Virtues in the Public Square Lesson 3 Justice

Hi, welcome back to EAV 300, Virtues in the Public Square, and welcome to the lesson on the virtue of justice. Today you're going to hear from three major scholars. The first is Len Goodman, our Jewish scholar, who you'll remember from our first lesson on the overview of the virtues. He's back today to discuss the virtue of justice in Judaism. And this is real treat for us because he's actually written one of the two major books on justice in Judaism. and he's here to discuss his theory of justice and how the virtue of justice has implications, major implications for how we treat one another in society and what we can learn from Judaism in in in how we become more just can how we can become more just soci society. And then you'll hear from professor David Walsh who is Catholic and he is actually doing this presentation from Ireland and he is also he's political scientist. So unlike the other scholars who we have here who tend to be from theological background, Professor Walsh is from political science background. And again his discussion of justice really has strong has he he brings out strong implications for what is going on in the heart, how that impacts society. And then we'll hear from Omar Kureshi who is the brother of Jawad Kureshi who you heard during the discussion on wisdom and he'll be discussing justice in Islam. look forward to to seeing you all on the other side of these presentations and we'll see you when we're ready to do the audio roundt discussion with these three scholars. Thank you. Back in the 70s, was at work on the idea of justice. So, saw it as great opportunity to develop those ideas when was invited to give the Litman lectures at Oxford University in 1979. was working on what called general theory of desserts. As worked on those lectures and the book that grew from them, friends would ask about my project. And when told them that was working on justice, they'd say pretty typically, you're working on RS." RS's theory of justice was making big splash in those days. Welld deserved for two reasons. One, because RS in the wake of Watergate seemed to be giving permission for political theorists once again to make value judgments and no longer hide their light under bushel pretending to keep to historical, analytic or purely descriptive work as valuefree social scientists. Secondly, because Ross had spent years developing his idea, seeking to enlarge and elaborate the applications and ramifications and anticipate all manner of objections to the basic thesis of his theory of justice. One result of his diligence was vast literature that sprouted in the soil RWS had cleared. But was not writing about RS. The theory was at work on was something new, but also very old and distinctively Jewish, as the editor at Yale University Press, Charles Granch, who had asked me for the book, pointed out to me when it was finished. Hence, after the title on justice, the subtitle, an essay in Jewish philosophy. The theory had in mind was much more general than RS. His theory was reworking of Lach's social contract idea. So it was very much in the American tradition. For Lock's theory, the true manifesto of the glorious revolution of 1688 was ancestral to the ideals that gave birth to the American Revolution. Lock's chief target was the idea of the divine right of kings and the lock link gave RS's theory its patina. But did not see the divine right of kings as the burning issue of our times. The great strength of Lach's contractual theory lay in the ancient idea of the consent of the governed, an idea well represented in the Hebrew Bible. It was on that biblical foundation that the founders of the American polity built their edifice using the idea of historical compact or contract. The social contract idea seeks the legitimacy of government in common undertaking, explicit or tacit, collaborative as Plato pictured, or more minimal, vested in promises not to harm or take unfair advantage of others if they made and kept like promises. Plato had thought such thinking commonplace and sought to transcend or supersede it, finding in the republic that political leg legitimacy lay in the use of reason to set and sustain communal priorities. But Epicurus stripped down the social contract idea, for he saw pleasure and pain as the only real basis for binding force in natural law. And he stressed that political arrangements must be conventional or contractual, for nothing to an Epicuran is inherently right or wrong simply in the nature of things, and the gods most pointedly enjoy too pleasant life to trouble themselves with human affairs. Few political theorists by RS's time took seriously the idea of historical social contract. And even the idea of tacit or implicit contract seems pretty iffy. Why would prior consent bind those not party to it? And how exactly might presumptions of tacit consent be enforced? Should dissenters to establish norms just be made to leave? One drawback in the notion of norms as mere conventions is that it ignores natural human groups of the communal rather than societal short. I'm referring there to the traditional distinction the 19th century distinction between divine shaft community and society is Elsha families, clans, tribes and nations. These are natural groups. One does not enter by prior undertaking and one cannot just leave quite so simply. RS favored the idea of virtual contract as conceptual tool useful in defining and describing justice. just society, he argued, would be one that reasonable people would have agreed to if they chose basic rules they'd live under when unconstrained and undeceived at the start, and ignorant of the roles they were called upon to play under those rules. This veil of ignorance, as RS called it, stabilized the plinth on which he erected his model of justice as fairness. It resembled the children's cake cutting rule. You cut, I'll choose. No one, RS presumed, would opt for system so unfair as to disadvantage too severely any of the choosers in the original position, if unaware of his own own role in it. Self-interest was implicit in the rationality RS presumed. Two notable findings of RS's thought experiment were these. First, any material inequalities of goods, costs, risks, opportunities, and such would have to benefit those least advantaged in the scheme. And second big point, liberties crucially would always have priority. Liberties would always have priority. The idea was RS put it in terms of what he called lexical priority. the the A's in dictionary always come before all the A's come before any of the B's and in this way any liberty would come ahead of any merely material benefit or risk or cost. that assumption is clearly very tested in real life in history in in today's history of what's going on. people surrender all kinds of liberties in behalf of their interests or or their even their comfort. But but Ross packed into the notion of rationality that assumption which later appears as the outcome of his theory. grave drawback to any contract theory of justice is the risk of excluding those who are not or cannot be parties to the contract. One may think of Aboriginal and tribal peoples here and persons colonized or enslaved. Now those in RS's original position would not, he presumes ever agree that they might when the die is cast be cast as slaves. But it's hard to assume that these so-called rational actors might not agree amongst themselves to enslave or colonize others. We've seen that happen. RS Rolls was kind of sure that democracies don't ever really make aggressive wars. history is not quite able to back him up on that one. More broadly, we need to consider foreign persons and peoples to whom justice or injustice might be done. And then there are the unborn, the critically ill, the helpless, future generations yet unborn completely, and the memory of ancestors so alive in the value systems of traditional and tribal cultures. What about animals and plants singly and as species and lineages? What about echoneiches and ecosystems? What about the monuments of nature and culture? The best RS can say about issues often assigned conventionally to today to concerns about the environment is prudential. It's imprudent of course to follow those portions of our world that we have not yet known that we need or might depend on or that might be vital to human survival. The impact of poor decisions can be devastating gi given the complex webs of interdependence in the natural world which we don't always know about in advance. It's true that some cured for cancers might lie hidden in the rainforest. But what about the intrinsic worth of all those beings with which we have no covenant? Is there every is everything or anyone everyone present in our world just for our use for our exploitation or enjoyment? That seems very narrow overly anthropocentric view. think about the contrast there between the stoics and the neoplatonists. The stoics thought that everything is provided by the divine nature for the sake of humanity. even they said something so noble as soul would not have been given to pig except to keep the meat fresh. however the neoplatonic view was that everything exists for its own sake and in Jewish philosopher like Marmanes he will say that that's the glory of God. He creates everything not just for our sake but everything for its own sake. Unlike walls, felt and feel no need to avoid or pretend to avoid metaphysics. found basis for desserts in all beings in their very being and identified the being of things with the konatus. That's what Spidosa called the the real essence of what things are. Aristotle had raised the question of what is it for thing to be. But he answered that question in terms of essences. Everything belongs to kind to natural kind which defines what species it's of and establishes the laws and the rules that nature enforces as it were on all things. But Spinosa noticed that beyond those general kinds, things have an essence which is particular and peculiar to each individual. And it's not universal like the Aristotilian essence. It's particular and unique to that individual. It's not static like Aristotilian essences which don't really allow for evolution or extinction or birth of new species. it's dynamic. Spinosa needed new word to avoid confusion about essences. So he redefined the old idea. First the conatus of thing is unique to it. It's not universal although there are features of all things of given type that they have in common. Second, the konatus of things is dynamic not static. Aristotilian essences are fixed and unchanged as long as that entity exists. And third, the konatus of thing is telic that is it involves pursuit of an end. To this we should add that the end of being pursues since the cononatus is dynamic might develop over time. These stipulations allow for evolution rather than preclude it as fixed essences did. They even allow for evolution in the vulgar metaphoric sense of the term now applied popularly. So person's project might grow or change as human projects typically do in the course of our life lifespan. The teiology here is not itself fixed. Beings and the populations of beings living and non-living may change in what was once called their essences. Hence the possibility of emergence as for example in the rise of new elements in the stars. Emergence is not generally self-conscious and the rise of new species of living things need not have preset destination. New living types evolve by what Tayard desan called groping. Mutation allows natural variation among existing types to test new strategies and structures to exploit or build new echoneiches. Conscious beings explore consciously. Per persons be human or perhaps quite unlike us see new opportunities and discover new potentials in themselves which they may choose to develop. It's in the dynamis dynam sorry it's in the dynamism andic character of all beings that find the basis of their desserts all beings are conitative the sunflower turns toward the sun its roots seek water beasts birds and insects seek mate the one moral norm which do rely on from which all others arise is the imperative to treat beings as what they are is here that anchor the idea of the konatus as the primai dessert of any being. Primmai since desserts may compete but also complement one another. One of the most serious and fraught tasks of any human society and culture is the discovery and integration of interests. Prioritizing them, subordinating some to others. We favor the child over the virus, for example, coordinating those that are compatible as when we garden or manage the flora and fauna of national park. and setting others on par. Human rights, believe, are on par. They're on plateau in terms of desserts. They belong to very special ca class and they go with the idea of dignity found only in persons in the virtue of the sub in virtue of the subject of those persons. Animals in my opinion do not have rights. Rights are irrefragable. But animals do have desserts. Hence the concern biblically recognized to safeguard beasts from undue pain. Plants too have desserts. Hence the biblical regard for preserving fruit trees even in wartime and not just for future use. For the Torah's argument is voiced that rhetorical question. This is Deuteronomy 20. Is the tree man? The idea being the the tree isn't your enemy? Why are you cutting down the tree? You can think about two other passages where the desserts of plants are referred to. One is in the book of Job where where Job remarks in his near despair for tree there is hope or in Jonah the last verses in the book of Jonah where God establishes gourd plant and and then it dies and Jordan is Jonah is Jonah is very peeved to the point that he's preferred prepared to he'd rather die than live any longer and God argues with him again rhetorically you didn't plant that plant. you didn't labor for it and and now you're upset and shouldn't feel sorry for city of 120,000 people who don't know the difference between their right hand and their left and also he says and also much cattle. Even an inanimate object deserve protection as witnessed the biblical and rabbitic ban on want and destruction. The ban is expressed in rabbitic language drawn from the Bible. Same verses chapter 20 verse 19 and 20k. Don't just be wantingly destructive. The general theory of desserts which is the basis of my book and you can read details in lot of Jewish texts biblical and rabbitic that back that up. The basis of that theory is that idea of the telic character of desserts. The basic norm of that theory is that one have to one ought to treat things as what they are and recognize in in moral and practical sense recognize what those things are. Recognizing the striving that they have and adjudicating to turn those primaaci desserts into rights in the case of persons or into claims which need to be credited dealt with taken seriously in the case of all other beings. The general theory of desserts derives turns the categorical imperative in its kingdom of ends formulation from the very claims it derives from the very claims made by the being of all things and because of that it extends beyond Kant's treatment of recognizing the ends of other persons treating treating other subjects as ends in themselves it extends to what Schwitzer called reverence for life and yet further to respect for all beings. Not just aesthetic respect but moral respect regard not indiscriminate as though animals had rights and the shrub took precedence over the child whose life it sap might save. That's the basic idea of that theory of desserts. it is Jewish theory. It is metaphysical theory. it is not contract theory. believe that the social contract is very valuable notion because it does turn on the recognition of the importance of the consent of the governor. But one of the things argue in that book on justice is that there are things that people could consent to which are not right and there are things which can be right without consent. One of the examples chose in writing on justice, thought about suppose there were social agreement on the legitimacy of marketing substance that was both carcinogenic and addictive. And have to confess here for our audience that came up with that example entirely out priori before realized we've done that. We've actually legalized we we think there's no alternative to it. We're now legalizing more substances, but we legalized the the open sale of carcinogenic addictive substance and people agree with that to the extent that their elected representatives have quarreled with it that the people have not stood up on their hind legs and rebelled against it. it's very interesting test case for the insufficiency of that important moral idea of the consent of the government. there are things that people can consent to which are probably not really just and there are things that they would never think of consenting to which actually do require their consent and and it's not forthcoming. the the the essence of the book is that you have to respect the claims that beings make that all beings make and that we have to work out just how that respect can be optimized. Albert Schwitzer had good idea about that. some of the Hindus and Buddhists and James have good ideas about that. And those existential desserts which are located in my view in the konatus of all beings are the foundation of what think justice has to regard. Thank you. I'll just sort of talk generally about the way presented the topic of justice. my way into it was not primarily through religious texts but through the philosophical path which eventually leads us back think towards the revelatory traditions. the title of my paper was was friends have no need of justice. And drew that from Aristotle's remark in the nick of the key ethics where he says when people are friends they have no need of justice which is striking way to begin thinking about the topic of justice because it suggests that justice is really secondary issue and that friendship is the primary issue. and that when you walk down the path of justice you eventually leave justice behind and become friends. thought that was provocative point that Aristotle brings us through and it's also somewhat paralleled in Plato's treatment of justice in the in the republic which sets out to define justice and then abandons the search for definition. so in sense each of these two classic philosophers really provide an opening into the way in which revelation which exceeds the the perspective of philosophical investigation also converges with the sort of boundary issues in philosophy. so there's sense that justice itself requires us to go beyond justice. and that you know that even though we're the project here is to talk about individual virtues one of the great temptations is to think that the the individual virtues stand alone. whereas the reality is that the individual virtues are virtues only in relation to whole life and whole orientation. if you're self-controlled that's not necessarily good thing. It's only if it's good thing in relation to things that are good. you could be miser as Aristotle said and be very self-controlled. you could be courageous and not in the good and not in good way. So the virtues themselves stand in relation to some higher good and that higher good is hard to hard to define. and it remains sort of indefinable in the in the classic philosophic sources. that's why in the republic when they get to the definition of justice it seems like justice is really simply the harmony of the different parts of the city or the different parts of the soul. But of course the the three cardinal virtues there are temperance wisdom and courage. and justice itself is not one of the individual virtues but is somehow the one that subsumes them all or goes beyond all of them and that remains kind of elusive within their discussion. Then it opens up and we get this long treatment of what the philosopher does and what the what the education of the philosopher is and so on. And we get this sense that outside of you could say the the goal of harmonizing and bringing together all of the different parts, we also have an inner orientation of the soul towards something that's utterly beyond it. And this is where Socrates introduces the idea of the good. And he says that the good is that which is beyond being in dignity and power. that of course you could say almost almost explicitly invokes the idea of God as that which is beyond all. so think that's remarkable kind of convergence with the revelatory traditions. and even though that's very often overlooked in the sort of scholar in in the sort of professional community of philosophers today that philosophy itself is kind of theology or kind of ultimate orientation within the order of being and one that takes account of the order of being as going beyond itself. that's that take that as as sort of first step. the the Christians when they come to the the discussion of justice use certainly the philosophic sources and see themselves as compelled to use that language because in order to talk about God as transcendent you do have to that's what really theology is the logos of of the divine the way of reasoning about God and there's there's really no alternative except to use to be to be to absorb the philosophic language. Augustine is probably the most famous in terms of giving formulation of it where he says that the city cannot be just if it does not do justice to God. if it is not if its justice is not ordered in relation to God. and so that by that definition every city is unjust and every soul is unjust. and so that makes justice itself kind of aspiration that's almost unattainable. when you look back then at the Greeks you think yes they were on the path towards that realization without you could say admitting it. the question of whether the best city and the calibus the most beautiful city can be realized anywhere is left hanging in in both Plato and Aristotle it's left open as if it's an elusive thing Aristotle in fact keeps talking about the city the fullest even when it's no longer viable political option as if you know there's it's totally unreal realizable. So there's there's huge issue here with the question whether justice is an ideal that can never be realized or is justice the highest reality. that's that's really the the question that both the philosophers and the Christians and think the other the revelatory traditions as whole grapple with in one way or another. St. Augustine's formulation that that Rome was never true city that was never true commonwealth never true republic because it lacked justice in this full sense. then leaves open the question then what kind of what kind of city can conform to the idea of justice and what kind of human being can conform to the idea of justice? Well, it does somehow require what we might call an escatological orientation, an orientation beyond this world, realization that justice itself is never fully realized in time and space. never realized under the conditions of mundane existence. Now the next question is is clearly then what good is it? what's its what's its value? What's its significance? and again we find echoes of the Greeks in the way in which the Christians deal with that namely that justice provides norm and measure even if it's never fully realized. It provides canon and and diametric and that that that really the even if it never appears anywhere in in history as fully realized entity guides history itself. Even Martin Luther King talks about justice as the arc as governing the arc of history. you know so there's there's great sort of continuity from that even though it's never actually in you know in some sense if if justice is fully realized anywhere in history history would be would be completed and so history and human life individual and collective life evolves under you could say the guidance but also the measure the judgment of of of justice. even someone like Vaklo Havl who's not believer in any any real sense has wonderful little passage in which he talks about living under judgment and living under the sense of an eternal perspective or an eternal measure. Let me just for moment read out that little quote because it's it's such it's such it's such an impressive thing. He wrote this in book called to the castle and back. and and use it quite often because you know we live in world of unbelievers. We live in secular world. And when you when you when you live in that world, you have to think well how how do you make that bridge? How do you make that connection to not just what we call religious but transcendent perspective that is is just behind the surface or below the surface even if it's not fully recognized. And anyway, Pavo has this little meditation think it's it's only couple of pages in that book where he's thinking what am doing? What am waiting for? And he says he says why do keep everything in order? Why do live in this way? why what am and and he comes to the realization I'm waiting for the judgment. He says I'm waiting for that moment when when you know everything do will be assessed. But what how does that how does that arise in somebody who really doesn't have theological frame framework? but he says, "But do care because I'm convinced that my existence, like everything that has ever happened, has ruffled the surface of being. And after my little ripple, however marginal, insignificant, and ephemeral it may have been, being is and always will be different from when it what it was before. All my life have simply believed that what is once done can never be undone and that in fact it remains forever. in the in short being has memory. It's an extraordinary formulation from somebody who really is not believer that being has memory. and you can see that once you begin to think about questions of justice, you eventually reach out towards something eternal, the perspective of eternity and cannot do without it. So our our our occ preoccupation and our occupation with being just and realizing justice in our lives and in our world is you could say underpinned and surrounded by the awareness that there's an order beyond the order that we instantiate that we realize within time. by the way was very taken by by lens beginning with the discussion of John Ross because when that big book on the theory of justice came out 30 years before that we've now learned Ross wrote senior thesis at Princeton called brief inquiry into the meaning of sin and faith when Ross himself was believer. and you can see that there you know there there is actually continuity there and and he actually comes back towards the end of his life to write little thing on his religion and so it's even Ross who who talks about secular reason and all of that and makes that the kind of standard can never quite leave it alone. So there there really is no such thing as purely secular account of justice. No matter what despite the best efforts of Ros when he was you know at the height of his cars as professional philosopher he still came back to the kind of reoccupations that he had as very bright undergraduate at Princeton in which were inspired by his Christian faith at that time. At any rate, you know, what does that how then what are we to make of that is really the question that I'm that was interested in and that tried to grapple with in the paper and was grateful for didn't write book about justice like like Lind did. but was grateful for the opportunity to think through again topic on which you know have to teach every year. but you know you it's always good to reorganize it in your own mind and and and to pull it together and because you know you're dealing with one thinker after another but then to put to have sort of synthetic statement of it is useful. So what do you do then with this insight that indeed justice never simply stands within mundane realm? and that it's never fully realized in this life and that it never really and yet it's never it's never utopia. It's never just an ideal which was of course the other great danger. but that indeed justice somehow governs the whole of reality. It is the truth of being in way that's inescapable. but then you know as work in in politics department so have to explain to students then well then what does that mean you know for real politics and for real political life and for your lives? and you know, you have to point out to them that yes, even though it may never be fully realized, you're responsible for realizing as much of it as you possibly can. and that it's it's measure. It's guide. and that you could say there's there ultimately we admit that there are really two kinds of justice which again we find me mirrored in classical philosophy and only gradually discerned think as the tradition unfolds. Aristotle again in book five of the ethics the Niconian ethics says indeed there's two kinds of justice there's justice in the full sense by which he means the total ordering of the soul which is very much like what's in the republic the way in which all everything holds together the total order of things and then there's the other kind of justice which he says is partial justice and what he means by partial justice is what we would call legal justice. the justice between separated beings, independent beings. And this is actually where the the social contract comes in more than anywhere else. So you're think is right that that that the social contract language doesn't really account for justice in the full sense, but it does account for justice in this partial or legal sense. the kind of reciprocal justice by which people enter into agreements with one another and and and create common life. but always with the understanding that that's all it is. it's only legal justice. It's not actually justice in the full sense. It's justice that constantly falls short. so the US courts or any court system does not give you justice in the four sense. It gives you justice within the limited framework of the law and the law is not the same as the just. morality is not the same as as as legality. and that's the kind of important distinction. Now that doesn't mean that that that that there's no connection between them and as said the the most important thing is to recognize that the larger account of justice really does underpin the law. So the law is not just not just what governments say they are what what's decreed by the government or by regulators or by by parliaments or congress or anything else. it's what ultimately comes up as sense of the community in this limited framework by which they can accord kind of justice to one another almost though with with the sort of awareness that in the background we have to do more than that. that if we were merely legally right or fair towards one another, we wouldn't really be just. and that we we always have to go beyond what's what the letter of the law requires. Just like in the rules of politeness, if you want to be polite to people, then you shouldn't just simply follow the rules of it. you should follow it with certain spirit, with certain attitude, with certain openness and and so you're you're constantly going beyond it. and and again, you know, I'm always thinking back and forth on these things that Aristotle also has wonderful examples of that when he deals with in in the two books on friendship where he deals with three types of friendship. friendships of utility, friendships of pleasure and friendships of virtue which are true friendships where people are friends for their own the sake of one another. but what's striking about that is that that he actually uses the other two types in the same way. He the model is true friendship but the other lesser forms of friendship are still forms of friendship. So even commercial transactions are for the for mutual good that's shared even though limited. but that means that it's they're never simply confined to purely transactional exchange between the people who are involved. that at any moment they can you could say en be enlarged or expand into friendships of pleasure which are much more mutual and indeed friendships in which they we recognize one another as persons and as friends in the true sense and civic friendship and all of those things. So, justice, think, is is an extraordinarily interesting, virtue because of this sort of, you could say, vacasillation back and forth between its transcendent measure, the superogatory by which we go beyond what justice requires, and also the capacity to to to, you say, include within it the humblest and most elementary and utilitarian relationships that we have. St. Thomas then when he comes to it has all has some interesting additions to that because he he absorbs all of that tradition. and he's of course very much thinking that everything comes under our relationship with God. and so all of the virtues for St. Thomas are not just in obedience to God but also you could say the total self-giving of the person to God. then and it's not just kind of wrote thing. It's not just not just habitual thing, not just conformity thing. but also but but means means giving everything unconditional. yet when he deals with justice he makes very important distinction. He says that all for all of the other virtues what really matters is not is not merely what's done but the way in which it is done the spirit in which it is done. When you're generous then it's it's not just enough to actually you know do generous actions but you must do it out of spirit of generosity spirit of giving more than than than is expected or than is asked of you. all of that. However, when he deals with justice, he has really what matters in just the most important thing in justice is that not the mode, not the spirit that's done, but whether it meets the external requirements. he say it's almost like legal requirement. and he he there he jumps back and says really in relation to the just it's the the external relationships that people have with one another. He says liberality is for the sake of each individual but justice is for the sake of others. Liberality is you developing virtue in yourself. in justice you're serving others. and that's that's its key thing. And what matters what ma yes of course the the attitude the mode the way in which you do it is important but it's not it's not it's not the most important thing the most important thing is that you meet the requirements that justice imposes on you in the particular conditions that you're in. Now Thomas think can do that because unlike say Aristotle and even Plato he has distinct virtue that covers the encompassing order of the soul which is keratas love and the total orientation of the soul. so he says keratas is the total ordering of all of the virtues towards God. charity is the total self-giving of of self towards God. Just as God gives gives him to himself towards us. justice is kind of mirror of that on the mundane level by which we order ourselves externally in relation to one another. let me see hope can find my little quote there on on that. very and he says this is in some of Theologia part two question two part two. and and so he says and so thing is said to be just as having the rectitude of justice when it is the term of an act of justice without taking into account the way it is done by the agent. whereas the other virtues in the other virtues nothing is declared to be right unless it is done in certain way by the agent. there's distinction between the total ordering of things for the good of of the whole society in an external way and and the other is the total good of the soul in relation to God and the total order of being. so think justice is one of these extraordinarily interesting virtues that jumps or shifts from what Aristotle would call the total justice in the total sense to justice in the partial or legal sense and maintaining that distinction even if think you're think Lennon is right that if you read Ross you would get the misimpression that that that his theory of justice is all of justice but actually it's only justice in the partial or legal sense. Not that that's terrible. but that's not the whole of justice and that's useful way of thinking of it. All right, that's probably enough. Thank you. It's pretty intimidating to come after Len and David. So, you know, but I'll do the best can. So what we have here is I'll be looking at in the Islamic tradition particularly Gazali's works on on ethics and his treatment of justice alongside you know other other writers on this topic and again we similarly we find it kind of it is bit confusing for students of ethics because the word justice al in Arabic is used in different ways and not not mutually exclusive ways but nonetheless in in different contexts and sometimes the whole the it's very hard to make to get sense of what justice entails and how these various usages relate to each other. And but we do find here you know the yeah we do find ways of how this is resolved in in that resemble and lot of what building off the works of Aristotle and Plato as well in the Islamic tradition. So here justice one understanding of justice is perhaps we can say you know relating to the individual not in terms of their interactions but in terms of their psychological state and that relates to their you know the the three faculties of the soul the rational the irrascalable and then the concupisb right the the akalia vabia and shahuania and for gazali one understanding of justice is that justice is term that denotes the particular order of these three faculties of the soul and what he calls terti and what he's referring to this particular order is when one when when when two of these faculties the irrascabel and the concis are are under the direct guidance and control of the rational faculty. So once that order is achieved then that particular order is referred to as justice. So in this context gazali would say that justice is in fact not one of the four virtues. It's referring to particular order of the three cardinal virtues or or the other faculties here. And so and because each faculty in the richellian sense has particular virtue associated with it with wisdom, temperance and and so so here justice now as it's conceived of or in the individual is referring to particular state of the soul and it's not in and of itself particular virtue. now once this particular state of the soul is achieved in the individual then that will lead to justice in the what Aristotle called the partial sense of justice and justice as we observe it in the social in one's social engagements. So the individual when an individual engage engages with other individuals in society you will start to see acts of justice appear but that's only because particular this particular state of the soul is is is acquired and then you also see that leading to justice in in in in the area of politics as well and their political engagement. So here one finds that justice is you know you find grounding so to speak or clear relationship between social and political justice and and then justice as as being grounded and only taking place properly once the soul is in just state meaning in relationship of the rel the particular order of these three faculties of the soul. And what's interesting here is every other virtue has vice of excess and deficiency except for justice. It only has injustice. So it doesn't have vice of excess. It doesn't have vice of deficiency. And because no matter what if your excess if there is any vice of excess or if there's vice of deficiency there's no particular name for it. It's just injustice and no matter what you know one encounters in that and so once once this what's really interesting here is then once one finds this particular state of the soul and then that that that now branches out into one's social dealings and one's political dealings and so when when we look at one's social dealings then justice now has to deal with how one interacts with another person in terms of what do they give to another person and what do they take and receive from another individual and then justice as it relates we see it in the political realm right is referring to in very platonic sense the particular order of the city and particular political order and again the analogy here of the analogies given of of the city and how the various con components of city are in particular order and then once that order of the city's achieved then that's referred to as just society or or city that is in just state and here what Gazali will have in mind is that every individual in that is in their what he calls proper place. And this is something find very interesting in in in Muslim discussions. And I'll be really interested to hear if this is in the other faith traditions as well of an object or thing or being having proper place and the and putting things in their proper place is the act of justice. Now that assumes knowledge of what the correct order should be and and and and knowledge of the object itself and where it should belong, what is its proper place. But here what we do see here is in as it relates to the city for example in the political realm is putting things in their proper place and that is how the just act or that is how one would observe justice in in the political realm. And all of this though is grounded in or can only take place once the soul is in just state and referring to the various faculties of the soul. So again here what we find here is that the you know we do find this idea of partial sense of justice and that is you know really dealing with the social and political. We're talking about justice as fairness, justice as equality, distributive justice and corrective justice. And we're also seeing here justice in whole sense. So very in in very risilian way here where it's referring to state of being and here justice is predicated on under and and and and understood in the sense of each particular being has proper place that's assigned to it. And when things are put into that proper place, whether that's spiritually, we're talking about our soul or as individuals or collectively as we relate to each other, as we relate to ruler, as we relate to God, as we relate to scholars, theologians, the pious, the saints, you know, how husband and wife should relate to each other, children, and parents. All of these social roles are very important as they embody or they allow us to understand the proper place of thing and then acting in accordance with that understanding of what thing's proper place is that's the act of justice. So here in in whole sense right which the whole sense and conception of justice assumes cosmic order and certain social political theological order that encompasses all of creation. And what's interesting here is the partial sense of justice must conform to justice is conceived of in whole sense. So there's relationship between the two. And hence as you know as as Len was talking about R's conception is that from Muslim point of view Gazali would theoretically say even sure there's partial sense of justice being achieved but it's it's not unless it conforms to justice as whole as state of being and and it takes into account so the idea of dist you know if you're distributing goods or you're carrying out correctives justice or fairness and equality ity. It must conform to particular understanding of thing's place and its and and in the cosmic order meaning the social political entire order of co of thing and as it it must take into account the object as it relates to God and then as it relates to other individuals in society and and all of God's creation. then and only then will you have true sense of justice right that'll be achieved. So there is very strong relationship between the partial sense of justice and in that it must conform and the whole sense of justice in that the partial sense of justice must conform to justice conceived of as whole. And here some contemporary Muslim philosophers have discussed this brings about question of well how do we know thing's proper place and here we find that many philosophers Muslim philosophers will hold that justice goes hand in hand in wisdom in fact justice is reflection of wisdom right and can just read certain things here by certain Muslim philosopher professor Nakibal Abdas who speaks about the relationship of wisdom and justice. So he says here is that justice is state of being condition of things being in their proper places. So this is justice as whole. It is also quality of human act quality that springs from moral excellence whose source is wisdom. So this human act of justice is the act of putting things in their proper place. To put thing in its proper place involves the possession of prior knowledge of the nature of the thing. So you have to know the essence of thing and its true nature and of its association with other known things in the system of relation already present in the soul. It involves the soul's recognition of the thing's proper place and such recognition comes about through wisdom which identifies its proper place and suggest to the soul to act accordingly. And so here it's it's really interesting is that the relationship between justice and wisdom is that they're basically mirrors reflecting each other. The act of justice presupposes wisdom, knowledge of wisdom which will allow the soul to know the proper place of thing based on its true nature and then it can act in accordance with the thing's proper place. And so now the act of justice can be fully achieved here. And related to that is what's the relationship between then justice as state of being and the social and political understandings of justice. And so he says here again I'll read from him. He says viewed as whole of the virtues justice is complete virtue and it is more than the sum of the virtues. It is the ultimate standard by which social and and political and social justice is meant to conform and by which the accuracy of their conformity is judged. So in other words, social and political justice are they truly are our social and political acts and our attempts to act justly are they truly how do we know we're truly acting justly is we have to look are they conforming to justice conceived as whole. And then he says very interesting statement here professor Athas. He says the constitution of the state cannot be regarded as the ultimate standard of justice. The ultimate standard of justice is natural and preeds political and social justice. It applies to all human institutions and acts as well as to the characters of human individuals everywhere and for all time. And so here the justice as whole actually precedes and must inform social and and and and political justice just as conceived of in partial sense. there's lot definitely lot to say here but I'll I'll I'll I'll finish my presentation here with the understanding that justice that all all the acts of all the virtues but in particular courage and temperance they stem from wisdom and justice. Now wisdom and justice ultimately are grounded in for Muslims the names of God. And so one central point of the of the Muslim ethical tradition, central principle is what's known as is that human being should acquire the character traits of God. And so here wisdom and justice are ultimately reflection of God's names of wisdom and justice. So God is you know wisdom God is the wise and God is the just. Those are two very important names of God in the Muslim tradition. And in Gazali's reflection of on the name Al of God of God being the just he doesn't what's interesting here is that in this in his reflection and contemplation on this name, he doesn't bring in the conception of justice in partial sense. He says that God's justice is relates to putting things in their proper place. And the only no way to know God's justice, right? And the only way to know justice period at all is you have to know God's justice. And and how do you know God's justice? The only way you can know God's justice is by contemplating the acts of God. All of God's acts are just according to Muslim theological tradition. And so one looks at the God all of God's acts and then you'll get true understanding of justice of God's justice and then an understanding of justice itself. And so he goes on to this very nice contemplation looking at the order of things from the human body to the cosmos to the you know the plant world, the animal world and and to the human body itself and looking at the order of things and where things are placed and how everything is placed in their proper place. And from understanding and studying God's acts, one can then understand how things are in their proper place. And that imparts wisdom and then to act in accordance with that will be considered just act. So I'll end here. Yeah, there's lot to say about this. definitely end here. know there's definitely, you know, it's interesting to see how in contemporary times justice has taken place and and we would definitely see strong large gap in R's understanding of justice and and dealing only with particular part of justice as it manifests in in in the life of human beings and human societies. but ultimately we would find his his account of justice to be incomplete as it does not take into consideration wisdom and and and understand justice as stemming from God's acts as well and not taking into account the proper place of things. So thank you. Thank you all of you. Russ Hittinger who is the scholar who did the overview for the Christian tradition in our course here. he remarked to me that it's interesting when it comes to the issue of justice that it's very difficult in our day and age in our time in our mind frame that we have our our our frame of mind our way of looking at things that it's it's it's very difficult to to conceive of justice in way that takes into account or that begins with the operations of the soul. and and rather we see justice only through framework of sort of you know of of of external operations, how its effect externally and how we deal with one another. And he remarked that that's kind of feature of our modern world and the the transition from you know just different understanding of the of the nature of reality of the trans of the focus on the transcendence of the turn away from the away from focusing on the soul and the ultimate aims of the human being of change in the anthrop apology in our modern world. So wanted to ask the three of you could you all discuss that amongst yourselves because someone jump in there and then I'd like to hear you know I'd like to hear your your all's response the internal the internal side of justice as opposed to the interocial. Yes. Because Yeah. And and all three of you actually discussed this to some extent from with your from within your own traditions. How how justice really begins justice justice between from human being to human being or from the ruler to the ruled. All of this originates somewhere originates somewhere that think is missed by RS and by Lach and by other people who you know in our modern or pre very close to premodern times this the early modern times conceived. So what what is it you know you you've all kind of touched on that in some way or another and I'd like to drill down on that little bit. So would someone like to jump in there? I'll I'll have go at it. And think first of all, all three of us were paying our respects to Plato because Plato had metaphysical and indeed theological account of of justice. He he thought unlike Lepicurus that the divine has lot to do with it. that's the aspirational side of it that that we have to strive for as Dr. Walsh was was bringing out there's transcendent dimension of it. And when we think about transcendence we've got to start with ourselves. it's it says in the Torah, you shall be holy for the Lord thy God am holy. we have an aspirational command there that we have to emulate God. The same thing is true in Plato when he says in Theotus 176 that you've got to become as like to God as possible. And my monities the great Jewish philosopher 1138 to 1204 are his dates conflated those two fused those two passages. We have to become as like to God as humanly possible which means not attaining God's self trans God's transcendence but attaining our own self-trcendence by by pushing the limits of our potential and becoming more and better human beings than we are. Dr. Of course she brought that out in terms of the platonic ideal reflected in the Islamic texts of subordinating the irassible and appetitive side of our personality to the rational and that's where Plato discovers justice. That's why Plato says that philosophers should rule in the state and wisdom the virtue of reason should rule in in the individual. think that aspirational side of the command of justice comes out beautifully in I'll quote passage that that comes in the Mishna in Pier Avote for those who are familiar with the Mishna. It's wonderful little track date that's that's often studied on its own and worth studied on its own. it it says in what take to be comment on Justinian's effort to to treat justice in purely external as it were secular way. the opening passage in Justinian's code says that the point of justice sum is sum that everything should be to each his own. It's usually translated we we should we should give everyone what he deserves but that's understood typically in terms of exchange relations. You you you you give this in exchange for that. but but in that passage in Mishna vote an exception is raised and the point is raised that's put this way. Some people say that that justice means what's what's mine is mine and what's thine is thine. but the objection is made. That is midatom. That is the ethos of Sodom. That's what the Sodommites did. The worry about the Sodommites and what their sexual practices were is not really in the forefront there. what's in the forefront is that they thought that I've got mine and you've got yours and I'm all right, Jack. And and that's the way it goes. but the the aspiration that's held out before us is not mid but mid the the ethos of loving kindness as Miles Coverdale translated it in his 1535 English Bible. Kessid is the corresponding idea to kas. That's exactly what kartas or agape is. Agape in Greek, kartas in Latin, kessid in Hebrew. This is the ideal of generosity. God is generous to us and we can't repay that generosity, but we can pass it on and that's what we're called upon to do. So there's passage in my monities where he talks about wonderful biblical twist on the idea of justice. The word sedaka which is the Hebrew word for justice in the Bible derives from sedic which means justice. And justice in that external minor legal social sense is is obviously of concern but that's just matter of giving everyone his due. Mymanity surveys the usage of the word saddaka and he finds out that the Bible consistently uses it to mean going beyond your basic obligations. Not just paying your bills or paying the person who did work for you. Jedaka demands in your treatment of others healing all those who are broken going beyond the bare letter of the law superrogation here think Dr. Walsh brought this out. Super irrigation is actually part of your obligation. It's not something that goes on your obligation beyond your obligation. It's not something confined to your obligation. It's something that you're supposed to press beyond emulating God's grace to us. God's grace is giving us more than we could possibly deserve. God created us. God sustains us. In this respect, justice is not just among the virtues but is the basic virtue. And would say also since my was writing in Arabic, he likes to point out that the Arabic word for justice is which means balance. But this kind of balance is supposed to favor others. He says very interestingly and this goes think directly to your question. It means you're doing yourself favor. How so? My man says when you shows show moral virtue to others, generosity in particular, you are doing favor to your rational soul. Why so? explain in my commentary on my monades guide. What you're doing really is laying the groundwork, preparing the soil for the development of the rational virtues whether which are the highest virtues. You do that by perfecting the moral virtues in yourself. Can want to follow up with something but you mentioned passage from the Mishna. Can you tell me where that's found? Yes, the Mishna as you know is is is one fat volume, right? and the Mishna forms the spine of the Talmud. So the Talmud is expanded into whole shelf of volumes. and all of those volumes consist take the form of commentaries on the different track dates of the mission. But vote vote which is usually translated as the sayings of the fathers. Sayings of the fathers. The sayings of the fathers. Mishna aote is is the one where that occurs and that's the one track date of the Mishna often studied on it on its own because it's very edifying very ethical. it doesn't have any any gamorra to it. That that trackctate stands on its own. My wrote commentary. there are other famous commentaries on it and and that's the that's the passage that that you'll find that and and think if you want to know something about Judeaic ethics Mishnaote is very good place to start okay we we we're including we're including readings with the course here so may may include that would refer people both to it's often called the sayings of the fathers or the precepts of the fathers or something like that the original intention of vote was to show the continuity of the transmission of the tradition from one generation to the next. So they give sample examples of famous sayings by some of the great sages generation by generation and and and they're typically edifying ethical sayings like that one. another famous one near the beginning is don't be like servants who serve for the sake of reward. It's better to serve like servants who save not for the sake of who serve not for the sake of reward and let all your actions be for the sake of heaven. And and the glossators explain that when he says of Soho said that when he said for the sake of heaven he meant do it for its own sake. do what's right because it's right, not because you expect to be rewarded for it or to avoid punishment for not fulfilling those obligations. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. thank you. so that that actually David, you mentioned Augustine and think you were found the passage that you were Yeah. In the city of God. found the ch the the chapter that you were referring to which is chapter 21 believe in book 19. Yeah. So he said so so there's really extraordinary paragraph here which think you know this encapsulates this question that had across what what all three of you were saying here and that is I'll read it. It's it's that law. And it is when the soul serves God that it exercises right control over the body. And in the soul itself, the reason must be subject to God if it is to govern as it ought the passions and other vices. Hence, when man does not serve God, what justice can we ascribe to him? Since in this case, his soul cannot exercise just control over the body, nor his reason over his vices. And if there is no justice in such an individual, certainly there can be none in community composed of such persons. Here therefore, there is not that common acknowledgement of right which makes an assemblage of men people whose affairs we call republic. And so this is very profound point and it's actually seems to me completely and please correct me if I'm wrong but it seems it seems to be very very elited and overlooked by contemporary concepts of justice theories of justice and so on. Am right here? Is there anything like this found in No, people are going back to it. No, mean the people are going back to Abuskin's account of justice and looking think you know just that one passage when you when you when you read it out there it seems you know such blunt and bald statement that only theologically framed account of justice is adequate. one that is rooted in submission to God or in obedience to God. you know one of the other and and this goes back to your your question about you know how do how do we regard this in the modern world and have we made fundamental shift in our sort of anthropology of how we how we deal with these issues. you know just the same answer think you could make to both of those questions and that is that really and Russer think hit on it in raising this you know that there's there's something there's something special about justice that it is yes the virtue that is the overarching order of the soul like Omar mentioned that that it's it's the one virtue that includes all of the others. It's not one of the particular ones. It's everything. and so it is the total orientation of the soul towards God. but yet there's also the other side of justice that it also functions in this external way as social interaction as as as means of rendering judgment between litigants disputers in cases criminals prosecuted one thing and another. and that's that's that's you know that isn't necessarily that that doesn't necessarily address the total ordering of the soul. mean, you have to remember Augustine himself he's he's the man who essentially invented the just war which you know at what point can killing other human beings be just the the soldiers the believers in in the army came to him and said can we serve faithfully and also be Christians' not just not you know this is after after Christianity is is is tolerated and adopted by the Roman Empire. and so they don't have to take note to the emperor. but they do have to do something that seems to be contrary to God's law. Thou shalt not kill. how is it possible to be good pressed Christian and yet kill other human beings? so he has to work that out. How is it possible in sense to render justice in this partial sense and yet also be faithful to justice in the full sense? That's the that's the issue of the just war. you know, in sense, one of the problems with Augustine is that yes, he has those, you know, wonderfully, you could say, definitive statements about justice as, meaningless unless it's total total turning over the soul to God. but he also then goes on in sort of his practical application of things to find kind of medium via media via by which you know we have to figure out how we can live in world where justice in the full sense can never be realized and yet not abandon it alto together. Let me let me make footnote to that if may, Dr. Walsh. first of all, we we want to look at the Hebrew when we're talking about the Hebrew Bible. And the Ten Commandments say, "Lot, thou shalt not commit murder." It doesn't say, "Thou shalt not kill." Right. Which which might make you into Jane, you know, you'd have to be sure sure not to step on bug. Yeah. the the the interaction between that transcendent aspirational dimension of justice and the worldly realm of civil and penal law is very important because that's where and think you and agree on this. That's where the civil and penal law gets its spirit and its intention. leave that out and you you've just got bunch of people dealing with each other perhaps in an attitude of hostility rather than friendship and fellowship which is as as we all recognize Aristotle thought that filia is the is the basis of communal and social organization. I'll give one example of that where the aspirational side has huge and visible impact on the transactional side. what it says in Deuteronomy 16 and 17 we're talking about law that's centuries and centuries and centuries before the Dread Scott decision. Mhm. It was forbidden to return fugitive slave to that fugitive slave's owners. You aren't supposed to provide that person with hospitality, take him into your house. The idea is if he took the risk of running away, he must have good reason. There's presumption there. But the but the transactional side of the law is infused with with that aspirational idea that we owe one another which is katas which is agape. We we the the fugitive slave is not to be sent back. It is forbidden in biblical law is not rebinic. It's biblical forbidden to return that person to his owners. and there there are many like provisions but that's that's very good one to to get the to get the force of of the the relevance. one one comment about kavo by the way you you said couple of times that kavo was not believer and I'm sure that's true. think part of the problem we have nowadays whether it's RS or Cavo is that it's unfashionable to talk about belief or faith or reverence for God. and think one of the reasons we have to lay it at the feet of the religious traditions themselves which have been oppressive and dogmatic in way that makes it unacceptable to people to express adherence to an idea of God. So Kant will say, although he knows better, that God might demand something completely unconscionable of you. But Havl and people like him who risk their lives and their liberty in behalf of higher ideal may not be able to confess it openly, but they are in way better believers than many of the people who do profess it. They have they have tacid they have tacit acceptance and and loyalty to what Plato called the form of the good which as you rightly said is another way of talking about God. Yeah. No, agree that's you know it's not really question of whether somebody is card carrying member of of church or or believing community. I'm I'm just interested in it from the point of view of anybody who takes justice seriously eventually finds themselves taking stand on things that for all intents and purposes is something metaphysical or religious or sacred. Yes. Whether they're believer or not. That's the that's the most interesting part that even people who who who who who are not self-recognizing as believers end up implicitly embracing that that that framework. Some some may discover it some may discover it themselves in the course of that personal evolution that we undergo and and some may be inhibited about doing that. So in that's very important. That's very important not just for those individuals but for thinking about the world that we're in. In other words, we're in world that thinks it's secular but deep down is not when push not not as secular as they think they are. Not as secular as they think they are. Yes. Yeah. And and that's exactly and think that's sort of key point to remember that you know we're not at war with with the world that we're in that that world is really looking for this enlargement of horizon. now that doesn't mean that there is this is going to become religiously inspired civilization. It's not going to become medieval world or anything like that or an Islamic or Jewish world. it's it's going to be world that at best will be compelled to admit that mean Habermass said that we live in post secular age. In other words, an agent which the secular world admits that it's no longer the definitive viewpoint on things and that beyond it there is something more that it has maybe not fully fully defined not fully grasped and that's that's an invitation think to the believing community to say here it is we offer it. wanted to pick up on something that Omar Keshi said with your permission is Ismael. Sure. You spoke about the names of God which is wonderful and beautiful important facet of Islamic theology and wanted to point out parallel to you which is in Exodus 34:6 where Moses is in in in difficult strengths there because the the people have worshiped the golden calf and he wants he wants to know how he can lead the people and he asks God to show himself and God reveals certain attributes. Traditionally we say there are 13 attributes which are proclaimed in that verse Exodus 34:6. and all those attributes could be taken as names of God corresponding in some ways to the 100 most beautiful names of God that you find in Islamic tradition. very interesting there that there's tremendous emphasis among that the attributes listed there that God describes himself as merciful or compassionate which is primary epithet applied to God in the Islamic tradition and goes on to say this gracious abundant of overflowing with grace and generosity mentions justice in that case only at the end. Often God is called truth which is another Hebrew way of saying justice like in Arabic where you say truth is is synonym for charity and justice only at the end. Why? Because he wants to emphasize if Moses is going to be following modeling himself on God's example, how does God rule creation? with generosity and grace and mercy and compassion. and no, he doesn't he doesn't exonerate the guilty. That's the very last one that's mentioned. they they they will reap the consequences of their actions. But tremendous emphasis if you take if you think of those attributes as names of God. Tremendous emphasis as there is in Islam on the on the compassionate side. In in Judaism they always like to say that there are two facets of God. Midatin and the the the the aspect of judgment and the aspect of grace. and they like to picture the two in dialogue with each other. They they have fun with that in mythological sort of way. But the important thing is that we hope that God will allow the grace to predominate as they do in that epiphany of Moses. It's really amazing to to hear that and there's lot of parallels in Islamic tradition. yes, especially with the two facets. one very common way of understanding God's attributes are those attributes of God's majesty, his jal and his beauty, his jamal and all of God's names and attributes can be fall under, you know, that are ultimate expressions of his majesty or his beauty and but yeah, you know, it's really interesting even in the social political aspect of justice and how it's administered as you know like the Islamic tradition we have the Sharia or the you know the sacred law and so one of the there's many instances where the punishment for adultery for example is to be either stoned to death or other details and so there are many instances where even the prophet Muhammad would even though it's considered to be pretty harsh punishment the evidentiary bar to reach to actually carry out that punishment is fairly high. We're eyewitnesses to the overt act. Yeah. Basically hard to get hard to get. Yeah. And then at the same time when when even when that even when that that that threshold is met it's it's all it's part of the training of judges is to always look for excuses, you know, that would that would not have this punishment to be applied. And that's coming from the practice of the prophet Muhammad himself where he would ask you know there are instances where someone would came and confess to adultery and that's pretty you know it's really hard to not carry out the you know the the punishment for it in that case. Yet even there he found excuses. He went to his family is this person you know perhaps he did this. He really you know maybe he really didn't commit the act. did something else, you know, you know, is even even the sanity plead was there. He goes, you know, is is he is he fully aware of what he was doing? And all these excuses were sought before, you know, that act the punishment were to was to be carried out. which again, yes, justice even in even the social political realm, it's not an isolated or something that is carried out. stripped away from all the other virtues, right? let me let me add to that that that emphasis on protecting the accused has its foundation of course in biblical law and developed in Mishnetic law. So for example in in the Mishna it it it tells the Mishna is mainly legal code apart from the one ethical part that highlighted. in capital case the witnesses have to be admonished very severely if there's any possibility of any discrepancy. He says it was under an apple tree and the other one says it was under an almond tree. that could discredit them because they don't agree about the circumstances. you also have provision in rebbitic law that one cannot impugn oneself. That is we all know in western law that you are exempt from having to testify against yourself under the fifth amendment of the US constitution. But in Mishnake law, you are not allowed to condemn yourself. They they find biblical peg to hook that to. You are not allowed to confession is not acceptable evidence in biblical law as interpreted by the rabbis. And there are two different grounds given for that. one man in the 15th century says they may be extenduating circumstances but mymonity says back in the 12th century that person may may be despondent or have death wish the first time think that there's occurrence of the notion later accredited to Freud of death wish he may he may want to die and therefore may falsely confess if it's capital crime or crime that involves flogging. if it involves life or limb, you are not allowed to confess. you can't you can't impugn your your own innocence. that again is part of the high bar which Islamic and Jewish law share with regard to evidence in those cases where the punishment is severe and irreparable. I'll mention I'll mention the the warning that the judges are supposed to give witnesses in capital case because it's also reflected in Islamic tradition. it says in the book of Genesis that when Cain killed Abel, God says, "Your bloods cry out to me." Odd that it should use the plural there, "Your bloods." Didn't don't we normally say with mass noun like blood? Don't we normally say your blood cries out to me? What is God getting at? And the rabbis give the answer that it was not just Abel who was slain, but all of his potential descendants. From this we learn from this we learn that whoever kills single individual, it's as if he had killed an entire world. And that's picked up in the hadith as you very well know. that's that's in Sanhedrin book 10 the the book about the high court where capital choice capital cases were heard and they and they give the caution in those terms and equally severe other terms to the witnesses. You better be careful what you say because if you're going to be responsible for the death of another person, namely the accused, your your your sentence has eternal and unlimited consequence. Omar, wanted to to ask you something. so so there's saying by the by preodern Islamic scholars. the earliest found from this is from Mardi though others before him might have you know likely said it but it's the what he says in Arabic is kingdom can't endure or persist upon disbelief but it it will not endure on injustice. In other words, you know, in other words that kingdom might not be Islamic. they might not be believing in in the truth of God or you know and others you know other faiths could see that it could also see you know see that as well from their perspective but if it is injust unjust then it will eventually collapse and there's there's verse in the Quran it's surah hood verse 117 that says your your lord does not destroy town for lun and the the commentators this means actually literally oppression or injustice but in the the commentators say that this here means polytheism and that's that's not stretch because there are many place there are places in the where where vul injustice definitely means injustice so anyway mean polytheism or disbelief essentially so in other words so so to to start again he says your lord will not destroy town due to its disbelief. while its people are while its people are those who do Islam, while its people are righteous and the the commentators on this verse, found few that all said more or less the same thing. they said that what this means is that God allows God does not destroy human beings because of their disbelief. That's not his that's not you know so the people of Noah the people of Sodom you mentioned Len he doesn't destroy them for their disbelief he destroys them for their injustice to one another. Yeah. And Razi says this is because the the the rights of God are he says they are he says God God does not demand immediate retribution for his rights. He gives people leeway with his rights. But the rights of human beings he is very strict with. And when the right when human beings violate the rights of another then habitually then he will end that that then he will punish that town as result. Where's the verse? What what verse is that? So that yeah that's surah hood which is the I'm not sure which number that is but it's verse 117. so yeah but that's that's surah hood and and we you can see kort tapsiro razies those are in Arabic don't know if any of that has been translated into English I'm not I'm not aware of that know there is someone's working on translation of Razi and his transl his his his commentary on that is wonderful little treatise essentially on this exact subject can Can you elaborate on that little bit? from your from your understanding? Yeah, mean it's pretty big question, but we'll try to get to it. This when we're looking at in terms mean know the word translated for huck or hok the plural of hoku is rights. you know and think that's okay but at the same time it does conjure up for us modern it means it means duties. What's really interesting what you just said like the the the modern reader of of don't mean to distract from your point but but the modern reader of classical Islamic texts will see something like or something like that and think the rights of man but really but but and sometimes it does mean that but but it often means duty the duty of man it is upon man the the you know so it's really interesting that can mean well it means truth but it also can mean Right. And it also can mean duty. Sorry to have interrupted you. No. Yeah. No, that's that's exactly when you just translate it as rights when people just you know use it as onetoone correspondent to the English word rights it it it doesn't it obscures quite bit of meanings that are there and so well one of the basis of the idea of the meanings in the term haka is that this is what is due to somebody or some object right so that's why in general in Islamic law you have three broad categories which is the hok of Allah meaning what is due to God, right? And you know, you don't say it's right of God necessarily, although that's how many people translate it. And then what is due to human beings? And then the third category is that you have acts or you have that or you have things that are there's there's an aspect of it which God has right or something is due to God over and then there's an aspect of the of an act where there's human beings. There's that which is due to human beings. So when we're looking at this concept that you know you've talked about here which is that you know political the idea is mean there's different ways and words that are used but the idea in Arabic the word mul is used which is referring to basically political rule right it doesn't you know and so meaning that there are times where and it is based on this verse in surahud you know verse 117 and we're saying that you know that God will not destroy you know here it's village forum the word uses oppression while the people of it of this village are rectifying themselves so ini's gloss and some other people's glosses they they would say the word shik here is is is the word zulum is to be glossed as shik. So yeah, which is which is way of you know which is theological belief of associating others with God. So God won't destroy group of people for associating others with God which is one one of the is the worst sin you know to do. while the people of the of this particular social polity are are muslihon are people who are rectifying things amongst themselves and the way they explain this is understanding that kufur or shik is it is an is it is an act of oppression according to the Quran because you're again it has to do with this idea of not putting things in their proper place so associating others with god doing polytheistic acts and committing polytheism. you are not you are by worshiping other beings than God, you are directing your worship not to its proper place which is towards God and you're directing it to other beings. So that's why it's considered an act of injustice or an act of oppression. Now those those so those things that are those acts that are due you know to God or the hakuk of Allah God will not necessarily take those to account in this world and he can even and he will pardon most of them if forgiveness is sought in the hereafter in Islamic law it's the rights of human beings that they have towards each other and in their dealings with each other that God will not forgive those unless the human being and forgives the other human being who's acted in in manner of who's transgressed you know on their rights. So here the understanding of this saying that you quoted from Mworthy and and and and haven't seen any scholars theologians who've not accepted this stating this statement about particular political yeah particular government and political structure remaining while even though they're polytheistic as long as they are treating each other justly in this in in the partial sense of justice right in the social political sense of justice. this is how this is to be understood. not that their sins of polytheism will be pardoned if they don't ask for forgiveness and repent. But those it's referring to this earthly existence, right? Our existence in this realm in the hereafter. Then God can take them to account for their polytheism or he can choose to forgive them. That's that's really up to the will of God and what he wants to do with with those individuals. But in in in this earthly realm the according to this verse and this statement that that's been said this adage that it's referring to the social political conception the partial sense of justice. So as long as that's being maintained here then that particular political structure will continue to exist. have question for you Omar. Yeah. you referred to polytheism chur or or even kifer as acts acts rather than matters of belief. are they construed as actions in fick are is is polytheism matter of act or or or is it matter of belief or or where's the line drawn there? Yeah, that's great question. mean it so it will be considered an act of the heart and and you know so it's an act of the heart. however in in Islamic law as you know Islamic law doesn't deal with the heart right it it doesn't deal with intentions it deals with it deals with observable acts right that's why ask yeah so so here you know it it would be if if someone actually utters statement of polytheism or if somebody like for example bows down and worships and prostrates to an idol it's that act that will be considered gotcha. And under that, not not the not the actual belief that they hold in their heart. would also add that the that the person who is offended against has to forgive you. that's that's again talmudic as you probably know. in the day of atonement, one can seek atonement for one's sins before God. But but one can't seek atonement from God for one sins against one's fellow human beings. Yeah. Which which also includes sins against God. But but God won't won't won't go for that unless you have sought forgiveness from the person you offended. Exactly. That's that's the same principle in the Sharia. And that's why, you know, from like, you know, in in believer's life, they actually take their social dealings with and and and engage and enter into social contracts and social dealings with great caution and and and and high deal of scrupulousness. And they want to make sure, you know, that actual like if owe you $51, I'm going to give you that one cent as well. and and and so they're very careful in those type of dealings because they don't want to fall short, right, and commit acts of injustice to their fellow human beings or animals or other life as well. By by the same token, when the day of atonement is approaching in their 10 days of repentance between the Hebrew New Year and and the day of atonement, you'll often see pious Jews approaching friends, acquaintances, and so forth. and if I've done anything to offend you this year, apologize. and and it's it's another way of cementing that fellowship which is the basis of community but but there's moral issue behind it. the spiritual does not preempt the moral. Yeah, that's very common Muslim practice too of just asking people just forgive me if I've done anything wrong to you. Right. Right. And in in Bosnia at janazas or funerals, it's and don't know if they do this in other places, but in what they do is when they're they're burying the person, they the imam turns around and says to the crowd that is there are we going to forgive him? And everyone all at once says mo yes we will you know are we so so in other words you're you know he doesn't go into the ground until everyone has cleared their clear the slate cleared yes and cleared their hearts of of any kind of thing that they're holding against him of that he might have done wrong and to them you and it's there's saying by know tamia said it and of course I'm sure others said it long before him that justice is the equilibrium of creation of the whole universe so it it's it's it's there's this sense that justice is resetting the equilibrium of of the universe to do justice is that and so justice is fascinating because it's something that that proceeds from the soul but also also has something to do with the the the nature of creation itself the nature of existence and we you know to the extent that even it's there's hadith that the prophet said that on the day of judgment even an animal that animals don't have souls. We we don't we don't in Islamic theology, but Yeah. But but but goat that that gourded another goat on on on the day of judgment, they will be resurrected and the goat that was unjustly gored will will come back and gore the other goat or at least he'll there will actually can't remember exactly what happens, but there'll be some sort of some sort of settling of accounts. Yeah. even among animals and then they will again be turned to dust because they didn't have an interesting interesting highlight when you talk about the world being based on justice which is of course the the once again you can see the precedence given to kartas agape because in the psalms psalm 89:3 it says the world is built on you start of course of course there's got to be balance for for nature to sustain itself but but why should nature exist at all beyond that aratilian idea of of of balance which gives stability to the world you have which gives existence to the world the world I'll say that line again Psalm 89:3 the world is built on beautiful okay yeah that's beautiful yeah and that's just quick question you mentioned about animal souls. What's what is the Jewish position on souls and animals? And there are two Jewish positions as you might expect. There's always there's always more than one. You know that the story about the the the Jew who was on desert island and somebody found him and he had two synagogues there. The one he worshiped in and the one he wouldn't be caught dead in. But but the sajaka who was the first systematic Jewish philosopher died in 942 lived in Baghdad. great great rebbitic scholar lexographer liturgist exog translator of much of the Bible to Arabic. Saja was very much influenced by the mutaza. So he thought that animals have recompense coming. If they have been eaten or sacrificed or in some other way died in innocence it's going to God God in his compassion is going to have to make it up to them. Mymonities who is more systematic and and more arisatilian thinker neoplatonic as well as arisetilian my monities rejects that idea. He's he's too courteous to mention Saja by name. He owes lot to Saja for opening that ground of Jewish philosophy for him. But but he he says well that's mortaz idea that some of us have picked up and he says that emanation is only to the rational soul of human beings. That's the only place where there's providence and that's the only place where there's immortality. animals like like people in general who have been too attached to the body. They don't they don't they don't have an afterlife. they they go down. There's sort of platonic rationing re reasoning there. so would say if you're talking about normative Judaism, mymonities would be the gold standard there. however kazidic sects very influenced by kabala they they actually have doctrine of transmigration tanas. wow. So there are there are human souls which go through different lives that are reborn in different bodies including animal bodies. but but that is not what you would call normative Judaism. That's that's mystical extreme. Well, I'd like to we've been going for about 45 minutes now. want to ask David if you've got any if you'd like to have the last word and it's clearly we could go for another couple hours at least on this fascinating topic. Given that justice is the basis of the entire creation and existence, it's all there's lot to talk about when we talk about justice. But David anything? Yeah, sure. well you know it's all it was impressive at the conference and it's impressive in this discussion too that the three traditions you know have remarkable convergence especially when we have representatives who have rather like-minded approach to things. and so that's that's obviously welcome and heartwarming and all of that gratifying. would just as sort of final note however just simply emphasize that we've been you know we we've been and think all three of us have sort of recognized that justice is peculiarly complex virtue. It's in on the one hand kind of key to all of the virtues and it is an underpinning one that opens the soul towards the transcendent. it's the source of all the virtues in some sense, the right order in relation to God and to one another. it's cosmic. It's all of those things. and so it's it's it's very it's very easy for us to agree on that. but would emphasize that we have to always also keep in mind that this other notion of justice as somehow partial legal what we can apply what we can do in this life. would wouldn't say that that's the best we can do in terms of our relationships to one another. but it's the indispensable and it's very important to to to avoid any any sense that well if we don't have justice in this complete you could say transcendent sense we've got nothing. no partial justice is itself legal justice is itself the first step in on on this road. and without without willingness to take that first step, without that willingness to recognize that indeed what happens in courts of law is are not simply you could say passing moments. One of my favorite episodes is in in movie called Snow Falling on Cedars where Max Vonce is the is the defense attorney and this Japanese American is wrongly accused of murdering another guy and and everybody's prejudiced against him and he stands up he's really old old actor at this point and he stands up and he says you know people think that this is small case in small town with no significance for anything. but I'm here to tell you that as get older and the closer get to death, see things in light of eternity and that there are moments like this when the whole world and the whole system is put on trial. So even small cases, small issues, small occasions are the moments in which that big question of where justice lies comes under scrutiny and judgment and examination and we all become responsible for for the part we play in it. that's all said as beautifully said. Thank you so much. want to thank each of you for your generosity and and in in your time and in sharing your insights and your wisdom and hope we can meet in person one day and thank you. Thank you so much. God bless you. Thanks for thanks for all your good work. Thank you. Wonderful conversation. Very good to hear. Thank you. Thank you all. Smile.