النص الكامل للفيديو
MICHAEL SELLS: Hello, everybody. It's my pleasure to open this event. My name is Michael Sells, and teach in the Divinity School and Comparative Literature. And to say few words about program under the auspices of which this event is happening. This is the fifth year of six years of known support, or what we call the Mellon Islamic Studies Initiative, which brings {} of scholars from around the world to campus to teach and to offer lectures. I'd like to mention in that regard and give special thanks to Deans Margaret Mitchell and Rick Rosengarten of the Divinity School, who were so essential in developing the proposal and getting the grant going. And also to our steering committee, which has had an involvement from number of departments across campus. In particular, to our coordinator this year and the past couple years, Norah {} who's out standing there, guess running the camera today. And to Bill Geraci, who has done so much work for us in setting up audio-visual. And, of course this year to the Department of South Asian languages and civilizations, which are hosting our speaker. This interesting has been punctuating by life today. And some day, perhaps will get the true speaker for what it is. But having said that, I'm now happy to turn over the floor to Professor who will introduce our speaker. Professor SPEAKER 2: Thank you. feel honored, having been asked to introduce my personal friend, Francis Robinson. first met Professor Robinson in the 1980, at the Institute of Historical Research, London University. Since then, we have been friends. have benefitted enourmously from his wonderfully scholarship of South Asian history and Islam. But of Mr. Robinson at the moment, at present he is Professor of South Asian History at Royal Holloway College, University of London. Over the last four decades, he has published enormously. Fourteen books, eight authored, four edited, and about 100 articles, in journals, edited ones, and encyclopedias. Most of these writings have been on issues pertaining to the culture and politics of Muslims in South Asia. Their interaction with larger part of Islam. And the ways they, and also the part of Islam met with the challenges of western modernity. As the leading scholar of the field, and as dedicated teacher, and generous mentor, he has influenced and inspired generation of scholars. As chair, dean, director, president, vice president, and key member of several high academic institutions in England, he initiated and enabled the bringing of variety of new areas of research on Islam and South Asia. Then in the last 25 years, that he has been associated with the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain, he has reorganized the Society's prestigious journal. Arranged and supervised the promulgation of large number of notable books on Islam, Asia, and Africa. And has also been driving force behind making available, in print, several volumes of pre- Ottoman historic manage of course, some of his obligation. His first book, "Separatism Among Indian Muslims," published in 1974, still continues to be an important entry point for anybody to understand that Asians, while being Muslims, under British rule, organized for equalities as separate community. Why they insisted on their separate identity which led eventually to the formation of Pakistan. And also to many other troubles and problems which beset the south continent even today. He has another book on and Islamic culture in South Asia-- focuses on numerous unexplored avenues of the developments of the second great culture of the Islamic world, namely, the Islamic culture in South Asia. The book illustrates how this culture rested on language, and on the rationalist traditions of Islamic scholarship and on formal and mystical learning together with the systems of transmission with the scholars we know and savings consolidated in India in the 18th century. Professor Robinson goes in his book, far beyond And The most is how, by using family records and private papers of the religious and priestly family we can address the big question of social of South Asia and Islam in modern times. In another book, Islam and Muslim History in South Asia, he highlights the dynamism and the complexity of the relationship between Islamic law and practice. The implications of conversion and secular and the impact of South Asian Islam. While he recently published on Islam, South Asia, and the rest, he focuses on the background to the interactions of Islam, South Asia, and the West, the shape that the British power and the Muslim revivalism gave to the modern Muslim world and the great shift from other-worldly to this-worldly piety amongst Muslim, the energy that this has been in the Muslim Revival. number of Professor Robinson's books also give us refreshing, deep critical synthesis of comparative history of and intellectual developments over nearly the whole of the Muslim world. Notably in this category is an atlas of the Islamic world since 1500. Written as an outstanding book it deals the transmission of Islamic culture from generation to generation and from estate to estate over the last 500 years. Among the other titles in this category, should mention The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World, The Mughal Emperors and the Islamic Dynasty of India, Iran, and Central Asia. And all this in volume five of the new History of Islam, where they have brought team of notable scholars to explore the Muslim response to the challenge of Western domination across the last 200 years. Professor Robinson of offers also substantial guidance for further history of Islam and Indo-Muslim culture, which amongst his colleagues and friends are-- his four forthcoming volumes, four other forthcoming volumes, including comprehensive biography of the last scholar and saint, And numerous are his promise to push history further. Professor Robinson speaks today on the building of Islamic societies from since 1800. Please join me extending warm welcome to him. FRANCIS ROBINSON: Thank you, Professor for that too-generous introduction. For 1,000 years, and as once put it, Islam walked hand in hand with power. They the structure of Islamic society, madrasas, the administrations of the law, the activities that pulled them up, were for the most part supported by Muslim political power. Some of those institutions played an important part in popularizing Islam, for instance, Sufis, shrines to Sufi saints-- at times, strove to distance itself from the wielders of political power. On the other hand, the powerful usually sought to patronize the Sufis, and sometimes the Sufis were happy to be patronized. For 1,000 years and more, those in power in the Islamic infrastructure of Muslim society were This all changed with the and influence to Key members of this process were the of Egypt in 1798 and of the last major Muslim power in India, during the in 1799. Now, the European The British would power in India by 1818 and had conquered all of it by the mid-19th century. At the same time, British and Dutch completed their conquests in Malaya and Indonesia. In 30 years before World Word the British, French, Germans, Italians divided most of Africa between them. During World War the British and French divided And at the same time, the Russians completed their conquest of the Caucasus and of central Asia. By 1920 in what remained of the Muslim ruled world, the Iranians had been subject to humiliating treaty by the British. And the remnant of the Ottoman army was fighting for itself in as the world power started to disintegrate. The only lands proved Western power were Afghanistan, North Yemen, and what is now Saudi Arabia. Western power led an assault on the Islamic infrastructure that was in society. In British power meant an end to government support to Islamic education. The British still good revenue being used to support learning, which, after their utilitarian fashion, they considered worthless. So the state of Bengal and North India, there resumed which sometimes that supported Islamic learning. By the same token, they no longer found room in their bureaucracy for men of Islamic learning. The training of an army, Muslim married man was no longer the route to government service. From now on, Muslims had to acquire Western and pass British exams if they were to rule. On occasion, the British also removed the British to which supported Sufi land of the Sufis and sin. And there were Punjab on which their power might rest. At the same time, the British imposed English law in the public sphere, narrowing down the sphere of Islamic law to the personal law, that involving marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Even this became increasing Anglicized, As as the advice of Islamic legal experts in the form of was removed from court proceedings. And second, the law itself became increasingly divorced from its Islamic starting point, as the application of common law principles of justice, equity, and good conscience were applied South Asian Muslims came to live with an increasing list from the sources of their relation, which should inform the Islamic society. In the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently through Ottoman Turkey, there was similar The process of 19th century as the Ottomans, heavily influenced by the Code Napoleon reconstructed ostensibly making all citizens, Muslim and non-Muslim, equal before the law. The process was continued with vengeance in the 1920s Turkish republic. The abolition of the caliphate in 1954 was followed by the abolition of the shaykh of Islam, the Islamic of chief justice. The abolition of British hierarchy, replacement of sharia law by European legal codes, which brought an end to polygamy, Islamic divorce, and the introduction of civic language. The madrasas were closed, which meant the end of education and the formal knowledge of Islam. This which meant the end of training in the spiritual understanding of Islam. Governments were controlling all the religious In the same way, they took control of over 70,000 mosques. Individuals were pressed into Western dress as opposed to more modest Islamic clothes. They were told to abandon the Islamic canon in favor of the Western one. They were literally instructed by Ataturk to give up their personal Islamic script in favor of the Roman script. The fabric of an Islamic society built up over hundreds of years was reduced to tatters. British South Asia and in Turkey was replicated in most other Muslim societies, in Indonesia on the Dutch, in the Caucasus in central Asia under Russia, Soviet Union, in Iran under the and in the European rule of North Africa. There's one Muslim exception. And that is Northern Nigeria. Here, the British as always, short of resources, rested their rule under Hausa chiefs of this Islamic society In consequence, sharia law was sustained by the as well as the Leaving Northern Nigeria to one side, the completeness of the change brought about by the presence of the West, it's overwhelmingly the way in which many of the structures on which an Islamic society might depend have been run down, as summarized by the poet Akbar Illahabadi. Writing in India in the late 19th century, he says, "They hold the throne in their hand. The whole realm is in their hand. The country, the apportioning of man's livelihood is in their hand. The springs of hope and fear are in their hand. In their hand, is the power to decide who should be humbled and who exulted. Our people is in their hand. Education is in their hand. If the West continues to be what it is and the East what it is, we shall see the day when the whole world is in their hand." And then he makes the point, rather more poetically that, "the minstrel, and music, and melody have all changed. with this change. The tale we need to hear is longer told. Spring comes with new adornments. The nightingales in the garden sing different song. Nature's every effect has undergone revolution. Another kind of rain falls from the sky. Another kind of bread grows in the field." What want to do is to examine Muslim responses to this shattering change. In particular, want to examine their responses to the degrading or the infrastructure of Islamic society. We should note that these responses were recalled, for the most part, by the great movement of revival and reform the Muslim world, which began to gather way in the 16th and 17th centuries and spread to in the 18th and 19th. It had basis in the ideals of and Damascus, School of in Medina, and subsequently, in the ideas of It also had bases in the thinking of in South Asia and his spiritual successors, not least amongst them, Prime features of this movement were an emphasis on direct often circumventing the an assault on Sufi practices, in particular those that suggest that Sufi saints might intercede to the hand of God, and an attack on concept of the unity of being. These ideas spread through the Muslim world along connections of Recently Indonesian scholar, has traced these connections in detail as they reach from West Asia to North and West Africa and also as they moved to Central South and Southeast Asia to China. like to think of these connections as the arteries and veins of the Muslim world along which the life giving pulse of Islamic knowledge traveled. What shall we by looking at the Muslim responses in South Asia.? There are good reasons for this. South Asian Muslims had arguably the largest and deepest interactions with the West. Because of this, they were particularly productive in generating new ideas and new organizations to sustain them. Representing 1/3 of the Muslim people to the world, they have been most effective transmitters of these new ideas and organizations to the world beyond South Asia. At the center of South Asian Muslim responses was one being called the emergence of or Protestant Islam. formal desire which might be able to stand be called At the heart of this process, were the and Madrasa some 90 miles Northeast of in 1867. They were assisted by other groups who performed the who took more extreme positions than the and were less They had And they had the Quran These reformers developed new emphasis in piety. The legals were encouraged to beh directly to scripture, which was translated in and other Indian languages. At the same time, any idea of descension, man with God to or through angels or the Imams was rejected after that. Muslims in this tradition were reminded of the horrors that they had gone through. his jewels of paradise, women, the prescriptions of which applied equally for men. Such were required to reflect every day on whether they'd done enough to to meet his high standards. The reformist God was certainly compassionate and merciful as he would always be. But he was also feared. Fear god was the very first practice sentence that women as they were learning to read. Such Muslims were always on whether they had done enough to be saved. Under this newly fashioned piety, there grew heightened sense of personal responsibility towards living good Muslim life. And in the process, healthy in Islamic society. So the absence of Muslim political power meant individual Muslim conscience was being shaped into the foundation of which an Islamic society progressed. This process also came to fashion an act of Islam in which Muslims knew that had to act on Earth in the light of God's guidance if they were to be saved. The reformers not only new form of piety, they also fashioned new ways supporting it and of transmitting it. At the center of this process was madrasa. They depended entirely on subscriptions of the people. It rejected all subsidies from government. The were now rooted as never before in society. They founded new madrasas in their tradition. By 1900, there were 30. community in the form of opinions on Muslims were encouraged to write from all over South Asia with their questions. office would send out answers through the postal service. set to work, set to the work of translating the Quran and books transferred in Islamic tradition into and other languages. They read books which reinforced their reformist understandings, biographies, collected poems, pamphlets on contested issues as well as comprehensive to reports South Asian Muslims had avoided until the 19th century. And now, everything was published lockstep to reach the widest possible market at the cheapest possible price. printing presses and booksellers. So, too, was the Where? As shows, Islamic publishing was big business. These stood up for their faith, engaging in debates with Christian missionaries and Hindu revivalists. Moreover, as they spread into the casbahs and local communities in South Asia, they proved their reforms and illustrated what it meant by the way in which they themselves behaved. At this point, we should note that although the tide was with them, the reformists were not merely producers of religious leadership as of Western dominance. There were little the followers of They believed in and followed many other practices, which Theirs was religious practice which embraced the deeply entrenched Sufi of the South Asian world. They, too, began to found madrasas and produce literature and So, too, did the totally new saint, the who emerged from cauldron of economic change and religious competition in the late19th century Punjab. saying that he was the Messiah of Christian and Muslim traditions as well as being an avatar of Christian Apart from this, his beliefs were not very different from those of the reformists, except that he This may seem anathema to most Muslims. But he gained far more for their initial work and still are. introduced to the early attempts of South Asian Muslims, to rebuild their society through the work of madrasas, as you're reaching out directly to Let me now demonstrate what happened to this initiative as the 20th century Once the numbers of the madrasas exploded. During the first part of the 20th century, their number would be less than 1,000. By the end of the century, there were 80,000, perhaps many more. Accurate numbers are hard to establish. Sometimes madrasas resisted registration or primary schools to be registered, which would not produce fully Nevertheless, although we cannot be precise about the number, we can be sure that they had vastly increased and well out of proportion to the increase in population. Let us consider this process in slightly greater detail. In Pakistan and there were abo 189 madrasas. By 2002, there were at least 10,000 of which 7,000 were and 1,600 were The reasons for their growth were madrasas, not just education, but all their sons The state would spend three times over the education allowed satisfactory public education funding for the madrasas, an enabling environment under the Islam regime of General were used to make both Pakistan and the Western madrasa and their human materials to resist the invasion of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the growing men they had from the 1980s as pools of supporters for those engaged in Pakistan's increasingly sectarian politics Many were the forces driving the growth of madrasas. But before we leave Pakistan, we should note one particular That is the work of the madrasas in creating Sunni infrastructure in Eastern Iran. and Paris has recently demonstrated in Karachi, in Iran, and Through here, with the support of both and revolutionary regime, they spread their madrasas through the region and into and Central Asia. Under Khomeini, they were given permission to run their own sharia courts. It would appear the central government in Tehran preferred to deal with law-abiding Sunni as regional representatives rather than with their fractious The outcome was the further spread of the infrastructure of Sunni Islamic society. In Bangladesh, madrasas have always been part of the There are two main types, the madrasas, which are self-funded and teach secular subjects alongside the Quran and and the madrasas, And therefore, primary and focusing on religious curriculum. Between 1972 and 2002, the earlier madrasas grew to well over 8,000. And the madrasas from 1,500 to maybe 12,000. Amongst the recent were failure of the state, as in Pakistan, to provide education at the lowest levels of society, the enabling atmosphere created by the regime of General as he sought legitimacy after the remittances of Bangladesh's migrant workers as they sought escapability in their village by supporting religious education, and the work of large numbers of Islamic engineers. As in Pakistan, some madrasas and their organizations became caught up with politics. Some, for instance, on the borders of became involved in In England, it would appear that the number of madrasas had risen from few hundred to over 40,000 with the beginning of this century. In explaining this, we need to remember the poverty of Indian Muslims, who are for the most part an oppressed minority. As in Pakistan and Bangladesh, madrasas may There said to be 30 million school aged children not in school. But the Muslims by preserving and Muslim manners as they teach successful madrasas subjects, they also preserve identity. Indian although right-wing Hindi politicians have not been served madrasas One of the elements of an Islamic society, which the madrasa world in India has supported, is the Imarat Shariah organization of the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, and Orissa. Founded in 1921, in the of the corporation it established the separate structure outside the state to administer Islamic law. This survived The organization arbitrates between litigants as traditional party might have done. power to enforce social pressure to enforce it. It is organization, which so far So the number of madrasas in South Asia has grown substantially. In principle, this has meant significant increase in those able to support the infrastructure of Islamic society. How much weight we should give to this is difficult to say. The numbers of madrasas maybe give an indication of the possible number of madrasa students, which might then have run 100 per institution to over 3,000 or more. Equally, we don't know how many students persist to the end of their course and emerge as fully fledged Nevertheless, we can be sure that the numbers of those able to play part is the as sustaining Islamic society have increased substantially. This said, the foundation of madrasas and the education of increasing numbers of alderman were not the only of building an Islamic society in There were also movements designed to fashion correct behavior piety in society One of these was the or which focused on reforming the individual and by this means, society at large. It was founded in 1927 by Mohammad He wished to rescue Muslims who recently converted to Hinduism. Under this, there grew vigorous Muslim missionary movement to Muslims at large. The basic was to call Muslims to improve their Islamic standing. While paid their own expenses, they formed themselves in groups of 10 They then went into specific area. And by what they preached, how they dressed, and how they behaved, called their fellow Muslims to Islam. All was modeled on the example of the Prophet Mohammad. Now, agreed to get day of the week, weekend every month, for 40 days year to the cause of preaching. And though no one can be sure, membership records do not exist. The most widely Islam with 100 to 150 It's which is said to be sources of great blessings to those who have done them attract vast numbers, over 1 million at Calcutta In India and 1.5 million at in Pakistan, and over 3 million at in Bangladesh. support from all classes, from Pakistan, for instance, from leading generals and politicians, down to humble apprentices. There are other Islamic movements, for instance, the founded by journalist and Islamic thinker This organization was fashioned an elite vanguard of the pure to transform Islamic society within it. Its branches in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh have relatively few members. Prospective members have to pass rigorous tests to belong. But it does have millions of particularly amongst the university educated. And the missionary technically served an approach towards women's activism now embraces their support. It runs women's organizations, women's unions, with Islamic messages. Its prime concern is to use the power of the state to press forward its Islamic It recognizes that women than men. Yet another movement is, ], which has made considerable purchase amongst the middle and upper class women in Pakistan. an Arabic scholar, who comes out if background is not popular with the They do not like woman taking the lead in religious teaching. They're also unhappy about the privileged backgrounds of the other how South Asia under the and under the independent regime that followed, Muslims, for the most part without political power have taken control of the business of fashioning an Islamic society. Direct knowledge of scripture working together with the individual was Tens of thousands of madrasas funded by popular subscription have helped to supply the infrastructure. Hundreds of thousands of students who of learning poured out of these schools to act as particularly for the learned in society. has made vast numbers of Islamic works available in vernacular languages and cheap form. The word of preaching has been carried forward with great vigor by ordinary men and are increasing by women. These developments, of course, have made In some cases, madrasas have made supporters and indeed, Islamic miltants. The has chief positions of influence and occasionally been member of governing coalitions in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Islamic vocabulary has increasingly become part of the political discourse. Political scientists will likely point out that there are many factors, both political and geopolitical behind the Islamization of the politics and Pakistan and Bangladesh since the 1970s. But have no doubt that part of the explanation lies in the construction of Islamic society's The same processes will be at work in India. But the situation of Muslims as relatively small and oppressed minority has meant that their expression Let us now turn to Turkey. You'll recall that under Ataturk, much of the infrastructure of Islam was in society. Yet, as in South Asia, Turkey remarkable rebuildng of its Islamic structure In this case, process nothing It was the work of Sunnis who survived Ataturk and the private piety of millions of individuals. As it happened, the initial spark of this process came from South Asia. The most important Sufi order, in terms of building an Islamic society in the 20th century, has been the In the early 17th century, the in India had experienced an important renewal under of India who have mentioned briefly earlier. His specific arguments were to religious of the modern emperors, They were contained in his his collected models and Specifically, they supported his release of God against various supporters of He was given the title Mujaddid or of the second millennium of Islam. The is known as the mujaddid. In the early 19th century, tradition inspired first to come to India and then to his own formation of the nationality This is from the renewal of Islam and resistance to Western economic political penetration. It had courses and the Crimea, and Istanbul. In the order, Syrians remained central All the manifestations of 20th century Turkey flowed from the Turgut Ozal, Prime Minister who liberalized the Turkish economy in the 1980s was And Let me introduce you to three offshoots of which have been building Turkish The first is the Sulaymaniyya, the followers of Sheikh Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan, who died in 1959. With 4 million followers, they represent the second largest Islamic group in Turkey. Their prime concern was traditional Ottoman Islamic society against both materialism and those who wished to unite to political power In there would need to be the text, in particular in order to build an inner resistance to secular development. At the same time, although harassed by the authorities, they trained men to be imams and preachers. From the mid-20th century, they increasingly operated more They worked with the democrat government in the 1950s in establishing Imam Hatip schools, now half funded by the state to train prayer leaders and preachers. From the 1980s, they focused on particularly on youth, to writing scholarships for university students. And the largest and best equipped student Their main supporters came from the growing and increasingly wealthy Turkish middle class. Power, by the industrialization of from the 1960s and by the liberalization of the Turkish economy from the 1980s. The most powerful, of course, in building Turkey's Islamic society has been the Nursia, the followers of Said Badiuzzeman Nursi, who died in 1960. In South East and Turkey. brilliant young man, he tried unsuccessfully to dissuade the Ottomans money to support foundation of the university teaching both modern science and Islam. He was also supporter of the young Turk revolution. He had an excellent record in World War fighting the Russians and Eastern Anatolia, and was strong supporter of the subsequent Turkish liberation strike. But in 1923, he separated from the regime when he heard Ataturk's was to separate the modern Turkish state in society from the Islam heritage. He went through major spiritual crisis. Assisted by reading among other works, he came to realize that man could only serve one He left the regime in Ankara and returned to for life of contemplation, writing, and spiritual leadership. He now understood that the rejuvenation of Islamic society in Turkey must be carried out at the level of the individual. He aimed to fashion new Turkish Islamic settlement, which would be reflective and which would be able to resist the destructive power of nationalism and materialism. So just as Muslims in India wanted to fashion an individual conscience as the basis of an Islamic society under British rule, so the Nursi did the same in Turkish society He was to return and frequently imprisoned. His means of transmitting his ideas was his his commentary on the Quran. As people were permitted to read his writings, they could not be printed. He said they were copied by hand and delivered through much of Turkish society. It's said that as many as 600,000 copies of Come the 1960s, Nursi's followers would come together in special apartment in which they would read out loud passages from writings and discuss them. The readings have involved the continuous process of interpretation in relation to The late would to which of their was best. Particularly, they might include small businessmen, lawyers, teachers, and students. Discussion would normally be led by layman. Government paid religious functionaries were not taken seriously. In this environment, Businessman might do business. But the shared Islamic world and heightened community conscience. In regards to the business of court, it's not surprising from the 1980s jurors consistently defended liberalizing policies and the withdrawal of the state from the education and economic spheres. By the early 21st century, the Nurcus had 5 million followers and 5,500 They had the largest number of educated supporters in Turkey and also the strongest support among To add to this, they developed major positions in publishing and in the which in fact is branch of the Nurcu movement, is that of Fethullah Gulen, known as the community of Fethullah Gulen. It's said to be the most influential Muslim movement in Turkey. Comes from Russia Gulen grew up regarding Islam and the state as prepared to listen to his word. The son of religious functionary, he went to work with the director of religious affairs. By the mid-1960s, he developed his vision for enabling Islam to work as in Turkish society. To put this into practice, he aimed not to create new class of but new class of intellectuals rooted in the Turkish Islamic tradition, but also able to engage with European enlightened thought. These intellectuals, moreover, were not to be the Islamic self-passionates of Muslim, but Muslims of action, Muslims who would realize their faith by action in the world. With this constant theme action, which he the mobilizing concept and protecting good work and seeking God's appreciation Like the Suleymaniyyas and Nurcus, supporters came from the increasingly large and wealthy Turkish middle class. Alongside the businessman and teachers, there were growing numbers of Germans, from the of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, who saw value in the fact that was both nationalist Muslim but had no desire to make Islam Ozal's liberalizing of the Turkish system enabled Gulen's move into the media, his establishment of the national newspaper, Zaman, and the national television channel, Zaman He also to establish business associations, and most of all, education institutions. Education was at the heart of his mission. This is the way an activist Islamic party was to be established. As it's not possible to teach religion outside the school, Gulen taught Islam His education network supports 6,000 teachers, 200 high schools, about 80 university schools, and seven universities in Turkey and Turkish Central Asia. English is the primary language in the classroom. And his students are notably successful in getting into university. These formal institutions are supported by widespread informal networks of The college students provide religious education and education and social support to their peers. Such has been Gulen's success that governments have become concerned about the size of these organizations within the state. The consequence, even though he defended the military crackdown after the coup of 1997. The military regime was against it. And he was forced into exile in this country. In 2015, Erdogan, who was in the party, Gulen had supported throughout the 21st century, decided that Gulen's followers had too strong position and began the witch hunt against them. Last weekend, Erdogan closed Gulen National So the Turks have built major Islamic presence in civil society in spite of that and in spite of the regimes which succeed. It is presence which has nothing to do with the administration of which was abolished by But it does have something to do with Islamic The numbers being trained in Imam Hatip schools rose from 220,000 in 1983 to over 500,000 in 1997. On the other hand, it is presence that has altered with the internalization of Islamic by all participants and their expression in measure of in society is the way in which Erdogan's Islamically rooted Justice and Development Party as been able since 2002 to keep the in the army on the margins Another though slightly is the way in which Erdogan was able to offer the states during their spring the model as secular state ruled by an Islamic rooted party. As indicated in the beginning of this lecture, the processes we see taking place in South Asia and Turkey can also be seen at work elsewhere in the Muslim world. While they're always subject to the pressures of local political Indonesia and Dutch rule, similar to the madrasas and Islamic organization for that in South Asia. From 1912, they developed the an organization stimulated by the general process of Islamic reform and expressing an Islamic piety, very simple Now it supports nearly 6,000 schools and has 29 million members. In opposition to the second group, the was founded in 1926. Its views are very close to Now, operating on outside the framework of the state, it claims to have nearly 7,000 schools, to own 44 universities, and to have 50 million members. In the 1980s, as General began to be militarized into new forms of dictatorship, he began to court the huge Islamic presence in Indonesia's civil society. He promoted Islamic supported the development of coded Islamic law, and lifting the ban on in schools and government offices. He even went on changing his name to beginning of his reign, felt able to be sensitivities, the sheer presence of Islam in civic society meant that as time went on, he had to pay it increasing attention. Egypt offers another example of Islamization Here, for government employees but from Muslim in the context of his rule in 1928, Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood to instill the Quran and the as the sole reference point of altering the life of the Muslim community, and state. His aim was to drop Western influence immediately. This has been the aim of the Brotherhood, influenced by the ideas of South Asia's from the 1950s down to present. Primarily funded by ties from his member to its work in supporting pro-Egyptians, it won widespread support from his students and middle classes as well as the wo class. Measures of his support Egypt's referendum in 1981, which voted to make the sharia the sole source of law, and the elections of the Arab Spring, we saw the Muslim Brotherhood's political doing, in party in the Egyptian parliament. And election of the unfortunate Mohamed Morsi, Egypt's president in 1912-- sorry, 2012. As we know, the Egyptian military have overturned these results. From what they say about how Egyptians have built their Islamic society from below remains unchanged. The capacity to develop and build an Islamic society today over the past 200 years have meant that Islam has been particularly well-equipped to establish itself in new regions where the state is either neutral or hostile. Most of the organizations covered in this lecture have spread Islamic communities into Europe and North America. In Europe, where there are in 2014, roughly 44 million Muslims, the Muslims are all the South Asian organizations are significantly present. In North America, particular prize, to be the first American Muslim community and building in Detroit the first mosque in the United States. So this community has been active in establishing charter schools. Not any, to my knowledge, has taken from the state. taken hand. Saddam Hussein supplied mosque in Birmingham, England, and the Saudis schools. I've tried to give you picture of how, over the past 200 years, Muslim societies without political power have built these societies Of course, Muslims have always contributed to the Islamic infrastructure of their society. But the loss of power made it crucial that they did so. The achievement in the past few centuries has often involved turning inwards to fashion and to develop the individual conscience as the basis of Muslim society. Moreover, as time has gone on, there's been the requirement that the should be an activist. The achievement has also involved massive projects in education at all levels, willingness to embrace In particular, print has driven the process forward. So, too, has the willingness of millions of individual Muslims who invest their resources of time and money. There have been many acts of courage as individual Muslims have faced imprisonment, torture, or death at the hands of secular, unusually dictatorial regimes. The fashion in Islamic societies from below would be profound achievement of piety, of humility, and Thank you. MICHAEL SELLS: FRANCIS ROBINSON: MICHAEL SELLS: would suggest if people address their questions directly to Professor Robinson. And we have about good 15, 20 minutes, if you stay that long for this. suggestion. So I'm going to ask the first question. Yes. SPEAKER 1: I'm happy to ask the first question. Professor, this Muslims intensely you know, engaged with the best and the most So picture of how happened at the organizers in political Islam and But I'm also wondering how does content So if you take the example of the which, of course, lived in society-- so even as community, how much content was there representatives of the state. And how did the interactions with representatives of the state at this very Could you tell us little bit more about this. FRANCIS ROBINSON: Well, that's an interesting question. First of all, don't think we should restrict things to the state. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. FRANCIS ROBINSON: We need to remember that there are missionaries. SPEAKER 1: Missionaries, scholars. Yeah. FRANCIS ROBINSON: But missionaries are pretty presence in you had missionaries actually speaking to you on the street rather the Salvation Army So certainly any one who at least state the fact that there was substantial foreign presence, whether it was presence of missionaries, whether it was the fact that you knew there was and important things in your life took place there. Of course, you've also been reprimanded in the middle And the way in which the mutiny uprising enormous power, which the British could wield if they chose to. So really regard the suppression of the mutiny uprising as major But just remember what happens in some of the big cities. Huge areas The whole of the area in which the old model nobody seems to live in outside and that was completely too. So you had some very graphic examples of power. Certainly, if you look at the they're very aware of the presence. And many of them are from That is sayings doings and saying actually involved how they felt, wisely or unwisely, with the British presence. So offer you three examples. Another example would be the court system. developed the massive market in land, trying to get land in the hands of people who actually produce. That means there's constant process So you're very aware that through the court procedures, who lands So don't think the British or state was and sometimes you can be SPEAKER 2: Question. Is some of the -- FRANCIS ROBINSON: Sorry, I'm little deaf. Can you speak up little? SPEAKER 2: Excuse me. Some of the messianic movements, like the in the Sudan, would that fit in with this development you were talking about with these FRANCIS ROBINSON: Well, not really. The movement in the Sudan does belong to the direct connections between Sufi leadership in in the You could see this as way of here is the movement is actually directed against Egyptian rule, but not necessarily against British rule. Although, British rule is there in the background. What could happen to movement in That as you see from what I've said, don't tie it in class. But you could certainly tie it in. Yeah. SPEAKER 3: Thank you very much. It actually gave me big picture of these various Islamic societies and below. And really appreciated how you tied it all together with this sense of lost power. And then when you ended, you said that one thing that was common to this rise of below was the focus of an individual notions of piety community. Now, want to hear little bit more first about the period between 1970 to now. FRANCIS ROBINSON: 19-- SPEAKER 3: 1970 to now. So not so much the caliphate, but just ask you little bit about the difference between these different societies. Because couldn't tell from the analysis that you presented aside from the fact that the Turkish one was and the salvation one was more couldn't grasp what the major differences might be in these different Islamic societies. And what's ramifications of these differences are particularly for Because you talked about the past statistics But I'm trying to grapple not so much with what is the same, but what is different. FRANCIS ROBINSON: Of course, they're numerous And so they were not different Nevertheless, if you like, the attitudes which were developed in with the British presence, that is compilation of the that you're going to make an Islamist society has to be to kind of contemplating the inner cell. You can't create it outside. They do have some That trajectory turns out to be extremely useful in for independence But nevertheless, they can through self continue to create society. What find fascinating is that you lose power, where do you get the resources in order to replace power. And found no basis of self which takes place over in Turkey and in South Asia, perhaps Now, you're also tempted to say, well, what's the difference between India and Pakistan SPEAKER 3: All of these. mean, there's so many different Turkey, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh. And see the similarities, but-- FRANCIS ROBINSON: OK. Well, can only speculate. can't tell you I'm going to speculate that But nevertheless, particular ways of being oughtn't change in the would suggest there could be more about what in Pakistan today we might find much less approach to how we operate. Because in sense, they're ready to power in Pakistan They don't have to operate in same way. But I'm afraid can't tell you that. think is very good encouraging you to think about these changes. And as you probably know, many people when considering the traditions of their are deeply shocked by what has happened in madrasas based in North where some very different ways of thinking So the context is SPEAKER 4: whether this opposition between state and society. You discussed with Asia, Egypt, but especially in And you, yourself, FRANCIS ROBINSON: I'm just not hearing you. I'll have to SPEAKER 4: Am not speaking loud enough? Or am speaking too fast? FRANCIS ROBINSON: don't know. SPEAKER 4: No, matters of state and Muslim state problems within political states, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey. And wonder especially in last few decades whether this problem in state and society is, in fact, more complicated. For example, you gave the example of how Pakistan madrasas were against the Soviets. Afghanistan. And you also mentioned how the West was for example, the US. For example, in the case of and Erdogan, the only cause you gave was question of corruption. FRANCIS ROBINSON: What's the question? SPEAKER 4: Well, the question is this. So right now, especially with Saudi Arabia Islamic state you have external states between deeply implicated in what seems to be the bottom So it's not just within the state, but FRANCIS ROBINSON: did actually mention that. SPEAKER 4: Did you? FRANCIS ROBINSON: you might have missed it. But did mention the in Bangladesh, and also the entrance of the Saudis madrasas SPEAKER 4: Yes. apart from individual examples, are more or less becoming the norm, where rulers from foreign states, not just Islam FRANCIS ROBINSON: Well, think one has to be careful about operating in sweeping For intsance, Are you going to suggest any are SPEAKER 4: Well, Erdogan says that do anything, mean, FRANCIS ROBINSON: Well, let's be careful Sorry, go ahead. SPEAKER 5: Yeah, my question is about your characterization of this as FRANCIS ROBINSON: Sorry, SPEAKER 5: My question is about your characterization of this as Because could tell similar story notice professor, which would be much more akin to all the instrumentalist elitist reading of this, which is the Muslim politics, like ethno-nationalism, resources which can whether they're in the state or not. So I'll give you couple of examples. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, of course, you have these viziers, who are the state, using Islam as resource to bolster its own kind of Elsewhere, I'm sure you could make good case. For example, this is what competing political parties do when they're out of power. Or, legitimacy, nobody notices any majority identity to mobilize. So Bangladesh is nice example where nationalism is framed around identity is much more about the Islamic side of this. So mean, could we not tell the same story running around middle class elites. mean, these are all very well-educated. lot of international figures were acting as the ideological mouthpieces of these movements. So is this not that much of competing for the same resources and other resources, and managing to bring them mobilizations towards FRANCIS ROBINSON: would say no. There's difference. But equally in That said, there was time when power appreciate your approach. But think one mustn't be extraordinary of institutions which society at large is But if you want to ignore that, think you're missing something very SPEAKER 5: FRANCIS ROBINSON: No. think-- think the point SPEAKER 6: I'd like to follow up on some of these conversations. In regard to firstly, the widespread allegations at least in that the madrasas with and other the militant political parties, we see vast Saudi Arabia. And that has been going on pretty much, since 1979, mobilization of that community. And the second point about Pakistan that seems to challenge little bit the notion of the humility and responsibility part is what is Again, don't know how this is mentioned. But what is widely reported as widespread support for the that target anyone who can be viewed as insinuating anything to do against the thought and which leads to power differential where local actors who, for whatever reason, with the backing of larger networks, can silence people even if they're not actually executed and pretty much end there. They're So the few questions funding of education and, of course, and the alleged widespread population of that lead to extraordinary exercise of power where individuals can basically and and so just thought on those two. FRANCIS ROBINSON: OK. and in addressing the other question, should have differentiated. Of course, the Saudis have taken the extent to which that money was also leaked elsewhere, don't know. Perhaps you do. SPEAKER 6: know. I'm FRANCIS ROBINSON: SPEAKER 6: Yeah. FRANCIS ROBINSON: But you're quite right about the amount of money Russian areas as part pf the process of resisting the Russian invasion. That said, But wouldn't want my in tends to be too thrown off course by-- we have to remember that I'm dealing with process that's taking place. And certainly And obviously, we had some interesting developments which might suggest that things are moving new which things are moving in different direction. But I'd still insist on the extraordinary achievement of think it would be pity. because we are aware of money that's supporting over particular to not acknowledge the achievement of 150 years in Your second point, it was about the apparently, particular, think usually accusations of blasphemy often about people trying to assert authority or about someone trying to grab someone's property. And then all sorts of venal processes underpinning accusations of blasphemy. But you were hoping, sir to make larger point? SPEAKER 6: The point would be that despite what seems-- from what get, at least in specific human rights reports by groups and international groups has brought up teacher wants the job of another teacher, the former teacher gets the job. That was the famous case of man called who And nobody's shocke that would have been relevant to the process. But my point is there seems to be-- why would the majority of Pakistanis-- again, reported-- be in favor of blasphemy code and be against given the fact that it seems to be used in the most irresponsible ways, even if one thought that-- FRANCIS ROBINSON: OK. Well, this is not what I'm talking about today. But would say lot of people are very private. as indeed some of us here And this is society in which no one has any patience for this. You really are And if you're wise person, you keep quiet. SPEAKER 6: guess-- I'll try to clarify my point one more time. If there was movement from below that that insists upon careful scholarship and careful study, personal responsibility, conscience, and humility, why isn't that movement making its presence known to defend on those who FRANCIS ROBINSON: It's would suggest that perhaps this movement which has humility, isn't perhaps -- hasn't infused as deeply as one might think. So you don't have all those qualities as widespread suspect that's where the concept MICHAEL SELLS: Yes. Before we take perhaps would like to remind everyone that there is reception. and that we can continue our discussion informally. And the reception would be downstairs in the room. So please, go meet us there. And if you want-- MICHAEL SELLS: So it's pleasure to thank you for really, really riveting talk. And as you can see, one that generated very engaged Thank you very much.