked to his banner. From here he went first north-west along the West bank of the Indus, conquering Sehwan with little more difficulty than Debal despite the stubborn defence of its leader Bachera, cousin to King Dahir. After another week-long siege, its citizenry, frightened by tales of Debal’s razing - favored surrender, eventually driving Bachera out in order to do so. few days later at Budiah, Bachera attempted another stand after fleeing Sehwan’s fall, joining that city's headman Karah Kotak to launch night attack against the encamped Arab army. thousand of his best warriors split into four groups for the raid under cover of darkness, backed up by Jats loyal to Sindh. Confused orders would see the nighttime attack come to naught, however, with the four groups failing to properly coordinate in the darkness, some becoming lost and failing to reach the Arab army while the rest were discovered and driven by the alert sentries of the well-fortified camp. In the aftermath of this defeat, Karah Kotak submitted to ibn Qasim as so many of Dahir’s vassals had already, while Bachera and his loyalists were slain, bringing almost the whole of Sindh west of the Indus under the sway of the Caliphate. The true test would be the crossing of the Indus, however, and here Qasim’s army, camped at Kohal, began to face difficulties. Dahir and Jaisiah stood ready on the opposite bank, the two armies at times within bowshot of each other, guarding against crossing. Despite nominally commanding the loyalty of the nearby conquered cities, Qasim’s position was still tenuous, based on fear that might fade if the conquerors showed too much weakness. Indeed, as the 50-day standoff across the Indus drew on, the Arabs found great difficulty in keeping themselves supplied, with the army beginning to suffer from hunger and disease and being forced to eat many of their horses, while Sehwan rose in revolt behind them and expelled its recently-installed Arab garrison. Though this revolt was quickly suppressed and 2,000 fresh horses laden with supplies were soon sent by al-Hajjaj, the long period of inactivity was clearly weakening the Arab position. Thus, on Hajjaj’s orders, the army departed towards Thatta, most likely in May of 712. successful crossing was made at Jhim: today the site of Keenjar Lake, but at the time relatively safe ford where small island stood in the middle of the Indus. Provided boats by the local leader Mokah Basaleh, ibn Qasim had them filled with ballast and connected by planks to form bridge, crossing before the unprepared Dahir could bring his forces to bar their way and routing the paltry force under Mokah’s loyalist brother Rasil. From here, Qasim marched swiftly North towards the Sindhi capital of Aror, defeating several Sindhi armies along the way. At lake just south of today’s Nawabshah, the first major engagement was fought, with Jaisiah taking strong force of soldiers and elephants to oppose the invaders. Though they fought bravely and the elephants caused great chaos among the mounted Arabs, they were swiftly enveloped and hemmed in by their more mobile foes, with the majority of the army being cut down while Jaisiah broke through the foes surrounding him atop an elephant to escape to his father’s side. This defeat further shook the confidence of Dahir’s vassals, with Rasil now defecting to join his brother in ibn Qasim’s service and securing boats to cross the lake as sign of his new loyalty. Over the following three days, Dahir, facing loyalty problems and apparently allowing the readings of his astrologers to inform much of his strategy, threw several detachments against ibn Qasim to no avail, allowing the Arabs to overcome these small forces piecemeal and reduce the Sindhi numbers advantage. On June 16 712, following the advice of Muhammad ibn Haris, leader of the Muslim Alafi tribe, which had fled Makran after blood feud brought them into conflict with al-Hajjaj, he finally brought his full army to bear against ibn Qasim’s army, which had crossed the lake lead by his lieutenant Uwais ibn Kais. Arranging his horsemen on his left, archers on his right, with foot soldiers supported by war elephants in the center, the Sindhi army numbered approximately 20,000 men to ibn Qasim’s 15,000. Though he initially attempted to rout them with an elephant charge, the Arabs and their mounts now had experience fighting the great beasts, and divided into small groups to confuse and frighten the war elephants sent against them. Meanwhile, cavalry charge by the Muslim second in-command Muhriz ibn Sabat into the enemy center saw significant success despite Muhriz’s own death in battle, causing great damage to the enemy before both forces were forced to withdraw after the day’s bloody fighting. The following day would be the climax of the conflict, with Dahir this time issuing forth with his horsemen at the center of his army while the Arabs shot arrows treated with flaming Naphtha to panic the elephants. Initially, the battle favored the Sindhis, with Shujah the Abyssinian, renowned champion in ibn Qasim’s army, being killed with an arrow to the neck and the Caliphal army beginning to retreat before the cavalry onslaught. Ibn Qasim managed to rally his forces, however, with Mokah Basayeh’s own mounted detachment reinforcing his commander in the center as the battle raged across the banks of the lake. Soon, Dahir’s lack of authority would be his undoing, with huge numbers of his levied footmen and archers fleeing, leaving mostly the dwindling noble-born cavalry to defend their king as the rallying Arab army began to push back. As the left wing of his army began to rout, Dahir launched last valiant charge from atop his elephant, only for flaming arrow to set the litter he rode in aflame, causing the elephant to panic and rush into the water of the lake. Some of his remaining men attempted to rally about him in the shallows, but now cut off from retreat, the king and those about him were cut down by volley from the Arab archers along the banks. While Jaisiah would escape to continue the war, this victory shattered the Sindhi resistance, with ibn Qasim executing every prisoner save the merchants and artisans and few willing to back Jaisiah in continuing losing battle. Many towns and cities would swear fealty to ibn Qasim and the Caliphate in the immediate aftermath, with Jaisiah holding out in Brahminabad until its fall to siege nearly year later in November 713 officially ended the Chach dynasty and the Kingdom of Sindh. This conquest, together with the simultaneous campaigns in Iberia, would soon bring the Umayyad Caliphate to near its greatest extent, yet for all its power the Caliphate was not invincible, and dangers both internal and external continued to loom. The Visigothic Kingdom of Iberia could trace its roots back to Alaric, the famous general who first fought for Emperor Theodosius against the Franks, holding the Balkans as Roman Foederati, or semi-autonomous ally, before his relationship with the Empire soured, and he became the first person to sack the Eternal City in over 700 years. The Visigoths had been one of several so-called barbarian peoples to arrive in the territory of the crumbling Roman Empire, with various Gothic and other Germanic peoples found in great numbers throughout the Empire and on its outskirts as slaves, soldiers, and allies. In the aftermath of Western Rome’s fall, the Visigoths were among the first to carve out their own kingdom from its ashes. Though Alaric’s power base had been in the Balkans, the Visigoths would migrate ever westward following his death, at times allies of convenience to the collapsing Roman Empire and at other times taking advantage of the West’s fall to expand their power. It would be in the Aquitaine region of Western France that the Visigoths would first establish true kingdom, from there pushing into Suebi-controlled Hispania at Rome’s behest, their kingdom encompassing Aquitaine and nearly the entire Iberian Peninsula by the death of the great warrior and lawmaker King Euric in 484. The years that followed would be less kind, however, as easy expansion against the backdrop of crumbling Rome gave way to new rivalries against other powerful barbarian kingdoms, most notably the Franks and Burgundians. It would not be long after Euric’s death, during the reign of his successor Alaric II, that the Visigothic territories in France would fall to these Northern rivals led by the Merovingian king Clovis, leading to the establishment of Toledo as the new Visigothic capital. With the Pyrenees now forming natural border, the Visigothic kingdom would remain secure in Hispania for the next two centuries, with occasional further conflicts with the Franks and revanchist Eastern Roman Empire making little lasting change to the status quo. As the 8th century dawned, though, the Visigoths would unexpectedly find far greater danger arising to their South. The Umayyad Caliphate’s border with the Visigothic Kingdom had been an embattled one since their first arrival, with raids into Southern Iberia having begun as early as 706, following the conquest of Tangier in today’s Morocco. In fact, the campaign that would spell the end of the Visigothic Kingdom likely began as another of these large-scale raids, with the force of some 1700 that crossed the Strait of Gibraltar in 710 under the leadership of Tariq ibn Ziyad, governor of Tangier, being quite sizeable for skirmishing party but smaller than would be expected had they intended campaign of conquest from the beginning. But circumstances favored the Muslims: following the recent death of King Wittiza, the Visigothic Kingdom had entered into succession crisis, with Roderic in control of Southern Iberia, pitted against the poorly-documented Achila II in the North. However, this low-intensity civil war was only indicative of larger weaknesses within the Visigothic kingdom. While the Visigoths had ruled Iberia independently for more than two centuries at this point and had exercised great autonomy under weakened Rome for another century before their independence, they had continued to rule on essentially tribal lines despite the scale of their kingdom rendering them inefficient. The feudal systems that would allow later kingdoms to efficiently raise armies through local vassals did not yet exist in Iberia, and while the landed aristocratic class of the Roman period had essentially merged with the Visigothic conquerors to form unified ruling class, the ethnic Visigoths that still made up most of the readily-available warriors the various Visigothic chiefs could draw on made up only very small minority in the larger kingdom. King Reccared’s abandonment of the Arian sect of Christianity traditionally followed by the Visigoths in 589 in favour of their kingdom’s majority Chalcedonian Christian faith, accompanied by the abandonment of the Gothic tongue as church language, had done much to unify the Visigoths with their subjects. However, the Hispano-Roman aristocrats had not been warrior nobility, and the kingdom lacked efficient administrative systems by which to mobilize its peasantry to war - while every denizen of the Visigothic kingdom was theoretically required to provide military service to the king on demand, this duty was owed directly to the king rather than to more accessible local intermediary, making it duty only too easy to ignore for the vast majority of the population outside Toledo and the king’s own demesne. Thus, while the Caliphate had been able to vastly expand its power through its conquests, through recruiting large numbers of converts in conquered territories for further campaigns and by embracing the sophisticated administrative systems left behind by the Romans and Persians - coupled with the laws laid down in the Qur’an - the military power of the Visigothic kingdom was not fundamentally changed from the tribal armies that had fought Rome under Alaric, its army still made up in large part by the personal warriors of Visigothic chiefs despite the vastly larger Latin population they ruled over. In addition to the relative unpreparedness of their foes, the Arabs had an valuable ally on their side - Count Julian of Ceuta, who was most likely Byzantine governor who had switched his allegiance upon his Empire’s abandonment of North Africa rather than attempting to fight doomed resistance against the Arabs. While it seems he aided by providing his suzerain ships for the crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar, his larger role in the story is somewhat in question. Despite his importance in later accounts - which claim he had made the first attack on Iberia with his own forces in 709, seizing loot with which to entice the Arabs to destroy Roderic for him and avenge his daughter’s rape at the Visigothic king’s hands, no mention of this grudge exists in the Mozarabic Chronicle of 754, the earliest surviving account of the invasion, and neither Julian’s subservience to the more powerful Arabs nor Musa’s predictable decision to expand into the rich lands of the Visigoths require any tales of vengeance to explain. The accounts that paint Julian as the architect of Visigothic kingdom’s conquest also clash with both the Mozarabic Chronicle’s assertion that Arab raiding had begun years before the conquest and with the common narratives of later Christian accounts, which claim that it was enemies of Roderic within Iberia that requested and facilitated the Muslim invasion. While any of these stories might be at least partly true, they are likely irrelevant - with North Africa subjugated and inhospitable, difficult to traverse desert to the South, the Caliphate’s invasion of Hispania was an inevitability whether Roderic was guilty of raping Julian’s daughter or not, and Julian would have been compelled to support Musa as Caliphal vassal with or without any personal grudge. Anecdotally, as side note, the modern name of the Strait of Gibraltar is named for Tariq, in corruption of the Arabic Jabal Tariq, or Tariq’s mountain. The renewal of raiding in the South went at first unanswered by the Visigoths, allowing Tariq to establish secure base of operations on the site that would later become the town of Algeciras, from there pushing deeper into Iberia. They would face their first opponent shortly after - Theodemir, Visigothic count holding extensive territories near Murcia, who with his force of some 1700 men attempted to delay the invaders in series of skirmishes while sending reports and pleas for aid back to Roderic. The establishment of this base and the arrival of further Muslim reinforcements quickly demonstrated to Roderic that this was no common raid, and he began assembling what forces he could muster at Cordoba, sending force of cavalry ahead to aid Theodemir in his resistance and instructing the count to withdraw northwards to join him,. Meanwhile, he began his own much slower march south, hindered by poor logistics, the slow arrival of reinforcements from disloyal vassal chieftains, and lack discipline among the conscripted serfs. He finally regrouped with the battered remnants of Theodemir’s force at Guadalete, their numbers weakened after series of skirmishes over at least month that greatly favoured the mobile Berber cavalry making up the bulk of Tariq’s forces, which had also been mercilessly raiding the countryside so as to force Roderic into battle on the field. Guadalete would soon be the site of historically pivotal but poorly-documented battle that has been the basis for countless conflicting tales and legends. The numbers involved are very much in question, with later Christian chronicles claiming as high as 187,000. Though the number given for the Muslim forces in the Mozarabic Chronicle - 7,000 in Tariq’s initial landing force, with 5,000 reinforcements bringing the total to 12,000 - is likely at least slightly inflated as well, it is at least plausible considering the readiness of converted Berbers to join Musa’s forces across subjugated North Africa. No figures are given for the Visigothic forces under Roderic, save similarly unlikely 100,000 claimed by later Arab chronicles. The defenders did most likely outnumber the invaders - with over 30,000 in the highest modern estimates, though given the previously mentioned challenges in mobilizing their Hispano-Roman subjects, even number half this is likely generous - but faced problems of disloyalty that undermined their small numbers advantage. Some recurring themes found in both Muslim and Christian sources may shed some light on the events of the bloody July day. The previously-mentioned Mozarabic Chronicle of 754, though useful source for information on the Visigothic kingdom’s history and politics, mentions the Battle of Guadalete only in passing and elaborates little on the tactics involved. It does, however, make it clear that many of the more powerful Visigothic tribal leaders had only feigned their support when accompanying their king to battle, intending to lead Roderic to his downfall and claim the throne themselves. And while later accounts are of questionable reliability, this general narrative of betrayal surrounding the kingdom’s fall remains constant. Some accuse Roderic of having had Wittiza assassinated in coup attempt, while many other accounts are quite hostile towards Wittiza and his line as result of the late king’s anti-clerical policies, with villainization of Wittiza growing harsher and more common as time passed. Wittiza’s opposition to series of discriminatory decrees by the Spanish church councils targeting Iberia’s large Jewish population might have contributed to this, given the growing hostility towards Europe’s Jews in the era of the Crusades and Reconquista, period that had seen renewed interest in the fallen Visigothic kingdom and to which many of these later chronicles trace. Many of these chronicles even suggested that two sons of Wittiza, seeking to claim their father’s throne, had invited the Arabs into Iberia, or that Iberia’s Jews had used their close ties to the Jews of North Africa to do the same, seeing an opportunity to end their long suffering under the harsh anti-semitic policies of the Visigothic kingdom and its church, which since 694 had even allowed for any Jew refusing baptism to be enslaved. Neither story seems likely, especially considering Wittiza was unlikely to have been older than twenty-five himself when he died, making any children he might have had rather young for such scheming, but whatever the case, if anyone had hoped to take advantage of the Muslim incursion to claim the Visigothic throne, they would very disappointed. Roderic had his loyal Visigothic warriors, armored and bearing axes and swords, split into two contingents - the larger making up the center of the vanguard and smaller detachment held in reserve. Behind these staunch defenders, the ill-equipped levies he had raised from his demesne around Toledo and during the mustering at Cordoba were arrayed, in particularly sorry state even for peasant conscripts, Roderic’s hurry to engage the invaders leaving little time to see these slaves and serfs equipped or drilled. On the wings were the forces of allied chieftains, many of questionable loyalty, and the kingdom’s comparatively meager cavalry remaining after the losses inflicted during Theodemir’s fighting retreat. Tariq, though outnumbered, had far more cavalry than his foe and fewer concerns of morale and loyalty. Though the majority of the Arab warriors that had come forth from Syria to conquer North Africa had either returned home or remained behind with Musa, he had strong contingent of heavily-equipped Arab cavalry making up his army’s center, with Berber and Arab infantry behind them, while Berber light cavalry on the wings and in the rearguard made up the bulk of his army. Accounts vary greatly, but it would seem that the first two days of fighting remained more or less in the balance, with both armies suffering mounting casualties and with greater Visigothic numbers seemingly giving them the edge at first. Both leaders encouraged their forces with speeches - Tariq chastising his forces for falling back during the second day’s fighting, claiming that only by holding fast and seizing victory could they hope to survive to return home, and promising to lead them to riches and glory on the following day. When the third day’s fighting began, Tariq would prove true to his word, personally leading his heavier cavalry in charge that broke through the Visigothic warriors making up Roderic’s center. With the enemy vanguard depleted by two days’ fighting, Tariq’s cavalry soon found themselves with nothing but scattering serf levies between them and the enemy leaders and rearguard, with the Muslim infantry taking advantage of the breach and following closely behind. The circumstances of the following rout are unclear - Visigothic leader slain early in the charge seems to have been mistaken by the Muslims for Roderic, starting false rumor of the king’s death that hastened panic and desertion in an army already held together by very little. Some accounts claim that much of the Visigothic cavalry under the Bishop Oppa - possibly illegitimate son of Wittiza’s father and predecessor Egica - defected to Tariq as part of prearranged betrayal, and while this claim is rather doubtful, it is clear that many did desert the king as the tables began to turn. general rout soon followed as the levies broke and the Berber cavalry charged the enemy flanks, running down fleeing soldiers. Though Roderic’s personal forces put up staunch defense despite their broken lines, inflicting sizable casualties, the premature rumor of the king’s death would soon prove to have come only few hours too early, and by the fierce battle’s end the king and sizable portion of the Visigothic nobility had been slain. Though nearly 3,000, close to quarter of the Muslim force, had been among the casualties, losses had been far greater for the defeated Visigoths, and their kingdom would not long outlive their fallen king. With the Visigothic kingdom so reliant on the military dominance of its ruling minority and commanding little loyalty from its subjects, this single crushing defeat effectively spelled its end.. Tariq was quick to march to Toledo in the aftermath, where Oppa - who does not in fact seem to have been present at Guadalete despite later claims of his battlefield betrayal - had taken the Visigothic throne. Oppa would prove ready collaborator with the conquerors, aiding them in capturing and executing many of the remaining Visigothic chiefs and nobility as they made to flee the capital. 712 would see Musa cross the strait with another army to join his victorious underling in pacifying the remainder of Iberia, with Tariq’s army splitting into four in order to more swiftly overcome what little scattered resistance remained. Some cities would put up spirited defences, with Seville requiring three month siege and Merida five for Musa’s army to capture, and with Seville even rising shortly in late 713 in rebellion crushed by Musa’s son Abd al-Aziz. However, the Visigoths’ unpopularity in the urban centers such as Cordoba left many ready to accept their new conquerors, and even the Mozarabic Chronicle - though quite hostile towards the Arabs - makes note of Cordoba’s flourishing after its later establishment as the capital of the new Caliphal province of Al-Andalus in 716. Though Oppa, Theodemir and some few other figures from the old ruling class retained degree of their former status through collaboration, there would be no more Visigothic kings, and their lines quickly fade into obscurity - if Oppa, Achila or any others had indeed conspired with the Muslims to take the throne, their ploy had failed, with the Visigoths being assimilated into the larger Iberian Christian population and their power broken. In their place, Musa placed Arabs in most positions of power within the newly-conquered state, though the Muslims did also rely heavily on Iberia’s Jews to help hold and administer their new territory. With the harsh restrictions put in place by the Visigoths lifted, Jewish communities were among the most eager in accepting the change of rulership, and many Jews rose to positions of prominence as advisors and officials under the comparatively even-handed governance of early Al-Andalus. However, this story would end in tragedy even for many of the victors, and Musa and Tariq would not enjoy the fruits of their success for long. By 715, they had completed the initial conquest of the peninsula, overrunning the lands of the Basques and the northern territories held by Achila, who disappeared from the record - making his supposed collaboration with the Arabs unlikely. But just as Musa had himself taken power in North Africa after the political disgrace of its conqueror Hassan ibn al-Nu’man, Tariq and Musa - by this point feuding with each other over the spoils and glory of the conquest, precursor for more Arab-Berber hostility to come - would be summoned to Damascus by sickly and aging Al-Walid, only to find the Caliph already on his deathbed upon their arrival, with his brother Sulayman the acting monarch. Mired in rocky succession, with Al-Walid having backed his son Abd al-Aziz ibn Al-Walid for the throne, Sulayman ordered Musa to delay his triumphant entrance into Damascus until after Al-Walid expired and he properly became Caliph. In doing this, Sulayman hoped to claim some of the glory of the conquest to inaugurate his new reign. Musa refused, however, entering and dedicating his victory and the spoils to Al-Walid. This did little to ingratiate him with Sulayman, with predictable results after Al-Walid’s death less than week later. Tariq and Musa were both first stripped of their wealth, then disgraced and publicly paraded as traitors, ostensibly in response to Musa’s complaints towards the confiscation but in all likelihood an inevitable part of the broader crackdown on Al-Walid’s governors and loyalists that took place upon Sulayman’s inauguration. The two conquerors of Al-Andalus would live the rest of their lives in obscurity, while Musa’s sons Abd al-Aziz and Abd Allah - left behind as governors of Al-Andalus and Ifriqiya respectively - would both be killed on the Caliph’s orders. Sulayman’s mishandled efforts to assert his control over the far-flung provinces of the empire would backfire in Al-Andalus, however, with the death of Abd al-Aziz sparking period of self-destructive infighting, spurred largely by resentment among the Berbers towards their lesser treatment compared to their Arab coreligionists despite playing such vital role in Iberia’s conquest. With the conquerors turned against each other, their hold on Iberia would begin to show cracks almost as swiftly as they had won it, with the mountainous Northern territories breaking away under the Visigothic noble Pelagius to form the Kingdom of Asturias in 722. It was not the far-flung western frontier of Iberia that Sulayman would spend his short reign focused on, however. Eager to forge his own legacy to match his brother’s in the short time remaining to him, he would soon turn the armies of the Caliphate towards prize long denied them: Constantinople. Upon his ascension to the Caliphal throne, Sulayman wasted no time replacing most of his brother and predecessor’s loyal governors and advisors, despite the monumental successes many of them had achieved during the storied reign of al-Walid. In Al-Walid’s last years of life, he had attempted to remove Sulayman from succession in favour of his son Abd al-Aziz without success, even requesting his governors to swear fealty to Abd al-Aziz before his death. However, few saw fit to take this risky stance against Sulayman, who was the horse with the best odds. Moreover, the rocky succession and support for Abd al-Aziz from al-Hajjaj, one of the most powerful men in the Caliphate, created deep divides in the Umayyad court and caused Sulayman to see enemies around every corner. As result, after Musa refused to delay his entry to the capital until after al-Walid’s death so Sulayman might claim the glory, both Musa and Tariq were stripped of their titles and disgraced. Qutayba ibn Muslim, who had brought Islamic rule to most of Transoxiana through combination of military victories and shrewd diplomacy, would be extended the offer to keep his position by Sulayman, likely due to the large powerbase Qutaybah commanded and the threat of civil war. Despite this placation, Qutayba, suspecting Sulayman would turn on him as soon as he felt secure enough to do so and resenting the appointment of his longtime rival Yazid ibn al-Muhallab as the new governor of Iraq and Persia, denounced Sulayman as illegitimate and rallied his troops against the new Caliph. Unfortunately for Qutaybah, his position had never been as powerful or secure as Al-Hajjaj’s, and his attempt to raise his army in rebellion against Sulayman caused many of his soldiers, particularly his fellow Arabs, to betray and kill him under the leadership of Waki ibn Abi Sud. Though Waki would take over as governor of Transoxiana, the following years would see many of Qutaybah’s successes in the region reversed in string of defeats and rebellions, and Arab control of Transoxiana would remain unstable for decades to follow. Meeting similar end would be the famous conqueror of Sindh, Muhammad ibn al-Qasim. As another close ally of al-Hajjaj’s who had opposed Sulayman’s ascension, ibn al-Qasim was removed from power by Sulayman and promptly placed under arrest by his replacement as Governor of Sindh Yazid ibn Abi Kabsha, and sent to ibn al-Muhallab’s custody to be tortured and executed. Recently-conquered Iberia would also see similar power vacuum created with the execution of Musa ibn Nusayr’s two sons, the governors of Ifriqiya and Al-Andalus, leading to period of the same self-destructive infighting. While ibn al-Muhallab quickly stepped into the powerful role Al-Hajjaj had long filled and prepared for new conquests in the East. With anarchy reigning in the Caliphate’s distant western frontiers, Sulayman’s focus was far closer to home. For Caliph looking to make his mark on history, no possible victory could outshine the conquest of Constantinople, city that had already beaten back four-year siege under Caliph Mu’awiya and was supposedly the focus of prophecies from Muhammad himself. It would seem preparations for the siege had already begun before Sulayman’s ascension as Caliph, either under the orders of Al-Walid directly or during the period in which Sulayman served as acting ruler for his dying brother - hardly surprising, given the years of frequent coups and turmoil that had weakened the Byzantines during Al-Walid’s relative golden age. During Al-Walid’s later years Arab raids had penetrated ever deeper and more brazenly into Anatolia, with his sons al-Abbas and Marwan ibn al-Walid and his half-brother Maslama ibn Abd-al Malik penetrating North of the Taurus mountains in 711 and 712, conquering Misthaea in the Lycaeonia region and raiding as far as Amasya and modern-day Çankırı along the Black Sea by 715. By contrast, the Romans in the same period saw three Emperors deposed in coups during the same five-year period. 715-716 With Sulayman spending the year 715 consolidating his hold on the Caliphate and building his strength, it would be in 716 that one of the single largest expeditions in Caliphal history would be launched, with land army under the command of Maslama: the brother of Caliph Sulayman, supported by fleet under Umar ibn Hubayrah al-Fazari. Wielding the resources of Caliphate, which was far vaster than the greatly weakened Roman Empire, the odds seemed stacked far more firmly against the Romans. Unfortunately, the vast expedition assembled by Sulayman and Maslama shared one major weakness with Mu’awiya’s earlier invasion: reliance on collaboration with Roman rebels. Mu’awiya had counted on the rebel Armenian general Saborios, then in control of much of Anatolia, to supply and aid his army in the march to Constantinople, only for his untimely death to undermine years of planning, stranding the first Arab expedition in hostile territory without supplies or allies, starvation and attrition defeating them more surely than the armies defending Constantinople’s walls or the Greek Fire devastating their fleets in the Bosphorus. Maslama, seemingly hoping to avoid the Herculean task of besieging and storming the Theodosian Walls of Constantinople, planned to avoid having to take the city by force by getting directly involved in Byzantine politics: taking advantage of the civil strife and frequent palace coups that had weakened the Eastern Roman Empire by backing his own claimant to the Byzantine throne: the Strategos Leo the Isaurian, whose role in the leadup to the siege varies somewhat between Roman and Arab accounts. In the Roman narrative, it is Sulayman ibn Mu’ad who first reaches out to negotiate with Leo and who first raises the possibility of Leo taking the throne while besieging Amorion, offering to lift his siege and spare the city if they would accept Leo as their Emperor. According to this tradition, Sulayman intended to capture Leo, knowing of the Strategos’ enmity for Emperor Theodosius - who had taken power in coup in May of the previous year - and convince him to take the throne with Arab backing and lead the Empire into submission and vassalage. Yet despite holding correspondence with first Sulayman and then Maslamah, in the Roman narrative, Leo never falls into Arab hands or forms any pact with the invaders: escaping their net through trickery, he rallied the defences of the countryside behind him, foiling Sulayman ibn Mu’ad’s advance force before seizing control of the Empire from the weak and unpopular Theodosius on his own after capturing the royal household with his army at Nicomedia. In contrast, the Arab narrative has Leo reach out to Caliph Sulayman to negotiate, deceitfully assuring him that he will deliver Constantinople into Arab hands. Though either account could be somewhat falsified, the level of trust Maslamah shows to Leo later in the siege would be highly surprising had their initial interactions been so short and hostile as claimed in the account of Theophanes the Confessor, suggesting at least some arrangements had been made between the two whether the Arab accounts are fully truthful or not. It should be noted that the dates are also slightly inconsistent between these two accounts, with the History of Al-Tabari placing the siege somewhat earlier than Theophanes the Confessor - while both provide valuable insight, the latter provides more consistent dates and is far closer to contemporary with the events enclosed, with the following dates primarily being those given by Theophanes. In either case, the winter of 716 would end this first stage of the campaign, one which saw modest Arab gains in Anatolia, the overthrow of an Emperor, and great deal of underhanded dealing but little in the way of direct engagement between the two armies. The year had been more active one in the East, although, on this front, the Arabs met with little success. Yazid ibn al-Muhallab attempted large-scale invasion of Jurjan and Tabaristan - the seat of the Dayubid dynasty, and the last one of the last independent vestiges of the Sassanid Empire, which had thus far kept its old rulers at the cost of paying tribute to the Caliph. Initially successful, he captured the town of Dihistan by siege with large massacre ensuing, strengthening his reputation for brutality and causing the region of Jurjan to capitulate without resistance and accept an Arab governor. Continuing West into Tabaristan, Yazid would see less success. The ruling Spahbed Farrukhan the Great appealed to his Eastern neighbours in the Daylam region for military aid and used the narrow mountain passes to hold off Yazid’s much larger army. His army fell back, seemingly beaten in their first clash, only to lead the Muslims into an ambush, where they were pelted by arrows and boulders from higher ground and forced to withdraw. Though Yazid still commanded by far the stronger army, Farrukhan’s successful resistance spurred the nobility of Jurjan, who had surrendered previously, to take up arms, killing most of the recently-installed Arab garrison during the night. With his supplies now cut off and hostile forces at his back, Yazid was forced to sue for peace, using the threat of renewed invasion to secure an increased tribute but failing entirely in his mission of conquest despite the vast resources at his disposal. In Transoxiana, Waki ibn Abi Sud had failed to inspire the same respect among the locals Qutaybah had, leading to turmoil and the gradual loss of Caliphal control over much of the region. However, Waki’s main focus seemed to be growing rivalry with Yazid rather than on keeping order in his province. After wintering in Cilicia, Umar would take to the sea again in 717, holding the dominant position in the Mediterranean but still wary of facing Greek Fire in the Bosphorus, while Maslamah would finally reach Constantinople’s walls in June. Perhaps learning from past failures, Maslamah’s army had brought vast stores of food to last them long siege, with more being ferried to them from Egypt and Syria under the protection of Umar’s fleet, with transport vessels and dromon warships travelling in convoy system for protection. To demonstrate his forces’ commitment to the siege no matter how long it should take, Maslamah had forbidden his forces to eat from the rich stockpile of provisions they had brought, instead building low walls and wooden houses for the besiegers around the city and sowing crops in the ground to sustain them. Feeding themselves by plunder and soon by their own harvests, Maslamah’s massive besieging force was transformed almost into small city of its own and looked well-prepared to weather the bitter winter approaching. But according to the Arab accounts of the siege, Leo and Maslamah remained in negotiations at this point. Leo still feigned allegiance to the Umayyad prince and claimed he was doing his best to convince his subjects to surrender. In the main version of the tale, Leo claims either that Constantinople’s inhabitants would surrender in exchange for the Arab’s food stores to feed the trapped and hungry citizens and demonstrate the truth of Maslamah’s promises of safety in exchange for submission. When Maslamah agreed, they looted the Arab army’s stores and crops by night before returning to their defences in the morning. In another version, Maslamah even burns his own supplies on Leo’s insistence that Constantinople would surrender without battle if convinced Maslamah was preparing for major assault. At face value, these accounts might seem unlikely, but at this point, Maslamah was negotiating from position of strength - with transport ships from Tunis and Egypt resupplying him, he risked little, and an opportunity to avoid the daunting siege might have been too tempting to pass up. Whether the tales are true or simply way to scapegoat one commander for broader military failure, the Arab naval supremacy would not be long-lived. As the fleet continued to arrive and ferry soldiers for the siege, many sailing past the city as far North as modern Istanbul’s Ortakoy neighbourhood, the convoys would be forced to sail past the Golden horn, which was blocked with chain and harboured the Roman fleet, which had been waiting for their moment of opportunity. For the large and unwieldy transport ships to sail North against the current of the Dardanelles required South wind. On September 1st, an unlucky change of weather would see twenty of these large and logistically vital ships, betrayed by the breeze, drift backwards with the current away from the safety of their escorts. The Roman fleet wasted no time, sailing out from the Golden Horn to bathe them and their crews in liquid fire, harsh blow with cold winter approaching and hit to the morale of the Arab fleet. In the historian al-Tabari’s words, the besiegers were forced to eat everything but dirt, suffering greatly over cold winter outside the city. On this sombre note, Caliph Sulayman would breathe his last, dying in October 717. In his brief reign, none of his grand ambitions had come to fruition within his brief reign: as Yazid ibn al-Muhallab’s invasion had been failure, and the attack on Constantinople had been stalled. The legacy Sulayman had killed so many for and worked so desperately to build would largely be one of setbacks and failures, overshadowed by the triumphs of his predecessor. Sulayman had initially intended to be succeeded by his son Ayyub, but Ayyub had died earlier in the year of plague that was possibly Sulayman’s cause of death as well. Instead, on his deathbed, he declared his younger cousin Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz - longtime ally of Sulayman’s who had served as his governor of Medina - to be his successor as Caliph, creating surprise and resentment among closer family members such as his brothers Yazid and Hisham - though Yazid was promised right of succession after Umar. It was no coincidence the newly-crowned Umar II shared name with the legendary second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab - through his mother’s side, he was the second Caliph’s great-grandson, prestigious connection he emphasized greatly. With the arrival of Spring, the pressure began to mount on the Arab army besieging Constantinople. The loss of the supply ships the previous autumn had reaffirmed the superiority of the Roman ships in combat. However, Leo’s fleet lacked the numbers to actively patrol outside the Dardanelles or safely scout the movements of the Arab ships. With the arrival of Spring, sizable fleets from Egypt and Tunis came bringing supplies across the Mediterranean to the besiegers. Keeping their distance from Constantinople, they landed secretly in various places, from Chalcedon to the mouth of the Gulf of Nicomedia, on the Asian side of modern Istanbul. However, the crews of these fleets were mostly Coptic Christians of Egyptian descent, thousands of whom had been relocated to work the shipyards of Tunis after the conquest of North Africa by Hassan ibn al-Nu’man. Upon the fleets’ arrival on Roman soil, organized mutinies among the Egyptian crews broke out among the Arab fleet, with the crews taking control of some ships while many others escaped, fleeing to sanctuary among their fellow Christians in Constantinople. With the fleets paralyzed and crippled by the loss of so many crewmen and Leo informed of the Arab fleet’s location and sudden weakness by the defectors, the Roman fleet sailed forth once more from the Golden Horn, capturing or destroying the great Arab fleets, nearly in their entirety. While the land army still held firm at first, the Romans had retaken full naval dominance for the time being. They cut the besiegers off from supplies or effective reinforcement, with the army divided by the now-uncrossable Dardanelles. The entry into the conflict of the Bulgarian Khanate, ruled by Leo’s ally, Khan Tervel, would spell further disaster for the Arabs. With the besiegers on the European side of the Dardanelles cut off from retreat without ships to ferry them across, huge portion of the demoralized army - forced to spread out across the countryside to forage for food and unprepared for the attack of lightning-fast cavalry army - would be defeated and massacred. With the army facing destruction on the European side, smaller defeats at Roman hands in Asia, and starvation throughout, Umar would end the grand expedition and call his cousin Maslamah home, leaving more than twenty thousand dead to hunger, Greek Fire or Bulgar horsemen behind them. The disaster would weaken the Umayyad state and serve as something of turning point - though Umar would be well-remembered for his political reforms, this largely marked the end of the great Umayyad conquests. More than the loss of manpower and ships at Constantinople, overextension and the rise of powerful governors would sap the ability of the Umayyads to project power outwards - already the frontiers of Transoxiana and Iberia had been left almost completely to their own devices, with little support from faraway Syria as anarchy and infighting ate away at the Caliphate’s power in these far-flung regions. Only few years before, the Umayyads had seemed at the height of their power, with illustrious conquerors expanding the Caliphate on every front - the death of these remarkable generals and leaders at Sulayman’s hands only foreshadowed the death of the age of expansion they had championed. Umar would attempt to address some of these problems during his short and mostly peaceful reign - the poor treatment of non-Arab Muslims, common cause for rebellion in past decades, would improve, with the Jizya tax now exempted for all Muslims rather than Arabs only, and attempts at reconciliation with the Shia would be made as well. Yet this is largely seen as the start of stagnation and decline that would last until the Umayyads’ overthrow some three decades later. Following Suleiman’s death and the end of his disastrous period as Caliph in 717, the Caliphate was granted brief reprieve from its troubles through the mostly peaceful and uneventful three-year reign of Umar II. Despite small Iraqi Kharijite rebellion in 718 seeing some initial success against local forces, Syrian troops swiftly put it down under Umar’s cousin Maslamah ibn Abd al-Malik, and the frontiers remained mostly quiet during Umar’s brief reign and the attempted political and social reforms he championed. As seen in previous episodes, numerous revolts against the Caliphate had come about due to the poor treatment of non-Arab converts to Islam, or Mawali. Rebellion among Persian-speaking Iraqis had threatened to topple the Umayyad dynasty twice, under Mukhtar al-Thaqafi during the Second Fitna and Ibn Al-Ash’ath in 700 AD, and Iberia was plagued by ongoing strife between its Berber and Arab conquerors. Umar made efforts to address this problem, making all Muslims exempt from the Jizya tax rather than Arabs only, which, coupled with expanded missionary activity to encourage conversion in his still minority-Muslim empire, brought some degree of improved cohesion and stability at the cost of cutting into the Caliphate’s tax revenues. However, several events during his reign would have long-term repercussions. First, the Caliphate met its limits on its far eastern frontiers, where the Arab holdings in Transoxiana became the battleground against new rival in the form of Tang China. The Caliphate’s holdings in the region were recent conquests brought about by Qutayba ibn Muslim, who had since been victim of Suleiman’s purges, leaving the distant frontier bereft of this popular and skillful leader. Thus, when the Arabs were drawn into an ongoing conflict between the Tang and the Tibetan Empire as Tibetan ally, it would soon spell disaster. The Caliphal vassal Khan Suluk of the Turgesh’s invasion of the Tarim Basin would meet staunch opposition from Ashina Xian, leader among the Western Turkic Khaganate and commander of the so-called Protectorate General to Pacify the West. Despite both the Arabs and Tibetans sending significant reinforcements for this offensive push and holding numerical advantage, the mostly Turkic Tang-aligned force opposing them would win decisive victory breaking the siege of Aksu while another Chinese force simultaneously defeated the Tibetans along the Yellow River, assuring Chinese dominance in the region for the next few decades. Suluk, for his part, promptly switched to the winning side and swore fealty to the Tang after his defeat at Aksu, even going on to attack his former overlords in Fergana, poorly defended region. There was little support from the Caliphate’s core to be found on the frontiers for reasons we will soon cover. However, this period did see successes in Al-Andalus, where Governor al-Samh ibn Malik had managed to bring much of the Arab-Berber infighting under control, allowing him to capture such major holdouts as Barcelona and Narbonne from the Visigothic remnant under King Ardo in 719 with the aid of Syrian and Yemeni new arrivals, with the minting of the first Arab coins in Iberia marking their gradual transformation from mere occupying army to the vibrant hybrid civilization Al-Andalus would later become. Closer to home, the rapid succession of Caliphs was creating its own problems, among them the arrest and later escape of Yazid ibn al-Muhallab, formerly governor of Iraq under Suleiman and the leader of the ambitious and increasingly powerful Muhallabid family. Over the previous decades, the prestigious position of Governor of Iraq had come to hold power almost rivalling that of the Caliph himself, given its traditional oversight of all the Caliphate’s eastern provinces, making the stance of Iraq’s governor major factor in any thorny or contested Caliphal succession such as those of Suleiman and Umar. Umar and ibn al-Muhallab had bad blood between them already when Umar took the throne, and the governor knew he only had worse problems ahead should Umar be succeeded as Caliph by Yazid ibn Abd al-Malik, whose in-laws from the family of the renowned former governor al-Hajjaj had been tortured and executed on ibn al-Muhallab’s orders during previous political power struggle. Thus, after being recalled from his governorship and arrested for withholding from the Caliph the spoils of war from his difficult Tabaristan campaign during Suleiman’s reign, Yazid ibn al-Muhallab opted to escape prison with his family’s aid in 720 and return to Iraq as Umar lay sickly and dying, rather than trusting himself to the mercies of the coming regime. Umar’s death in the same year brought Yazid ibn abd al-Malik to the throne as Caliph Yazid II. Thus, the all-too-short years of peace under Umar were brought to an end as Yazid was immediately forced to contend with Muhallabid rebellion in Iraq. However, not all challenges to the Caliphate would be as open or as blatant as those of the Muhallabids. It was during these same few years that Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Abdallah ibn Abbas, the patriarch of another prominent family based in Khorasan, first began to spread anti-Umayyad propaganda and build network of support around demand for rule by blood relatives of the Prophet. And while his and his family’s efforts on such distant frontier attracted little attention from the Umayyads in Damascus at the time, the name Abbasid would soon be known throughout every corner of the Caliphate. The new Caliph would take no half-measures against ibn al-Muhallab upon learning of his escape and subsequent refusal to swear fealty, and even before any armies had met in battle, he took steps to undermine the influence of the Muhallabid family. Three brothers of the rebellious former governor were arrested and imprisoned despite not having directly participated in their brother’s acts of defiance, deepening the rift. Meanwhile, Yazid ibn al-Muhallab travelled as fast as he could to Basra, where other relatives of his were among the prominent nobility and joined their own forces to his to create formidable army. This began standoff with the local forces in Basra, with the Muhallabids demanding the release of their imprisoned kin and spreading bribes among the defending soldiers in Basra to weaken the defenders’ resolve and attract more support in their opposition to the Caliph. The dwindling defenders under Adi ibn Artat attempted to hold the city but were defeated piecemeal, with part of the army splitting from the main body to hold the city’s western caravan quarter, though whether this was due to breakdown of authority among the demoralized defenders or poor strategic decision on Artat’s part, this force would be attacked and routed from the city before the main confrontation began. The remaining defenders eventually rode out from the fortress to engage the Muhallabid besieging force in nearby cemetery, but despite the staunch core of Syrian horsemen bolstering the local forces, they were soon defeated as well, with the rebels pushing past them in the confusion of their defeat to seize the fortress, capturing Basra and rescuing Yazid ibn al-Muhallab’s imprisoned brothers. Though Caliph Yazid II’s reign had barely begun, he already faced serious challenge to his rule. Sparing Adi ibn Artat, the victorious rebel began appointing his own governors in the territories around Basra, while tribal leaders and army commanders loyal to the Caliphate fled to Kufah and Syria. Interestingly, it seems the conflict very nearly reached peaceful conclusion at this point - one of these retreating tribal leaders, Al-Hawari ibn Ziyad, came across two messengers from the Caliph escorting Yazid ibn al-Muhallab’s nephew and generous peace offer, the new Caliph apparently valuing stability over any family feud and willing to return ibn al-Muhallab’s relatives and governorship. However, Ibn Ziyad argued against this, informing the messengers of Artat’s defeat and insisting ibn al-Muhallab could not be trusted, convincing them to turn back. Ibn Ziyad’s own family rivalry with the Muhallabids may have played into his actions, as ibn al-Muhallab’s nephew Humayd suggested in his pleas to the messengers to continue on to his uncle - but whatever his reasons, he ensured through few words that the civil strife would continue. However, despite Caliph Yazid’s reluctance to do battle, the advantage was nevertheless his. While the Muhallabids had secured the support of most of the tribes and army commanders in Basra, aided by lingering resentment towards the Caliphate lasting since the tyrannical reign of Al-Hajjaj, they had been too slow to seize control in Kufah before its reinforcement despite the prominent places many members of the dynasty had held in the region. Thus, after some skirmishing against General Maslamah ibn Abd al-Malik that saw the Euphrates crossed and the Al-Jazirah region retaken by Umayyad forces, ibn al-Muhallab left Basra with its treasury in hand, intending to march to Kufah. An advance party of Maslamah’s army sabotaged the canals south of Kufah, however, creating flood that cut the Muhallabid army off from their destination - as well as from any possible reinforcement from Kufan supporters and family members - and leaving them stranded near Karbalah in August 720, where Maslamah’s main force would catch them on August 17th. An initial engagement set the tone of the battle, with an advance force under Yazid’s brother Abd al-Malik ibn al-Muhallab initially driving back the Umayyad’s own advance party under al-Abbas ibn al-Walid and nearly claiming victory, only to be routed when the Syrians managed to rally and regroup with the bank of the Euphrates at their backs. Abd al-Malik would regroup with the rest of the army, digging trenches to fortify their camp next to bridge across the Euphrates and stationing part of the army on the opposite bank to protect line of retreat. However, these precautions would not save the Muhallabid rebellion when the battle was finally joined. According to the sometimes unreliable testimony of the historian Abu Mikhnaf, Yazid ibn al-Muhallab favoured night attack on the Umayyad camp to fill in the Umayyads’ own trenches under cover of darkness and prepare for decisive assault at daybreak but was overruled by the chiefs and leaders among his army who insisted they abide by the terms of honourable combat under the Quran they had agreed upon with the Umayyads prior. Yazid disagreed, claiming the Umayyads were unlikely to show the same chivalry. This odd episode is likely coloured by Abu Mikhnaf’s anti-Umayyad biases, but the battle itself bore out his supposed warning, with the Umayyads opening the full-scale battle on August 25th by sending small force in boats to set the bridge ablaze and divide the Muhallabid army. On top of cutting off line of retreat and stranding some of Yazid’s forces on the opposite side of the river from the battle, the torching of the bridge was already enough on its own to cause many of Yazid’s questionably dedicated soldiers to break and attempt to flee, only to be rounded up and beheaded as an example on their own commander’s orders, leaving the Muhallabid ranks in chaos before the first blows were even traded. The greater blow would be the death of Yazid’s brother Habib, who commanded the Muhallabid right flank and perished early in the battle. The death of his brother, combined with the other setbacks and pressing defeat, seems to have unbalanced the elderly Muhallabid leader, whose words and behaviour following are marked with single-mindedness bordering on madness. Dismissing advice to retreat to Wasit, he pressed on with the remains of his wavering forces, charging straight for the Umayyad center where Maslamah was camped with little care for maneuver or nuance. The greater Umayyad numbers and Yazid’s seeming death wish made the outcome of the battle certain. Yazid and his companions clashed with Syrian cavalry until their defeat, with warrior named al-Qahl ibn Ayyash fighting his way to Yazid, whereupon the two men each dealt each other fatal blows. Another of Yazid’s brothers, al-Mufaddal, commanded the left wing with more skill and discipline and even saw some success after the routing of the rest of the army, but when news reached him of the deaths of his brothers and flight of his allies, he fled the battlefield, the decisive battle ending whatever threat the Muhallabids posed. The immediate aftermath of the rebellion was nearly as bloody as the battle that preceded it, with both sides vengefully executing whatever prisoners they held, including Adi ibn Artat in Basra and numerous members of the Muhallabid family that had been arrested at the rebellion’s inception, while Maslamah - taking over as governor of Iraq - pursued the fleeing al-Mufaddal and other prominent rebels to Fars where they were finally slain. Though quite large in scale, this rebellion was fairly short-lived, and its impact on history would likely not have been great if not for the previously-mentioned Abbasids building support for their own ambitions. With the power of the Muhallabid family broken, its loyalists and more distant kinsmen not caught in the purge pledged their still-respectable power to the Abbasids, and the family would return to prominence in later decades as vassals to another Caliphate. Thus, this rebellion is somewhat more significant as one of several leading into the Third Fitna, the Umayyad victory only bolstered the strength of tomorrow’s enemies. For now, though, as the Abbasids bide their time and the deteriorating Arab position in Transoxiana sees fighting rock Samarkand, our attention returns to Al-Andalus and southern France. The previously-mentioned Andalusian governor al-Sahm ibn Malik, now more secure in his new holdings and reforms, chose in early 721 to continue the conquests of the Umayyads further northwards into the lands of the Franks, gathering an impressive army, likely 10,000 to 15,000 strong even if the six-digit figures given in Frankish accounts are dismissed. On top of bringing further prizes and revenues for himself and the Caliph by his conquests, al-Sahm seems to have rushed into further outward expansion in part to keep the fragile harmony within Al-Andalus, hoping the Arab and Berber soldiers and settlers so recently at each other’s throats could come together for plunder and holy war in France rather than returning to their infighting at home. Narbonne was established and provisioned as the forward base from which the campaign would be launched, while to the North, Duke Odo of Aquitaine gathered forces of his own and sent out calls for aid. Though the exact date of his advance into Frankia is unclear, it coincidentally seems to have taken place very shortly after the death of the Frankish king Chilperic II, leaving Frankia technically under the rule of Theuderic IV, an eight-year-old boy. However, this was far less significant than it might sound. Real power was held by the steward Charles Martel, who held the rather odd title of Mayor over all the Frankish kingdoms after his victory in many-sided struggle that had started as civil war for Charles’ native Austrasia. When Chilperic, then King of Neustria, had attempted to take advantage of the chaos and jointly invade with King Radbod of Frisia, their opportunism backfired, with Charles eventually defeating not only his Austrasian rival Plectrude and the invaders but also the previously-mentioned Odo, who briefly joined Chilperic as an ally once the Neustrian king’s war had defensive one. Finally betrayed by Odo and delivered into Charles’ hands, Chilperic surrendered most of his authority to Charles - being elevated to become king of all the Franks in name, but in truth serving as nothing more than puppet - less than three years earlier in 718. Chilperic’s passing and the crowning of Theuderic by Charles removed any lingering internal threat to the steward’s power and allow him to consolidate his hard-won position, but despite this new security, Charles would not be coming to answer his former enemy Odo’s call for reinforcement. Though Charles Martel would become famous throughout Europe for his later efforts against the Moors, at this point, his efforts were still focused on fighting the invading Saxons, and it’s likely that seeing his powerful and functionally independent Aquitainian vassal weakened was to his benefit as well. Odo would thus be forced to stand alone against al-Sahm’s invasion, though he would prove himself far from helpless. Initially unopposed as they left Narbonne in Spring, the Arab and Berber force arrived at Aquitaine’s largest city of Toulouse in early March of 721, their momentum halting as they settled in for siege but with the advantage seemingly still on their side. But the three months the cavalry-heavy Muslim army spent waiting outside the walls of Toulouse robbed them of the advantages in speed and mobility that had allowed such rapid conquests in Spain, and it seems al-Samh may have allowed himself to become complacent while Odo assembled his army of perhaps 8,000 to 12,000 soldiers, not expecting significant resistance after his string of easy victories against the remnants of the Visigoths. In an apparent failure of scouting despite his access to thousands of skilled horsemen, al-Samh allowed Odo’s army to march South of Toulouse by the beginning of June, cutting the Muslims off from Narbonne and trapping them between the field army and the besieged city’s garrison. As with so many other battles turned into myths to glorify religious victory, the exact events of the battle that erupted June 9th are difficult to pin down, with both sides claiming absurdly inflated army sizes in excess of 300,000 for their enemy. What is clear is that after skillful encirclement of the besieging Muslim force by Odo, the defenders of Toulouse took bold risk in sallying forth to join the battle in the field. To their credit, the Muslims did not quickly break or rout, despite their disadvantage and the simmering distrust still felt by many along the Arab/Berber divide. Rallying around al-Samh, they fought dogged last stand even after their leader’s mortal injury, and after hours of fighting, portion of the army even managed to break the encirclement and escape to Narbonne with the injured governor. With their mobility advantage nullified and enemies on all sides, though, this brave stand did little to change the inevitable outcome, and the majority of the Muslim invasion force was either taken prisoner and ransomed or perished in battle on the bloody fields outside Toulouse, while al-Samh succumbed to his wounds in Narbonne not long after. This would not be the last attempt of the Umayyads to invade France, but Toulouse was nothing less than disaster for the Umayyads, particularly with the dangers posed by revanchist rival kingdom so close to home - the recently-founded Kingdom of Asturias, ignored for their defensible terrain and comparative poverty in favour of more lucrative targets in France, would win its own first victory against the conquering Umayyads the following year at Covadonga, relatively small-scale but historically significant skirmish marked by many today as the beginning of the Reconquista, which we will cover in separate series. These developments, together with the growing power of the Abbasids in Khorasan, represented many pivotal events and transformations in their infancy and the dawn of new era just around the corner as the sun began to set on the Umayyads. After the death of Caliph Yazid in 724, the first consequence of his successor Hisham’s rise to power would be something of disaster. During the last year of Yazid’s reign, major expedition into Transoxiana had been planned by then-governor Muslim ibn Sa’id al-Kilabi. The army raised, like most Umayyad armies, included significant detachments from tribes loyal to both the Qays and Yamani tribal federations of Arabia, two rival groups that had grown in power and spread across the domains of the Caliphate with every conquest. In the past, the Yamani had been the favoured faction of the Umayyad Caliphs, with the Qays even siding with the Zubayrids during the Second Fitna, though following the Second Fitna’s conclusion, the Umayyads opted to make efforts to reconcile with the Qays and win their support rather than punishing them for their rebellion. Yet, the Caliphate’s efforts to remain neutral and above the feud was felt as betrayal by the loyal Yamani. This would lead to serious tension when, shortly after the campaign was launched, the throne changed hands, and the new Caliph had al-Kilabi replaced as governor. Though removed from his post, al-Kilabi decided to continue with his campaign, but this would cause the simmering rivalries between the Qays and Yamani to spring to life - as al-Kilabi belonged to the Qaysi, the Yamani contingent under Amr ibn Muslim refused to follow him across the Oxus after his demotion, preferring to wait for him to be recalled and follow his replacement into battle instead. The first fighting in al-Kilabi’s grand campaign would occur outside Balkh and be Arab against Arab, with al-Kilabi and his loyal followers bringing the Yamani to heel by force, poor start to doomed campaign. Weakened by internal conflict, and with many of the defeated Yamani deserting, al-Kilabi’s diminished army joined with Sogdian and Hephthalite allies from still-loyal principalities such as Samarkand and Saghaniyan to march against Turgesh-aligned Ferghana. No sooner would they arrive than their hopes were dashed by the news that Khan Suluk, Khan of the Turgesh and their turncoat former ally, was prepared for them and already en route with large army. Tasking his Persian quartermaster Abdallah to organize retreat, al-Kilabi attempted to withdraw his forces in good order but was harried for nine days by Turgesh horsemen during his retreat, with parts of his army being attacked piecemeal as some of the lesser tribes and local allies were split from the main force. Crossing the Jaxartes would mean relative safety for the retreating army, and they ended the ninth day close by, though al-Kilabi opted to make camp rather than travel by darkness and risk nighttime raids. This would prove mistake, though, as the Turgesh-aligned forces of Ferghana and Tashkent used this opportunity to maneuver themselves between the river and the retreating Arabs. Al-Kilabi’s army, already exhausted from more than week of forced marching, awoke to find enemies both before and behind them, their path of retreat and access to water cut off. With no other options, al-Kilabi ordered his exhausted army forward, beginning battle that would be remembered as the Day of Thirst. The day was won by the Muslims, but the cost was heavy. The rear guard’s commander, Humayd ibn Abdallah, died in battle to hold off the Turgesh pursuers, but the bulk of the army eventually succeeded in breaking through the enemy lines to cross the river. Ultimately, the heavy casualties and abandonment by local allies meant this pyrrhic victory on the Jaxartes massively weakened Caliphal power in Transoxiana, with the Arabs withdrawing to more secure frontiers around Balkh as former vassals abandoned the Caliphate in favour of the Turgesh, and by extension the Tang Empire of China’s sphere of influence, despite the new governor Asad ibn Abdallah’s best efforts to rebuild trust and good relations with the Caliphate’s local Sogdian allies over the next three years. The worsening rivalry between the Qaysi and Yamani federations would be of further concern as well, with some tribal leaders among the spurned Yaman federation joining the Muhallabids in clandestine support for the Abbasid clan’s whispers of revolution and one even turning to the Kharijite heresy and embarking on short, doomed rebellion in Yemen the following year. The years 724 to approximately 727 saw the Caliphate remain fairly stable and secure, if not entirely at peace. Cyprus was raided by sea, and attacks on the Byzantines by the long-serving general Maslamah ibn Abd al-Malik continued in Anatolia, with Caeseria being conquered in mid-726. The Eastern Roman Empire was far from toothless, however. Emperor Leo the Isaurian, who had beaten back the massive siege of Constantinople some years prior, had ended the years of anarchy that saw so many Emperors raised and deposed and brought measure of stability back to the Caliphate’s oldest rival. Under pressure and unable to compete with the Caliphate in direct military might, Leo's hopes lay with his ally on the Caliphate’s northern frontier - the Khazar Khaganate. 727 would see the Caucasus mountains become major battleground for the still recently-enthroned Hisham, part of the ongoing Arab-Khazar wars that will be the focus of an upcoming series. The Khazars would not be the only threat to face the Caliphate in this period, and the following year of 728 only spelled further trouble both in the North and East, with even Samarkand, which had long served as the stronghold and regional capital for the Caliphate in Transoxiana, erupting in unrest. Following the Day of Thirst, Governor Asad ibn Abdallah al-Qasri had initially succeeded in stabilizing the Umayyad hold, but with the tribal feud within his ranks worsening and Abbasid-backed missionaries and seditionists beginning to make their presence felt in the Caliphate’s far east, al-Qasri seems to have been overtaken by paranoia by 726, dealing out punishments to many perceived enemies, some severe and some humiliating - flogging his predecessor’s right-hand man Nasr ibn Sayyar, having collection of tribal leaders imprisoned and shaved bald repeatedly in mockery, and chopping off the legs and hands of suspected seditionist. These and other actions began to alienate both his forces and the locals and led to his replacement in 728 by Ashras ibn Abdallah al-Sulami. Hoping to inspire greater support and loyalty from the locals, Ashras sent the missionary Abu al-Sayda to Samarkand and the surrounding regions to call for conversion to Islam, with al-Sayda promising the lifting of the Jizya tax from all converts. His efforts were remarkably successful, bringing in numerous converts and building mosques in the city - but after Samarkand’s ruler Ghurak complained to Ashras of falling revenues and suggested some had simply feigned conversion to escape taxation, the governor eventually ordered the recent conversions to be ignored and the tax collection to continue as before Outraged, more than seven thousand locals refused to pay their taxes, supported by Abu al-Sayda in opposition to Ashras and the Caliphate. The imprisonment of the missionary and other leaders among the would-be rebels defused the situation before it could devolve into bloodshed, but the disillusioned former followers of al-Sayda sent offers of alliance to the Turgesh Khan Suluk to drive out the Caliphate from Samarkand, further undermining their hold. Things would only get worse in 729. Resolving to take the fight to Suluk with another offensive campaign, Ashras sent his vanguard commander Qatan ibn Qutaybah, son of the great conqueror Qutaybah ibn Muslim, ahead of him across the Oxus as he camped in Amul with the bulk of his army. Despite initial setbacks and raids on Qatan’s camp, Ashras would score an initial victory in driving back the raiders and recovering their plunder as he advanced to join the vanguard, camping in the trading town of Baykand near Turgesh-aligned Bukhara. But in near-repeat of the Day of Thirst, the Arab army was encircled by night, awakening to find themselves again cut off from water. In the following Battle of Baykand, despite thirst sapping the army’s strength and the Turgesh killing more than 700 in the initial bloody engagements, Qatan and Ashras separately managed to break through enemy lines and escape with their forces, each thinking the other had perished for two days before rejoining each other among the still Arab-held forts near Bukhara. Ashras did seize victory of sort from this setback - Suluk’s pursuit was turned back after bloody two-month siege at the fort of Kamarjah, initially driving its Arab garrison from their trenches outside the fort and storming the gates, only for the defenders to light blazing fires in the midst of the fighting and force the Turks back. After several failed attempts to break the defenders' resolve through assaults on the walls, attempts at bribery, and mass execution of prisoners that was copied in equally grisly fashion by the defiant garrison, Suluk was forced to withdraw, allowing Ashras to lay siege to Bukhara and even capture it in 730 after wintering at nearby oasis. But even this short victory would soon be for naught. In the aftermath of Baykand, Ghurak defected to become another ally to the Turgesh, and though the sizable Arab garrison in Samarkand under Sawrah ibn al-Hurr still held the city itself, it was now surrounded by hostile territory and ruling over hostile population. When Suluk marched on Samarkand in 731 to restore Ghurak to the lordship of his city, the new governor, al-Junayd ibn abd al-Rahman, sent large army recorded as 28,000 strong to relieve them. But the relief force would find itself besieged in turn after Suluk lifted the siege to intercept it in the steep, dry Takhtakaracha Pass between Kish and Samarkand. battle broke out in the narrow pass, cavalry clashing on the more open Muslim right flank while fierce fighting took place on foot against the cliffs on the Muslim left. Though the fighting was close, with slaves in the Arab baggage train even being offered their freedom to join the fighting, the Muslim right was soon broken and driven back, leaving al-Junayd under pressure in the center. With the battered two armies separating at dusk, al-Junayd - tasting likely defeat in any further open battle - made the decision to dig trenches and fortify their camp despite the lack of water source, sending orders to Samarkand’s garrison of 12,000 to depart the city and relieve their relief force. As the garrison sallied forth on their mission despite Sawrah’s misgivings and attempted refusal, spies sent word of their coming ahead to Suluk and Ghurak, who departed from the pass to seize their true prize, meeting them in battle atop hill not far from the camp of al-Junayd. Here, without cliffs to protect their flanks or the numbers to match the Turgesh-allied army, the garrison found themselves marching into grass fires set by their foes and harried by cavalry on all sides. The outnumbered force was soon shattered, run down and slaughtered by enemy horsemen as their confused formations broke up in the thick dust and smoke. Sawrah died in battle, and though al-Junayd would survive and escape thanks to this diversion, this decisive defeat - coupled with religious revolt led by Al-Harith ibn Surayj in 734 that united portion of the Arab settlers with overtaxed local converts against the weakened Umayyads - would cause the almost total collapse of Arab power in Transoxiana for nearly decade to follow. The most storied battle of Caliph Hisham’s reign did not take place in Transoxiana, however, but in France. The Caliphate’s previous defeat to Duke Odo at Toulouse, though major setback, had not spelled the end of their ambitions in the region, and numerous raids were launched from the forward base of Narbonne during the 720’s. 730 saw Duke Odo take advantage of the infighting in al-Anadalus to form an unusual alliance by giving his daughter Lampagie in marriage to Uthman ibn Naissa, often called Munuza in Frankish texts, Berber leader in command of modern-day Catalonia. Though this deal would briefly stop the raids and bring measure of security to Aquitaine, it would very quickly backfire when Uthman rose in rebellion against the recently-appointed Arab governor Abdur-Rahman al-Ghafiqi. With his ally’s ill-advised rebellion swiftly crushed, Odo found himself facing not simple Berber raids but the incensed and vengeful governor’s army, which in early 732 launched lightning attack into Navarre, seizing Bordeaux by storm and inflicting heavy defeat on Odo at the river Garonne. With the hero of Toulouse bloodied and, on the retreat, the path seemed open for far greater offensive than Al-Sahm’s. But in an act of desperation, Odo swore fealty to his one-time rival Charles, steward to the puppet king Theuderic IV and the effective ruler of the Franks. While Charles had been absent at Toulouse, he had not spent the intervening 11 years idly - knowing confrontation with Al-Andalus was inevitable, he had taken out large loan from the Pope, equipping and training one of the only professional standing armies in Western Europe since the collapse of the Roman Empire. In comparison, Abdul-Rahman - though remembered as just and generous leader in Arab texts - seemed quite unprepared for confrontation with rival such as Charles, unsurprising considering the rapid turnover of Umayyad governors and the preoccupation with Arab-Berber rivalries closer to home that the governor had worked so hard to calm. With his foes on the move and Odo’s independence broken, the Mayor of all the Franks gathered up powerful army to halt the Umayyad incursion, joining the remnants of Odo’s forces in October at the city of Tours in the path of the Umayyad advance. Reaching Tours on October 4th, Abdul-Rahman and his army - heavily laden with plunder already - were surprised to find an army in an organized, phalanx-like formation atop hill just South of the city and the Loire River and were left with the decision to fight or to abandon the loot they had taken at Bordeaux and withdraw. Tours was rich prize, and Charles seems to have relied on its attractiveness as target and Abdul-Rahman’s confidence after his decisive victory at Garonne to compel the Arab leader to attack. If the Umayyad army chose to withdraw, Charles’ army of heavy infantry would be ill-suited to pursue, and would risk annihilation if they broke formation to do so, leaving the decision to do battle in the hands of the Muslims. With more than 25,000 soldiers and high-quality heavy cavalry unmatched by the Christian kingdoms of Europe, bolstered by fresh Berber horsemen from Ifriqiyah, Abdul-Rahman held some major advantages over his outnumbered foes of some 17,000 to 20,000. Yet cavalry charge, devastating though it could be in the right circumstances, relied heavily on the terror it could inspire - if the Franks held their ground in the face of charge rather than breaking, their tight formation and the uphill fighting would render the governor’s strongest weapon relatively impotent. Rather than rush to decision, the Umayyad army made camp, waiting in standoff for six days - though despite the approaching winter and the bitter cold setting in, the Franks did not abandon their defensive readiness atop the hill, the warmer clothing they had brought South with them from Austrasia serving them well as the invaders shivered in their camp. Finally, on October 10th, Abdul-Rahman made the decision to attack, worrying an order to abandon the treasure might lead to dissent in the ranks and trusting his experienced soldiers to win him another victory. The main body of the Frankish army, Charles’ professional heavy infantry, held firm on the hilltop while raiders from among levied and local troops were dispatched to harry the Umayyad rear, taking advantage of paths through the nearby forests to maneuver past the enemy army despite its greater numbers and mobility. Abdul-Rahman, for his part, is remembered as capable general. But whether out of overconfidence or desire to finish the battle swiftly before his army suffered another freezing October night, he played his hand early in the battle, riding with his best heavy cavalry in series of charges at the battle’s start that failed to dislodge the still fresh and eager Franks. Were he facing an army of levies and conscripts as most of Western Europe would have sent against him, these heavy cavalry charges might have produced the panic and rout Abdul-Rahman hoped for, but instead casualties began to mount among the Umayyad army’s finest, while the forests and nearby river prevented him encircling the mostly stationary Frankish army with his greater numbers. Despite the initial setbacks for the Umayyads, the battle was certainly not one-sided one, and as the day of October 10th progressed, the outcome hung in the balance, with casualties on both sides rising until the armies parted at nightfall. The battle’s end varies slightly between tellings, although most of the basic facts remain consistent. The official Frankish account sponsored by the Carolingian dynasty simply describes the Franks slaughtering their foes and driving them from the field with little further detail - the Mozarabic Chronicle, contrarily, claims the Umayyads simply left during the night, with the Franks tensely awaiting another attack in the morning before discovering their foes’ tents empty. The most complete account, and one that has worked its way into most telling since is an anonymous Arab chronicle that tells somewhat different story than either. In the morning of the 11th, the Arabs returned to their attack on the Frankish formation, holding their own and - if the slightly dramatic telling is to be believed - breaking through the center of the formation to push towards Charles, coming close to breaking the Franks completely. But small force of Franks - likely levies or survivors from Odo's army not trained to hold formation with Charles' professional soldiers - took advantage of paths through the forest to raid the Arab camp. Small though the force might have been, confusion and fog of war magnified its impact on the battle, with the attacking cavalry breaking off the attack to rush back to camp - worried their treasure might be stolen, or that larger force could still be hidden among the forest to encircle them. Abdul-Rahman remained at the front and tried to stem the retreat, but the Franks were quicker to take advantage of the momentary confusion, surging forward and killing the governor and those around him with hail of spears. If hope still remained to restore order to the disoriented army, Abdul-Rahman's death put an end to it, and the Franks soon turned the confusion into total rout. The Battle of Tours is today one of the most-discussed and best-remembered battles of the Early Middle Ages, credited by some with ending the threat of the Caliphate to Western Europe. Its impact on history is matter of some debate, particularly compared to the earlier battle at Toulouse. It is true that Tours looms much larger in Christian than Arab accounts - while the devastating defeat and Charles' prowess were certainly noted by Arab historians, it gets no more attention than Toulouse, even being absent from the quite thorough history of Al-Tabari. It has been suggested by some that Charles and his Carolingian descendents’ prominent place in European history caused their triumph at Tours to take exaggerated importance compared to the victory of the more obscure Duke Odo, and while it is true no further invasions of such scale ever occurred, the Arabs did continue their raiding over the following years, and Berber revolts and the imminent splintering of the Caliphate likely had as much or more to do with the end of expansion than the defeat at Tours. Yet whether or not the battle of Tours can be fully credited with ending the threat of the Caliphate in the West, the prestige it won Charles in the eyes of the Pope and the Franks, and more pragmatically the forced subjugation of his last Frankish rival Odo, made it an important moment in the unification of the Frankish realm, paving the way for the Frankish Empire of his grandson Charlemagne to resurrect the spirit of Rome in the West and serving as founding moment of glory for the Carolingian dynasty. It was through this victory Charles would become known to his countrymen and to history as Charles Martel or Martellus - "the Hammer." The victory at Tours would not mark the end of conflict Charles Martel and his Carolingian dynasty would wage against al-Andalus, though. The earlier victories over Odo and the Visigoths of Septimania meant portions of today’s Southern France remained in Muslim hands. And to some independence-minded Gallo-Roman nobility, particularly Duke Maurontus of Provence, Charles Martel’s powerful and expansionist Frankish realm now seemed more of threat than the Muslims. Though formally subject to the Frankish crown for nearly century, Gallo-Roman nobles with very old roots still ruled Provence more or less autonomously, and wished to maintain that independence in the face of the empire-builder Charles. Thus, in 734, two years after their defeat at Tours, the Umayyads added Avignon to their realm apparently not through conquest but through diplomacy, with Maurontus willing to forge alliances with non-Christians to avoid subjugation. Other accounts suggest that it was in fact conquered, along with Arles in 735, by Narbonne’s Umayyad governor Yusuf ibn Adb al-Rahman al-Fihri - and while the stronger evidence points to an alliance, it is certain Maurontus was under great pressure from both sides, and his alliance with Yusuf would have been an uneasy one at best. Whatever the case, with 735 also seeing Duke Odo’s death and Charles receiving the formal pledge of fealty from his successor, Hunald of Bordeaux, the stage was set for new set of confrontations between the Hammer and the Caliphate. The Franks were this time on the offensive, with Charles deploying his brother Childebrand in 736 with an army to bring Provence to heel and drive out the Umayyads. As 736 ended, Avignon lay besieged, and both Umayyad relief armies and larger Frankish force under Charles’ command were being mobilized to take the field. The first fighting would occur at Avignon. Charles arrived in 737, before the expected relief army, and opted not to wait out long siege, launching frontal assault against the walls of Avignon with rams and catapults and battering down the gates despite the best efforts of its Umayyad garrison. Though no numbers exist for the defenders, the characterization of the defense as mostly Umayyad effort and Charles’ confidence in his direct assault and its rapid success together suggest small defending force, and further suggests the inhabitants of Avignon were not inclined to support their occupiers against the besiegers, the pragmatic alliances of their rulers not outweighing the religious divide for most. Following this, Charles marched for Narbonne in Septimania. Here, victory would not be so easy - the Umayyad relief army had by this point mobilized and crossed the Pyrenees under command of governor Uqba ibn al-Hajjaj, and the Septimanian provinces had been Umayyad for years now, with Narbonne much more firmly held and garrisoned than Avignon. To avoid being trapped between the relief army and sortie from Narbonne’s defenders, Charles left token besieging force behind and continued past the city to meet the Umayyad army in the field, blocking their path at the River Berre. Here was fought battle not so well remembered or recorded as Tours, but perhaps of similar importance. In the five years since his previous triumph, Charles’ army had evolved and even adopted some of the techniques of its foes, with the Franks this time bringing heavy cavalry of their own to battle to match those of the Arabs. This addition to his ranks, along with the Umayyads being forced to cross the river and give the Franks the advantage of defensive position despite being the invaders, likely contributed to what quickly became Charles’ second decisive victory over the Caliphate, with the Umayyad army’s attempts to retreat being broken up by the rivers and rough terrain of the region, leaving numerous disorganized pockets of fleeing soldiers to be run down and captured by the Franks. This victory would not spell the end of the Umayyad presence in France entirely - the rebellions of Maurontus and Hunald proved more pressing, causing Charles to abandon what would have been length and difficult siege of Narbonne to quash them, though not before sacking the smaller city of Nimes and leaving much of Septimania and Provence devastated. The death of the Merovingian King Theoderic in the same year left Charles steward without king to represent, possibly undermining the legal charade holding up his rule, though the forging of an alliance with the Lombards of Italy during this time demonstrates Charles was powerful enough, and secure enough in the throne that was his in all but name, to ignore such questions of legitimacy for the time being. Septimania would remain Umayyad for over decade more, and Hunald would prove persistent nemesis for both Charles and his son Pepin after the Hammer’s death in 741, but the proven military might of the Franks, the added weight of the Lombard alliance, and the Arab-Berber hostilities now brought to boiling point by Kharijite preachers across Iberia and North Africa meant the once-threatening Caliphate could do little to aid its northern allies or protect its Septimanian holdings. The growing Carolingian empire, so recently imperiled by Umayyad invasions, would be able to take the offensive at its own leisure in the years to follow. Next 2 subseries of our series on the Early Muslim Expansion will continue this story and will talk about the Arab-Khazar Wars and the rise and fall of the Abbasid Caliphate. To ensure you don’t miss them, make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button to see them. Please consider liking, subscribing, commenting, and sharing - it helps immensely. Recently, we have started releasing weekly patron and YouTube member exclusive content, consider joining their ranks via the link in the description or button under the video to watch these weekly videos, learn about our schedule, get early access to our videos, access our private discord, and much more. This is the Kings and Generals channel, and we will catch you on the next one.